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ABSTRACT 
 
TAE HEE LEE: Revisiting Internet Service Providers’ Immunity  
From Defamation Liability  
A Decade after Enactment of the Communications Decency Act 
(Under the direction of Dr. Ruth Walden) 
 
 
 This thesis explores the Internet Service Providers’ immunity from cyber-torts by 
third parties since the enactment of the Communications Decency Act of 1996. It examines 
two court groups’ rationales concerning Section 230’s immunity provision: rationales split 
between those courts following the Fourth Circuit decision in Zeran v. AOL – which granted 
ISPs absolute immunity from torts liability – and other courts disagreeing with Zeran. The 
legislative history analyzed in this thesis strongly supports the premise that Section 230 did 
not grant perfect immunity, but instead limited immunity to ISPs that engaged in Good 
Samaritan blocking. Interest groups have strongly influenced the ISP immunity issue from 
the legislation to recent court cases. The case analysis demonstrates that broad immunity did 
not encourage ISPs to self-police the Internet. The news portal analysis demonstrates that 
anti-Zeran courts’ reasoning concerning the meaning of the “development” of content is 
appropriate for applying to the current Internet environment.  
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CHAPTER Ι 
INTRODUCTION 
 If an anonymous person falsely described somebody as a murderer on the Internet, 
what kind of relief can the defamed person expect from the courts?  
 In September 2005, John Seigenthaler Sr., a former USA Today editor and the founder 
of the First Amendment Center, was astonished when he found his fake biography, which 
directly linked him to the assassinations of both John F. Kennedy and his brother Robert 
Kennedy in Wikipedia, the anyone-can-contribute online encyclopedia.1 This entry also 
included false claims that Seigenthaler had lived in the Soviet Union from 1971 to 1984. 2 
According to Seigenthaler, the only correct fact in the biography was that he was “the 
administrative assistant” to Robert Kennedy. 3 
 This defamatory entry was made by an anonymous user on May 26, 2005. The only 
action of Wikipedia was to correct the misspelling of a word, just three days after the entry 
was originally posted. This entry was taken down only after Seigenthaler complained to 
Jimmy Wales, the founder of Wikipedia, on October 7, 2005.4 However, the defamatory 
entry had remained uncorrected for almost four months, and what was more, numerous minor 
                                                
1 John Seigenthaler, Truth can be at risk in the world of the web, The Tennessean, Dec. 4, 2005, available at 
http://www.tennessean.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20051204/NEWS01/512040352/1006/NEWS. 
2 Id.  
3 Id. 
4 Journalism.org, Seigenthaler and Wikipedia – Lessons and Questions, 
http://www.journalism.org/resources/research/reports/Wikipedia/timeline.asp (last visited Jan. 24, 2006). 
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websites hyperlinked and displayed the hoaxed biography for several months after Wikipedia 
removed it. Seigenthaler wanted to investigate who posted the malicious entry. However, this 
defamatory entry was traceable only to the Bellsouth Internet account of an anonymous user, 
and the giant Internet service provider refused to identify its user, because ISPs won’t reveal 
users’ information without a court subpoena.5 However, before long, the identity of the 
poster was revealed by an anti-Wikipedia activist. The poster of the libelous biography was 
the employee of a small delivery company in Nashville, Tennessee.6 The reason he gave for 
posting the false biography was that he thought Wikipedia was a joke site and made the fake 
biography to try to shock his colleagues.7  The affair started as a joke, but it ended up as an 
“Internet character assassination,” said Seigenthaler in the Op-Ed section of USA Today.8  
 The Seigenthaler case raises important issues: Is there complete legal immunity from 
defamation suits for ISPs such as Wikipedia regardless of how long an inaccurate article 
stays on the sites?  What if Wikipedia had refused Seignthaler’s request to take down the 
entry?  Should ISPs retain their immunity when they knowingly distribute defamatory 
postings?  
                                                
5 Seigenthaler, supra note 1. According to Seigenthaler, when he asked Jimmy Wales for the identity of the 
author of the fake biography, Wales’s reply was that Wikipedia did not know and could not find out the author. 
In order to identify the poster’s identity he should file a “John or Jane Doe” lawsuit because of federal privacy 
law, which doesn’t allow a communication company to reveal the private information of its customer. If the 
court accepted plaintiff’s claim, then the company would respond to subpoena to disclose the identity of user. 
At least one anonymous poster filed a lawsuit against Yahoo! for disclosing his identity to the employer that he 
criticized on a Yahoo! message board. See John Doe v. Yahoo!, No.CV00-4993-NM(C. D. Cal. filed May 
11,2000). However, the plaintiff later withdrew his complaint.  
6 Brandt, Daniel, Reports of the incident and discovery of Brain Chase, Wikipedia Watch.org (Dec. 5, 2005), 
http://www.wikipedia-watch.org/usatoday.html.  
7 Katherine Seelye, A Little Sleuthing Unmasks Writer of Wikipedia Prank, N.Y.TIMES,  Dec.11, 2005, at 51.  
8 John Seigenthaler, A false Wikipedia ‘biography,’ USA TODAY, Nov. 29, 2005, available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2005-11-29-wikipedia-edit_x.htm. 
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 Seigenthaler did not file a libel suit against Wikipedia because he discovered that 
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) provides legal immunity to ISPs for 
defamation posted by third parties. As Seigenthaler pointed out in his USA Today article, the 
Act means, unlike traditional media such as print and broadcast companies, online service 
companies can rarely be sued for “disseminat[ing] defamatory attacks on citizens posted by 
others.” 9 He scathingly wrote that a string of court decisions demonstrated that “Congress 
has creatively barred defamation lawsuits against all Internet service providers.”10 Attorney 
Anita Ramasastry agreed with if he had filed a lawsuit, “The court very likely would have 
dismissed his case.” 11  
In 1996, Congress passed the CDA to regulate the circulation of objectionable 
material, especially pornography, over the Internet in order to protect children by making it 
illegal to send indecent material to children or to display it on the website.12 The CDA was 
designed to encourage self-regulation by allowing Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to 
exercise editorial control in filtering offensive material.13 To achieve this goal, Congress 
created a specific provision, Section 230 of the CDA, which granted broad immunity from 
liability to ISPs for any defamation on their web pages supplied by a third party. In Zeran v. 
America Online, a seminal case interpreting section 230, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit found that an ISP was not liable even though it ignored notices of the 
                                                
9 Id. 
10 Seigenthaler, supra note 1. 
11 Anita Ramasastry, Is an Online Encyclopedia, Such as Wikipedia, Immune From Libel Suits?, 
http://writ.findlaw.com/ramasastry/20051212.html. 
12 See 141 CONG. REC. S8088 (daily ed. June 9,1995).  
13 Jae Hong Lee, Batzel v. Smith & Barrett v. Rosenthal: Defamation Liability for Third-party Content on the 
Internet. 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 469, 470 (2004). 
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defamatory posting from the offended person and neglected to remove it.14  In Blumenthal v. 
Drudge, AOL was judged to be free of liability even though the company had promoted news 
items including a defamatory story about a false rumor.15 Since Zeran, blanket immunity for 
ISPs has firmly taken root as the predominant case law.  
Introducing the CDA, the late Senator Jim Exon of Nebraska emphasized the 
paramount purpose of the statute: “The information superhighway should not become a red 
light district.”16 The Zeran court also interpreted that the ultimate goal of Section 230 was “to 
cultivate the robust nature of Internet communication” and “to keep government interference 
in the medium to a minimum.”17 To accomplish this goal, Congress decided to eliminate the 
“threat that tort-based lawsuits pose to freedom of speech in the new and burgeoning Internet 
medium,” the Zeran court declared.18  
However, a decade after its enactment Section 230 of the CDA has continuously 
come under fire. The Seigenthaler-Wikipedia controversy was just one of the recent cases.  
 Seigenthaler said that, even though he was a staunch advocate of First Amendment 
freedom, we live in a universe of new media “populated by volunteer vandals with poison-
pen intellects. Congress has enabled them and protects them.” 19 Furthermore, Judge Ronald 
                                                
14 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). 
15 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998). 
16 141 Cong. Rec. S1953 (daily ed. Feb.1,1995). 
17 Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997). 
18 Id. 
19 Seigenthaler, supra note 8. 
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M. Gould, apparently criticizing the Zeran decision, argued that some courts’ opinions made 
the Internet like the “Old West: a lawless zone.”20  
 It seems that courts that have considered cyber-libel cases have recently faced the 
criticism from both inside and outside the judiciary that Section 230 has allowed libel to go 
unpunished and the Internet to be an unregulated zone that does not contribute to the robust 
nature of the Internet, on the contrary, and that the statute detracts from the potential of the 
Internet as effective mass communication media. However, in spite of the criticism of Zeran, 
many of courts have confirmed the Zeran court’s interpretation of the original intention of 
Congress.21 Some scholarships also strongly support Zeran on First Amendment grounds.22 
A decade has passed since the enactment of Section 230. It is time to revisit Section 230, to 
rethink the appropriate standard of ISP liability. 
 The purposes of this thesis are (1) to examine the legislative history of the CDA, 
especially Section 230, to determine how and why Congress decided to grant ISPs immunity, 
(2) to trace the evolution of court opinions concerning ISP immunity and to analyze how the 
courts justified their different conclusions, (3) to explore relevant legislation passed in other 
countries as well as how courts of these countries have approached ISP liability immunity. 
                                                
20 Batzel v. Smith, 333 F. 3d 1018, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003). Furthermore, since 2003, a few courts have challenged 
Zeran by refusing to grant absolute immunity. See Barrett v. Rosenthal, 114 Cal. App. 4th 1379, (2004); MCW 
Inc. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, 2004 WL 833595 (N.D.Tex. 2004).  
 
21 See Carafano v. Matchmaker.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir, 2003); Schneider v. Amazon.com., 31 P. 
3d 37 (Wash. App. 2001); Patentwizard, Inc. v. Kinkos, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 1069 (D.S.D. 2001); Ben Ezra v. 
AOL, 206 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 2000); Optinrealbic.com, LLC v. Ironport Systems, Inc., 323 F.Supp. 2d 1037, 
1045 (N.D. Cal. 2004); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 52  (D.D.C.1998); Dove v. AOL, 783 So.2d 
1010 (Fla.2001); Gentry v. eBay, 99 Cal. App. 4th 816 (App. Div. 2002).  
22 See Jonathan A. Friedman & Francis M. Buono, Limiting Tort Liability for Online Third-Party Content under 
the Section 230 of the Communications Act, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 647 (2000). See also Paul Ehrlich, Cyberlaw: 
B. Regulating Conduct on the Internet: Communications Decency Act § 230,  17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 401 
(2002). 
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 While this thesis will also generally review the common law of libel, the 
philosophical and historical background of Internet regulation, and compare other relevant 
laws, such as copyright law concerning ISP liability, the focus of the study will be on 
determining how to strike a sound balance between the protection of freedom of expression 
and individual reputations on the Internet. This thesis will clarify the current issues 
concerning ISP liability and will try to find and suggest possible solutions to build a more 
robust cyberspace. Ultimately, the thesis will try to find answers to the question of whether 
Section 230 is effective in satisfying its statutory purpose in an ever-changing Internet 
environment. 
1.1. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
1.1.1. THE COMMON LAW OF DEFAMATION  
 Before examining ISP immunity from liability for third-party postings, it is necessary 
to understand the framework of the common law of defamation.  The Restatement (Second) 
of Torts defines a defamatory communication as one that “tends so as to harm the reputation 
of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from 
associating or dealing with him.”23 Why do courts impose liability for defamatory 
statements? The late Justice Potter Stewart pointed out that “society has a pervasive and 
strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation.”24 Protecting reputation 
reflects the value that society places on “the essential dignity and worth of every human 
being.”25  
                                                
23 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §558 (1977). 
24 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (concurring opinion). 
25 Id.  
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 Mike Godwin also mentioned that the goal of libel law is to compensate for the 
damage from defamation as a remedy and a deterrent against future defamation.26  
In Gertz v. Welch (1974), Justice Lewis Franklin Powell wrote, “[A]bsolute protection for the 
communications media requires a total sacrifice of the competing value served by the law of 
defamation.”27 Justice Powell declared that the Court would not require states to abandon 
“the legitimate state interest underlying” the libel law: “the individual’s right to the 
protection of his own good name.”28 Powell’s opinion acknowledges that freedom of speech 
is not absolute and “must be balanced against other competing social interests.” 29 
Consequently, the Court has made efforts to appropriately accommodate the need for 
freedom of expression and the legitimate interest in redressing wrongful injury.30 In other 
words, the Court puts weight on not only creating “breathing space”31 for freedom of speech 
and press, but also the social need to protect other individual rights. 32    
 Under common law principles, if a defamatory statement was communicated to a 
third party, the content was “published” and the publisher could be held liable.33 In particular, 
Section 577 of the Restatement indicates that one who intentionally and unreasonably fails to 
                                                
26 MIKE GODWIN, CYBER RIGHTS: DEFENDING FREE SPEECH IN THE DIGITAL AGE 82-84 (2003). 
27 418 U.S. 323, 341(1974). 
28 Id. 
29 Kyu Ho Youm, Libel Law and the Press: U.S. and South Korea Compared, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 231, 
231 (1995). 
30 418 U.S. at 342.  
31 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
32 In New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713,761-62 (1971), Justice Blackmun argued in his dissenting 
opinion that the First Amendment is “only one part of an entire Constitution,” and “each provision of the 
Constitution is important.” According to his argument, “First Amendment absolutism” has never commanded a 
majority of the Court.    
33 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 23, at 577. 
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remove defamatory statements under his control should also be subject to liability for 
“continued publication.”34 This principle is extremely important because the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Zeran v. AOL, interpreted the CDA to mean that ISPs can 
enjoy freedom from liability even though they ignore notifications of defamatory postings. 35 
 Under the “republication rule,” someone who repeats or republishes a defamatory 
statement made by a third party bears a liability equal to that of the original publisher.36  The 
Texas Court of Appeals in Dement v. Houston Printing Co. stated that by republishing a 
defamatory statement, a person “becomes responsible for his own act in doing so, and, if he 
seeks to justify, he must prove the truth of the charge published.”37 In other words, the law 
regards a republisher of a defamatory statement as having “adopted” the statements as his/her 
own,38 based on an old rationale that “talebearers are as bad as talemakers.”39 
1.1.2. THREE LIABILITY CATEGORIES 
 For the purpose of deciding liability for defamation, courts have traditionally divided 
the various entities that publish, republish, or disseminate a defamatory statement into three 
categories: publisher, distributor, and common carrier.40 
                                                
34 Id.  
35 Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). 
36 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 23, at 577-78. See also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER 
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORT §113, at 799 (5th ed. 1984). 
37 Dement v. Houston Printing Co., 14 Tex. Civ. App. 391, 393 (Tex. Civ. App 1896). 
38 MADELEINE SCHACHTER, LAW OF INTERNET SPEECH 275 (2nd ed. 2002). See also Barry v. Time, Inc., 584 F. 
Supp. 1110, 1122 (N.D.Cal.1984).  
39 Mcdonald v. Glitsch, Inc., 589 S.W. 2d 554, 556 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) quoting Houston Chronicle 
Publishing Co. v. Wegner, 182 S.W. 45, 48 (1915). 
40 Douglas B. Luftman, Defamation Liability for On-Line Services: The Sky Is Not Falling, 65 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1071, 1084 (1997). 
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PUBLISHER LIABILITY  
 A publisher exerts comprehensive editorial control over the distribution of 
information.41 Newspapers, magazines, and broadcasters are classic examples of publishers.42 
Publishing companies are held liable for libel because their employees select, write, edit, 
and/or distribute false and defamatory statement to the public.43 In other words, publishers 
have a responsibility to monitor the content of their publications.44  Their editorial control is 
stronger than that of common carriers and distributors. A publisher of content supplied by 
third parties over which he/she has editorial control can be held liable for libel when the 
following four conditions are met:45 (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning another 
person, (2) an unprivileged publication by a third party, (3) fault amounting to at least 
negligence on the part of the publisher, and (4) the existence of harm caused by the 
publication.46  
  New York Times v. Sullivan47 established the modern standard for publisher liability 
by refusing to hold a publisher strictly liable for disseminating defamatory material.48  
                                                
41 Id. 
42 SCHACHTER, supra note 38, at 275. 
43 KENT R. MIDDLETON, WILLIAM E. LEE, BILL F. CHAMBERLIN, THE LAW OF PUBLIC COMMUNICATION 117 (6th ed., 2003). 
44 Sewali Patel, Immunizing Internet Service Providers from Third-Party Internet Defamation Claims: How Far 
Should Cours Go?, 55 VAND.L.REV. 647, 654-59 (2002). 
45 Bryan J. Davis, Frontier of Law: The Internet Ad Cyberspace: Comment: Untangling the “Publisher” versus 
“Information Content Provider” Paradox of 47 U.S.C. § 230; Toward a Rational Application of the 
Communication Decency Act in Defamation Suits Against Internet Service Provider, 32 N.M.L. REV. 75, 81 
(2002). 
46 Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 558 (1977). 
47 376 U.S. 254 (1964).  Before New York Times v. Sullivan, defamation was considered a strict liability tort. 
According to Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999), a strict liability tort can be defined as one in which liability 
“does not depend on actual negligence or an intent to harm” but is based on the breach of a duty that is imposed 
by the law.  
  10
Instead of adopting strict liability, the Court ruled that the First Amendment demands a 
minimum constitutional fault standard of “actual malice” when public officials file 
defamation suits.49 Later, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Court ruled that private libel 
plaintiffs are not required to prove New York Times v. Sullivan actual malice but the 
minimum fault standard of negligence.50 
Distributor Liability 
 Those who deliver or transmit defamatory material can be defined as “distributors.”51 
Bookstores, libraries, and news vendors are categorized as distributors, which exert less 
editorial control than publishers but more than common carriers.52 More specifically, a 
distributor “only delivers or transmits defamatory matter published by a third person” and is 
subject to liability only if the distributor “knows or has reason to know of the material’s 
defamatory character.”53 Generally, distributors have no legal duty to examine publications 
for defamatory content prior to offering them for sale.54 
                                                                                                                                                  
48 Patel, supra note 44, at 655-59. 
49 Luftman, supra note 39. In this case, Sullivan, the police commissioner of Montgomery, Alabama,  argued a 
false advertisement printed in The New York Times damaged his personal reputation and that the newspaper 
should be held liable for defamation. However, the Court held that while the Times’s failure to check the 
defamatory advertisement might be evidence of negligence, it was not sufficient to prove “actual malice,” or 
publishing while “knowing it was false or exercising reckless disregard for the truth.”  
50 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974). See also, MIDDLETON et all, supra note 43 at 123-131 (6th 
ed., 2003).   
51 SCHACHTER, supra note 38, at 275. 
52 Luftman, supra note 39, at 1084-88. 
53 Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 581(2).  
54 Schachter, supra note 38, at 275.  
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 Smith v. California55 is said to be first case in which the Supreme Court addressed a 
distributor’s liability.56 Smith, the proprietor of a bookstore in Los Angeles, was convicted 
under a city ordinance that made it unlawful for any person to have any obscene or indecent 
books in any place for sale.57 The Supreme Court ruled that “by dispensing with any 
requirement of knowledge of the content of the book on the part of the bookseller, the 
ordinance tends to impose a severe limitation on the public’s access to constitutionally 
protected matter.”58 Moreover, the Court addressed the fact that if booksellers wanted to be 
absolved of liability for disseminating obscene materials, they had to thoroughly inspect the 
contents of every book in the store.59 As a result, the ordinance restricted the sale of both 
obscene and constitutionally protected books.60 The Court reasoned that bookstore owners 
are not publishers who control the content of their offerings and that asking owners to review 
each book for obscenity would unconstitutionally hamper the free flow of information.61  
 In Auvil v. CBS “60 Minutes,”62 a federal district court used a similar rationale to 
reject an argument that CBS affiliates had a duty to exercise editorial control over a “60 
                                                
55 361 U.S. 147 (1959). 
56 Luftman, supra note 39, at 1086. 
57 361 U.S. 147. 
58 Id. at 153. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Luftman, supra note 39, at 1086. 
62 800 F.Supp. 928 (E.D.Wa. 1992). Some 4700 Washington apple growers filed a defamation suit against CBS 
and its affiliates for airing an episode of “60 minutes” criticizing the pesticide Alar, which was commonly used 
in the apple industry as a growth regulator. The Natural Resources Defense Council expressed concern over 
research which indicated that Alar cannot be washed off the fruit, nor will peeling remove it. Based on these 
findings, “60 minutes” investigated a report published by NRDC and centered a broadcast on those concerns. 
After the program aired, apple prices and sales declined, costing apple growers sustained losses amounting to as 
  12
Minutes” broadcast.63 In this case, the network’s affiliates republished the program by 
relaying an unedited feed without exercising any editorial control. The court held that the 
plaintiffs’ argument would force “the creation of full time editorial boards at local stations 
throughout the country which possess sufficient knowledge, legal acumen and access to 
experts to continually monitor incoming transmissions and exercise on-the-spot discretionary 
calls,” The court added, “[T]hat is unrealistic.”64 The court reaffirmed the classic rationale 
that distributors would be liable only they knew or had reason to know of the defamatory 
character of the publication and said there is no “conduit liability.”65 
 In Misut v. Mooney,66 a New York state court dealt with the liability of a distributor 
defendant who exercised basic editorial control before distribution.67 In this case, a contract 
printer had scrutinized fifteen articles prior to publication and had no other input into the 
material, which he printed. The court ruled that the defendant was not liable for defamation 
on the basis that he had not exercised sufficient editorial control over the material.68 The 
court also held that examining the material is no indication that the printer had any 
                                                                                                                                                  
much as $75 million.  The credibility of the report was overestimated by the activist’s interview. Apple growers 
argued that because the CBS affiliates had a three-hour delay between receiving the broadcast and its local 
airing, they had a duty to censor the show. 
63 800 F. Supp. 928 (E.D. Wash. 1992). 
64 Id. at 932. 
65 Id. 
66 475 N.Y.S. 2d 233 (Sup. Ct. 1984). 
67 Luftman, supra note 39, at 1086 
68 475 N.Y.S. 2d 233, 236. 
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knowledge or reason to know of its libelous nature because it was not “in a position to test 
the truth of statements submitted by an independent author.” 69 
 COMMON CARRIER LIABILITY 
 Common carrier liability can apply to any entity that acts as a passive conduit to 
provide facilities that enable the exchange of communications.70 Telephone companies, 
telegraph and microwave communications companies would be typical examples. 71 They 
simply carry the messages of others without editorial control72 and basically have an 
obligation to serve the public by transmitting communication efficiently and on a non-
discriminatory basis.73 Thus, to impose a responsibility for common carriers to monitor the 
massive volume of communications transmitted across their lines is too heavy a burden and 
also has the potential to invade privacy.74 Therefore, should they be held liable for 
defamation by a third party, “their social function could not be satisfied.”75  Based on this 
reasoning, courts have ruled that common carriers may avoid liability for defamation 
regardless of whether they know or had reason to know of the defamation because they have 
no editorial control.76 Therefore, Luftman concluded that a common carrier “is not subject to 
                                                
69 Id. 
70 SCHACHTER, supra note 38, at 275. 
71 Steven M. Cordero, Damnum Absque Injuria: Zeran v. America Online and Cyberspace Defamation Law, 9 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 775, 780 (1999). 
72 MIDDLETON et al, supra note 43, at 117.  
73 Davis, supra note 45, at 79. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 581(1) (1977). 
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defamation.”77 For example, in Anderson v. New York Tel. Co., the New York Court of 
Appeals held that a telephone company was not a publisher and not subject to liability, even 
though the plaintiff had notified the company about allegedly defamatory recorded messages 
and the telephone company had refused to stop the recordings.78   
 Common carriers are clearly distinguished from publishers and distributors due to 
their lack of editorial control. However, the conceptual borderline between publishers and 
distributors is unclear. David Sheridan referred to a publisher as a “primary publisher” who 
has control over the content79 and a distributor as a “secondary publisher” or “republisher” 
because he “does not create content but makes it available to others.”80 In many cases 
publishers are also considered distributors and would be liable for defamation as either a 
primary publisher or a republisher.81 For example, a television network not only creates 
programs but also distributes them. This vague distinction between publishers and 
republishers also leads to confusion and controversy over ISP liability in Internet libel.82   
 It is important to note that distributors have always been held liable when they had 
knowledge of or had reason to know of defamatory content; this principle has not been 
challenged under the common law. However, this principle has been disregarded in Internet 
libel by the blanket protection granted to ISPs under Section 230 of the CDA and the current 
                                                
77Luftman, supra note 39, at 1084. 
78 345 N.Y. 2d 740 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973). A minister in a religious sect sued a telephone company for failing 
to stop an individual from using leased telephone equipment to carry recorded messages allegedly defaming the 
minister.  
79 David Sheridan, Zeran v. AOL and the Effect of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act upon 
Liability for Defamation on the Internet, 61 ALB. L. REV. 147,154 (1997).  
80 Id. 
81 Patel, supra note 44, at 658. 
82 Id. 
  15
interpretation of Section 230 in Zeran v. AOL, and has become one of the major points in the 
ensuing discussion surrounding the issue. 
1.1.3. INTERNET LIBEL CASES BEFORE THE ADOPTION OF THE CDA 
 With the advent of the Internet, courts faced the dilemma of applying to ISPs the 
traditional three categories of liability for defamation. Before the passage of the CDA in 
1996, courts used a case-by-case approach in applying the common law’s standards to 
cyberspace.83 The three categories are appropriate for addressing the traditional media but 
did not always work with the “technological and communication structure” of the Internet.84  
In attempting to apply traditional libel law to the Internet, courts reached conflicting 
conclusions in similar cases.85 Two cases well represent this situation: Cubby v. 
CompuServe86 and Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Service. 87 
 In Cubby, a federal district court determined that CompuServe, an ISP that offered its 
subscribers access to an electronic library of news publications, was not a publisher but a 
distributor because it did not take steps to monitor the content of its discussion forum.88  
                                                
83 Id. 
84 Paul D. Driscoll, Legal Issues in Online Journalism, in ON LINE NEWS AND THE PUBLIC 81-117(Michael B. 
Salwen, Bruce Garrison, and Paul D. Driscoll ed., 2005). 
85 Friedman & Buono, supra note 22, at 52. 
86 776 F.Supp.135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
87 1995 WL 343710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995). 
88 776 F.Supp.135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). The plaintiff, Cubby, charged CompuServe and Don Fitzpatrick with libel 
claiming that CompuServe was liable for allegedly defamatory statements relating to his publication  Skuttlebut. 
The allegedly defamatory story was made by Rumorville USA, an electronic daily newsletter published by Don 
Fitzpatrick Associates. CompuServe offered CompuServe Information Services (“CIS”) to subscribers for 
membership and online time usage fees. In return for these fees, the user was given access to an electronic 
library including thousands of information sources and interest forums. When Rumorville was ready to publish 
a newsletter, it uploaded it directly onto the CompuServe network. Therefore, the publication received no prior 
review by CompuServe before being posted. Cubby claimed that court should conclude that CompuServe was a 
publisher and hold it to a higher standard of liability. On the other hand, CompuServe argued that it was a 
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Citing Smith,89 the court held that CompuServe should not be held liable for a defamatory 
posting because it had no more editorial control over an electronic daily newsletter’s online 
forum than did other distributors, such as public libraries.90 Furthermore, the court held that it 
was unfeasible for CompuServe to screen every publication it carried for potentially 
defamatory statements.91  In conclusion, the court said that “given the relevant First 
Amendment considerations, the appropriate standard of liability to be applied to CompuServe 
is whether it knew or had reason to know” of the allegedly defamatory statements. However, 
Cubby failed to establish that.92 
 Four years after Cubby, in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Service Co.,93 a New 
York state trial court took a different direction in applying defamation liability to ISPs.  An 
unidentified bulletin board user posted accusations of crime and fraud against Stratton 
Oakmont, Inc., a securities investment firm, and its president, Dainel Porush, on Prodigy’s 
“Money Talk” bulletin board.  Unlike Cubby, the court ruled that Prodigy was a “publisher”94 
since “an on-line service that sufficiently exercised editorial control over the content of 
                                                                                                                                                  
distributor of Rumorville. Furthermore, it could not be liable because it neither knew nor had reason to know of 
the allegedly defamatory statements. The district court rejected the plaintiff’s claim.  
89 Id. The court cited the Simth case holding: “Every bookseller would be placed under an obligation to make 
himself aware of the contents of every book in his shop. It would be altogether unreasonable to demand so near 
approach to omniscience. And the bookseller’s burden would become the public’s burden, for by restricting him 
the public’s access to reading matter would be restricted. If the contents of books and periodical stands were 
restricted to material of which their proprietors had made an inspection, they might be depleted indeed.” Smith 
v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152-53 (1959). 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 140,41. 
93 1995 WL 343710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).   
94 Id. 
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messages posted on its computer bulletin boards” was a “publisher.”95 Prodigy had 
advertised itself as a family-oriented service, monitoring its boards and screening for 
offensive messages for a safe Internet.96 In order to satisfy this purpose, Prodigy actually 
“created an editorial staff” who had the ability to continually monitor the bulletin board, and 
the court regarded these activities as a “censorship.”97  In rejecting Prodigy’s claim that it 
should be treated as a distributor, the court focused on editorial activities such as actively 
screening and editing messages before posting them, running software screening programs, 
and publishing content guidelines.98 The court ruled that “Prodigy’s conscious choice, to gain 
the benefits of editorial control, has opened it up to a greater liability than CompuServe and 
other computer networks that make no such choice.” 99 These activities rendered Prodigy a 
publisher instead of a distributor, the court reasoned.100 Consequently, Prodigy was the 
publisher of all statements made on the bulletin board because of its frequent editing control 
regardless of actual editing or removal of the particular material.101Against the claim that 
publisher liability would exert a chilling effect on ISPs’ efforts to self-police their services, 
                                                
95 Id. 
96 Id.  
97 Id. at 13  
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 13.  
100 Id. at 10. Prodigy attempted to rely on the Cubby case. However, the court distinguished this case from it for 
two reasons. “First, Prodigy held itself out to the public and its members as controlling the content of its 
computer bulletin boards. Second, Prodigy implemented this control through its automatic software screening 
program and the Guidelines which Board Leaders are required to enforce. By actively utilizing technology and 
the manpower to delete notes from its computer bulletin boards on the basis of offensiveness and bad taste, for 
example, Prodigy is clearly making decisions as to content, and such decisions constitutes editorial control.”  
101 Ryan W. King, Online Defamation: Bringing the Communications Decency Act of 1996 in Line with Sound 
Public Policy, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 24. 
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the court replied that such claims “incorrectly presumed that the market will refuse to 
compensate a network for its increased control and the resulting increased exposure.”102  
 However, the two courts’ decisions created “troubling problems” of ISP liability.103  
While some ISPs that screened online content bore the potential danger of liability in libel 
suits despite their good faith efforts to prevent defamatory or illegal postings, those ISPs that 
did not take any action to block offensive material were free from such threats.104 This 
conflicting result appeared to encourage ISPs to ignore the content on their websites or 
bulletin boards in order to attain the much safer distributor status. 
1.1.4. SECTION 230 AND ZERAN V. AOL 
 The decision in Stratton Oakmont that more efforts by ISPs to try to provide family-
oriented content by self-policing would make them more vulnerable to defamation suits 
created a sensation in Congress, which was designing legislation to regulate pornography on 
the Internet. 105  Before long, Congress reacted to this situation with legislation, i.e., Section 
230 of the Communications Decency Act. The House Conference Report clearly stated that 
“one of the specific purposes of [Section] 230 is to overrule Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy and 
any other similar decisions.”106 
 The most salient characteristic of Section 230 is a deviation from the common law of 
defamation. First of all, Section 230 (c) (1) states that “no provider or user of an Interactive 
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by 
                                                
102 Id. at 13. 
103 Davis, supra note 45, at 85. 
104 Id. 
105 Sheridan, supra note 79, at 159. 
106 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996). 
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another information content provider.”107  As mentioned above, common law divided 
potential defamation defendants into three categories; however, Section 230 eliminates the 
liability of publishers who distribute third-party content. Second, Section 230 contains a so-
called the “Good Samaritan” provision,108 which grants “protection for private blocking and 
screening of offensive material.” 109 This provision was a clear reaction to Stratton Oakmont, 
Inc. v. Prodigy Service Co., since Congress feared that the decision would deters ISPs from 
policing offensive material such as Internet pornography.110 The Good Samaritan provision 
allows ISPs to enjoy even broader immunity from publisher liability. In other words, even 
though ISPs exert editorial control over third-party contents just like newspapers’ 
gatekeepers (publishers), they would be protected under the umbrella of Section 230.   
 Another crucial point of Section 230 is the Information Content Provider (ICP) 
provision. Section 230 distinguishes an ISP from ICP. The traditional role of ISPs is to 
provide access to the Internet.111 However, Section 230 defines an ISP more broadly as “an 
information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer 
access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that 
provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or 
                                                
107 47 U.C.A. § 230 (c) (1). 
108 47 U.S.C. § 230 (c) (2) “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be liable on account of 
(a) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or 
user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, 
whether or not such material is constitutionally protected; or (b) any action taken to enable or make available to 
information content providers or others the technical means to restrict access.” 
109 See Zeran v. AOL., 958 F. Supp. 1124, 1129 (1997). 
110 Stephanie Blumstein, The New Immunity In Cyberspace: the Expanded Reach of the Communications 
Decency Act to the Libelous “Re-poster,” 9 B.U.J. SCI. & TECH. L. 407, 412 (2003). 
111 LILIAN EDWARD & CHARLOTTE WAELDE, LAW & THE INTERNET, §10 Defamation and the Internet 191 
(1997). 
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educational institutions.”112  ISP immunity is granted when defamatory content is created by 
“another information content provider.”113 However, an ISP might be subject to joint liability 
with an ICP when it contributes to develop the material originally made by third party.114  In 
this statute an ICP is defined as “any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, 
for the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any other 
interactive computer service.”115  Section 230 does not grant the same immunity to ICPs. 
However, in many of the cases, the borderline between an ISP and an ICP is somewhat 
unclear. According to the Good Samaritan provision, an ISP’s editorial control is shielded. 
However, editing control is, to a degree, related to the notion of development of content. This 
leads to these questions: What extent of development of content might cause an ISP to 
become an ICP? What is the meaning of “development”?  The ambiguous conceptual 
demarcation between ISPs and ICPs is the most controversial part of the problem. This 
distinction rests on how the courts interpret the phrase “the development or creation of 
information.”   
 Lastly, Section 230 (c)(1) does not specifically mention protection for distributors, 
only for “publishers or speakers.” Therefore, soon after the enactment of the CDA, in Zeran v. 
America Online, Inc.,116 the courts had to address for the first time whether Section 230 
intended publisher liability to include distributor liability. In particular, notification-based 
liability arose as an immediate issue.  
                                                
112 47 U.S.C. 230 (f) (2). 
113 47 U.S.C. 230 (c) (1). 
114 47 U.C.A. § 230 (f) (3). 
115 47 U.S.C. 230 (f) (3). 
116 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). 
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 In Zeran v. AOL, the court interpreted Section 230 broadly and granted immunity to 
ISPs for acting not only as publishers but also as distributors. Kenneth Zeran sued AOL, 
arguing that the ISP, as a distributor, had a responsibility to immediately remove defamatory 
postings by a third party once notified but had unreasonably delayed removing them, had 
neglected to screen other similar defamatory entries, and had refused to post retractions.117 
 Zeran argued that “Section 230 immunity eliminates only publisher liability, leaving 
distributor liability intact.”118 He stressed that he provided AOL with sufficient notification 
of the defamatory posting, making the company liable as a distributor because it “acquired 
knowledge of the defamatory statement’s existence.” 119 
 One issue that emerged was the language of Section 230. Zeran contended that 
Congress used only the term “publisher.” Accordingly, the law was applicable only to 
publisher liability, while “distributors are left unprotected by Section 230.”120  
 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected Zeran’s claim, declaring 
that Section 230 granted ISPs blanket immunity. The court held that Section 230 created “a 
federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers liable for 
                                                
117 Id. Just six days after the Oklahoma City bombing of April 19, 1995, an anonymous individual posted a 
message advertising the sale of tee-shirts and other items with slogans glorifying the bombing on an American 
Online (AOL) bulletin board. The messages stated that the merchandise could be purchased by calling the 
plaintiff at the listed telephone number. As a result of this spiteful message, Zeran received a large number of 
hostile calls including death threats. In fact, Zeran was a commercial publisher with no connection to the 
Oklahoma City bombing. Zeran informed AOL that he was not involved in these unauthorized messages and 
asked that AOL both remove them and take steps to prevent reposting. AOL deleted the message at first but 
refused to post a retraction. Despite removal, the same messages were reposted on numerous occasions in an 
approximately three week period. Meanwhile, Oklahoma City Radio received a copy of the first AOL posting 
and urged audiences to call Zeran. The numerous calls subsided only after a local newspaper exposed the 
defamatory advertisement and after the local radio station made an on-air apology. Zeran filed a libel suit 
against AOL.  
118 Id. at 331. 
119 Id. at 332. 
120 Id. 
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information originating with a third-party user of the service.”121 Thus, any claims based on 
“the publisher’s traditional editorial functions such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, 
postpone or alter content” are not allowed.122  
 Zeran’s proposed distinction between publisher and distributor was also rejected. 
According to the Zeran court, distributors are traditionally considered publishers under libel 
law.123 The Zeran court did not deny that Stratton Oakmont and Cubby recognized a legal 
distinction between publishers and distributors. However, “this distinction signifies only that 
different standards of liability may be applied within the larger publisher category, depending 
on the specific type of publisher concerned,” the Zeran court explained.124 Furthermore, the 
                                                
121 Id. at 330. 
122 Id.  
123 Id. at 332. The Zeran court held that it would be very difficult to distinguish the terms “publisher” from 
“distributor” in the “garden variety defamation” because the publication of the statement was a “necessary 
element” of defamation action, in that, only those who published could “be subject to this form of tort liability.” 
Furthermore, the court added the rationale why distributors are considered to be publishers for the purpose of 
defamation law: “Those who are in the business of making their facilities available to disseminate the writings 
composed, the speeches made, and the information gathered by others may also be regarded as participating to 
such an extent in making the books, newspapers, magazines, and information available to others as to be 
regarded as publishers.”  
 More theoretically, the Fourth Circuit court found the authority of their logic from the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts. Section 577 definition of “publication” of defamatory material, which states,  
(1) Publication of defamatory matter is its communication intentionally or by a negligent act to 
one other than the person defamed.  
(2) One who intentionally and unreasonably fails to remove defamatory matter that he knows to 
be exhibited on land or chattels in his possession or under his control is subject to liability for its 
continued publication.   
Thus, “publisher is not merely one who intentionally communicates defamatory information. Instead, the law 
also treats as a publisher or speaker one who fails to take responsible steps to remove defamatory statement 
from property under her control.”  In other words, if the one who had responsibility to remove a defamatory 
story did not do his duty, he could be liable as a publisher. See id. at 332 and also Jane Doe v. AOL, 783 So.2d 
1010, 1015 (Fla. 2001).  
124 Id. at 332. 
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Zeran court justified its decision by stating it could not find any mention in the two decisions 
that “distributors are not a type of publisher for the purpose of defamation law.” 125   
 The court concluded that distributor liability was “merely a subset, or a species, of 
publisher liability and is therefore also foreclosed by Section 230.” 126  Therefore, AOL fit 
within the term “publisher” as used in Section 230.  
 Citing the First Amendment, the court rejected the claim of notification-based 
liability for ISPs, saying that such an obligation “could produce an impossible burden for 
service providers, who would be faced with ceaseless choices of suppressing controversial 
speech or sustaining prohibitive liability.”127 According to the court, “It would be impossible 
for service providers to screen each of their millions of postings for possible problems.” 128  
In sum, any attempt to distinguish between publisher liability and notice-based distributor 
liability can not be allowed. Therefore, according to the Zeran rationale, the Section 230(c) 
as a whole granted absolute immunity to ISPs for third-party posting because whether they 
do (subsection (c)(2)) or do not (subsection (c)(1)) make good faith efforts such as editorial 
control, there is no liability under either state or federal law.129  
 Since Zeran, the rationale of this case has become “the standard for judging Internet-
based defamation claims under the Section 230” and has offered the basis for the other 
                                                
125 Id.  
126 Id. In a related context, the court said that if ISPs were subject to distributor liability, they would face 
potential liability each time they received notice of a potentially defamatory statement. Therefore, the court 
worried that notice-based liability would prevent service providers from self-regulating activity.  
127 Id. at 333. The court cited the reasoning of Auvil v. CBS 60 Minutes, 800 F. Supp. 928 (E.D. Wash. 1992). 
128 Id. at 331.  
129 See John Doe v. GTE Corporation and Genuity Inc., 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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defendants to expand the reach of Section 230 immunity. 130 However, this case has 
generated endless controversy over ISP liability.  
To date, the Supreme Court has not addressed the question of whether ISPs should be 
held liable for third-party defamation. While the Supreme Court struck down the provisions 
of the CDA that prohibited the Internet transmission of indecent communications to persons 
under the age of eighteen, the constitutionality of the immunity granted to ISPs under Section 
230 was not questioned. 131 
    1.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 The scholarly literature that provides the foundation for this study can be categorized 
into three sections: 1) studies by scholars with different perspectives on the Internet, 
especially those of cyber-libertarianism, the clear-rules approach, and the moderate view;132 
2) controversy regarding Section 230 and the Zeran decision; 3) comparisons to other laws 
concerning ISP liability.  
1.2.1.DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO THE INTERNET: IS THE INTERNET A FREE SPEECH ZONE?  
  The policy underlying Section 230 of the CDA reflects a certain philosophical 
attitude toward the Internet:  in “cyberspace,”133 the less government intervention and the 
broader the self-regulation the better.134    
                                                
130 Friedman & Buono, supra note 22, at 659. 
131 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). In this case, the Court ruled unconstitutional Section 223(a) and 
Section 223(d) of the CDA, which prohibited knowing transmission of “indecent” or certain “patently 
offensive” communications to minors. 
132 Aaron Burstein, Thomas Devries, and Peter S. Menell, The Rise of Internet Interest Group Politics, 19 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 5 (2004). This article categorized attitudes toward the Internet as “cyber-
libertarianism” and “clear rules” approach. The moderate view is added by the author.  
133 The term “cyberspace” was developed by novelist William Gibson in his popular science-fiction novel 
Neuromancer. He defined cyberspace as a “consensual hallucination that felt and looked like a physical space 
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  Section 230 clearly shows this intention by declaring that it is national policy “to 
preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and 
other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation,”135 and further, 
“to encourage the development of technologies which maximize user control” over 
information.136  
 There are various theories and approaches on how to deal with government regulation 
of the Internet, but it is helpful to classify three perspectives for this study: cyber-
libertarianism, the clear rules approach, and the moderate view.  
Cyber-libertarianism  
  Advocates of cyber-libertarianism137 emphasize that the value of the Internet is 
maximized when no regulation controls the flow of communication. In this view, the Internet 
is the ultimate free speech medium. Cyberspace is such a totally different place from the 
traditional communication realm that it should remain a free zone, governed by self-
regulation and protected by the First Amendment, a zone free from government control.138  
Consequently, some commentators assert that the government should have the wisdom to 
permit cyberspace to make its own rules, just as “churches are allowed to make religious 
                                                                                                                                                  
but actually was a computer-generated construct representing abstract data.” See EDWARD A. CAVAZOS & 
GAVINO MORIN, CYBERSPACE AND THE LAW: YOUR RIGHTS AND DUTIES IN THE ON-LINE WORLD 1 (1994). 
134 SCHACHTER, supra note 38, at 282.   
135 47 U.S.C. §230 (b) (2). 
136 47 U.S.C. § 230 (b) (3). 
137 See Margaret Chon, Internet Law Symposium:Introduction, 20 SEATTLE UNIV. L.R. 613 (1997). The term 
“cyber-libertarian” was used by Chon for the first time. He defined cyberlibertarians as those who believe the 
private ordering through the contract is the most natural form of legal regulation on the Internet.   
138 David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders- The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 
(1996). 
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law” and “securities exchanges can establish commercial rules so long as they protect the 
vital interest of the surrounding community.”139  
 Schachter pointed out that this logic and the theory that speech is a vehicle for attaining 
individual self-determination was embedded in Section 230.140 The Section states that it was 
designed “to encourage the development of technologies which maximize user control.” 141 
 According to Bruce Sanford and Michael Lorenger, the Internet is fundamentally 
different from traditional mass communication media in at least three respects.142 First, the 
Internet can offer an “unlimited number of information sources”143 without concerns about 
the scarcity that limits the electromagnetic spectrum of the broadcast media. 144 Second, users 
and producers on the Internet overlap. 145 In other words, “every person who taps into the 
Internet is his own journalist.” 146 Last but most importantly, “the Internet has no 
gatekeepers,” such as publishers or editors, who can control the distribution of information, a 
                                                
139 Id. at 1392.  
140 SCHACHTER, supra note 38, at 283. 
141 47 U.S.C. § 230 (b) (3). 
142 Bruce W. Sanford & Michael J. Lorenger, Teaching An Old Dog New Trick: The First Amendment In an 
Online World. 28 CONN.L.REV.1137, 1142 (1996). 
143 Id. at 1141. 
144 See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court said that 
the physical limitations of the electromagnetic spectrum justify government licensing of broadcasters. Justice 
White pointed out that as long as demand for spectrum space exceeds the frequencies available, no one can 
claim a First Amendment right to broadcast.  
145 Sanford & Lorenger, supra note 142.  
146 Id. at 1142. According to the authors, before the advent of Internet, anyone could argue his opinion in the 
town square. However, the distribution of one’s message was limited “by the power of the lungs.” Only few 
selected people such as journalists or politicians could transmit their ideas to the public. Now “Internet 
speakers” can convey their ideas to millions of people at their homes without any restriction.   
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characteristic that facilitates the decentralization of the supply of information.147 According 
to Schachter, one of the underlying rationales of Section 230 reflects the concept that “the 
Internet has no gatekeeper.”148  
 Furthermore, anonymity, one of the characteristics of the Internet, enables John Doe to 
communicate with numerous people without any fear of retaliation or punishment.149  
Jonathan D. Wallace emphasized that anonymous and pseudonymous speech on the Internet 
is “entitled to the same First Amendment protections” as in traditional media.150 Sanford and 
Lorenger concluded that “the lack of gatekeepers, wide-open networks, and anonymity make 
the Internet invaluable as a tool of free speech.” 151 And “[t]he Internet’s value is maximized” 
when the rules and regulations controlling the flow of communication are minimum, Sanford 
and Lorenger added. 152   
 Some commentators found the justification for self-rule in the global nature of 
computer networks. According to David R. Johnson and David Post, cyberspace has no 
territorially based boundary, and, furthermore, computer networking destroys “the link 
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148 SCHACHTER, supra note 38, at 282. 
149 In general, the advocates of the First Amendment have argued that the Framers of the Constitution 
recognized clearly the value of anonymous speech and that anonymous speech is essential to the democratic 
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should be protected in order for Internet users to express alternative views without fear of reprisal. See generally, 
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between geographical location and the power of local government to assert control over 
online behavior.”153 They argued that cyberspace can develop its own self-governance 
system and that a community of online users and service providers should be up to this 
task.154 
 “A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace” by John Perry Barlow essentially 
condensed the idea of cyber-libertarianism.155 Barlow stressed that even though Internet users 
may be distributed across the many jurisdictions of the real world, the only law in cyberspace 
would be the “Golden Rule.”156 Therefore, users would “be able to build our particular 
solutions on that basis,” so the Internet culture did not invite government to regulate and 
could “not accept the solutions you [i.e., the government] are attempting to impose.”157   
  Mike Godwin supported the same idea. Godwin’s extreme position was that “[l]ibel is 
dead” in cyberspace.158 In other words, the “net has the potential to render libel law 
altogether obsolete.”159 His argument started with the question, “Why hasn’t the net seen 
more libel lawsuits?”160 To answer this question, Godwin pointed out two differences 
between cyberspace and real space. At first, he argued, in terms of First Amendment law, the 
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Internet has changed the nature of the “limited public figure,”161 those who thrust themselves 
into the vortex of public debate, as defined by the Supreme Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch 
Inc.162 He argued that since anyone with Internet access is able to thrust himself into public 
debate, it was “almost trivially easy to become a public figure” in cyberspace.163 In order for 
public figures to win libel suits, they must prove “actual malice” on the part of the 
publishers.164 However, Godwin asserted that in practical terms, it is very difficult to do 
so.165  
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163 GODWIN, supra note 26, at 89. 
164 See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In this case, the Court defined actual malice as proof 
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 Another reason for the scarcity of libel suits is the ease with which one can respond to a 
libelous posting – Godwin called it “self-help”166 – reducing or eliminating any actual need 
for libel suits.167 In the real world, where “public officials and public figures usually enjoy 
significantly greater access to the channels” of communication to counteract false statements 
than private individuals,168 private persons are more vulnerable to harm from defamation. But 
those individuals now have the same broad, unlimited access to the Internet to correct 
libelous statements.169 
 Most importantly, Godwin argued that Internet service providers are more like 
bookstores than traditional publishers because of the low expectation that they will review 
the materials and that Congress seemed to accept this argument in the Communications 
Decency Act.170 Jeremy Stone Weber, applying Godwin’s rationale to Internet bulletin 
boards, also argued that everyone should be treated as a public figure.171 Furthermore, he 
pointed out that the Internet is a “textbook marketplace for the trade of ideas.”172 Therefore, 
“if ever a true marketplace of ideas existed, it exists where the cyber-libel plaintiff can make 
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a nearly instantaneous and universal response on the bulletin board.”173 This argument 
reflects Justice Stevens’ opinion in Reno v. ACLU174 that “any person or organization with a 
computer connected to the Internet can publish information.”175 
“CLEAR RULES” APPROACH 
   The opposite of cyber-libertarianism is the “clear rules” approach. In contrast to 
cyberlibertarian’s free-Internet approach, this approach is based on the strong normative view 
that Internet should be regulated.176  The basic premise of this view is that the Internet’s legal 
issues should be handled not by new rules such as Internet libel law but by existing legal 
rules because “the Internet presents few, if any, new legal questions.”177 This is the approach 
U.S. courts have always taken to new technology, applying existing rules of law unless 
Congress enacted specific legislation. This approach was supported by U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit Judge Frank Easterbrook in his article about copyright law and the 
Internet.178  Judge Easterbrook asserted that the optimal way of managing disputes in 
cyberspace is to “keep doing what you have been doing” because currently existing 
principles can be applied to most behavior in cyberspace and then to “make rules clearer” 
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when necessary.179 He argued that there is no separate law of cyberspace since “the best way 
to learn the law applicable to specialized endeavors is to study general rules.”180 
 Joseph Sommer’s argument is more extreme. He asserted that “cyber law” or “law of 
the Internet” does not exist.181 His basic logic is simple: Technology is socially significant 
but cannot create legal categories to govern most fields of law. For example, “tort law is not 
the law of the automobile, even though auto accident is the paradigmatic tort case.”182 In the 
same way, “cyber law” that is associated with the Internet or other information technologies 
is not a useful concept, according to Sommer.183 
 Ronald Mann and Seth Belzley argued that government regulation of the Internet is 
inevitable.184 According to them, it should come as no surprise that harm perpetrated on the 
Internet, such as piracy, “continues to grow each year”; moreover, the lack of regulation 
makes illegal behavior too easy.185 They argued that advocacy of self-regulation or no 
regulation of the Internet is based on the “unexamined view” that the Internet is 
fundamentally different from the real world.186 In contrast to cyber-libertarians, Mann and 
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Belzley regard the relative anonymity of Internet users not as a safeguard of free speech but 
an obstacle that makes redress for damages generally less effective.187  
 Godwin’s “public figure” rationale has generated severe criticism from the “clear 
rule” advocates. Stephanie Blumstein argued that although defamed individuals can access 
the Internet, Godwin’s model, which is based on a self-regulating system, provides “no 
deterrent effect” for malicious posting because “no one is potentially accountable under the 
law” for his/her actions188  According to her argument, self-help also seems ineffective 
because it is extremely questionable whether “those who read the first defamatory statement 
may necessarily revisit the same web site to read the response.”189 Blumstein asserted that the 
“Internet is not self regulating.” Therefore, solutions are immediately needed for malicious 
postings and ISPs’ disregard of the notice of the defamatory messages.190 
  Robert O’Neil also criticized the “responsive capacity” rationale, saying that it 
overemphasizes the importance of the “call a press conference and they will come” factor.191 
According to O’Neil, even though the defamatory message was retracted in response to a 
complaint from the defamed people, “the damage had already been done in ways the subjects 
could not easily refute or redress” because of the republication of defamatory statement by 
other media including newspapers and magazines.192  O’Neil also argues that even if the 
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defamed persons create their own web pages, their readership and that of the web sites that  
originally posted the defamatory message would likely have minimum overlap. 193 
THE MODERATE VIEW  
 Those who hold the moderate view can be characterized as the people who attempt a 
compromise between a free Internet and strong regulation of cyberspace. Typically, 
Lawrence Lessig suggested a “some-regulation-better-than-none” approach, noting the 
interaction between legal policy and technology.194 He focused on the paradoxical situation 
that “an ideology against regulation” restricts the government’s motivation to regulate, but 
this ideology invites “the defeat of the very values that are being defended.”195 He used spam 
regulation as an example. The regulation of increasing unsolicited commercial e-mail faced 
harsh resistance from those who considered it a kind of censorship.196 However, he pointed 
out that lack of such regulation led many to choose a white-list approach, which allows the 
reception of e-mail only from the people one knows. He stated that, in a sense, this situation 
means “a general and valuable feature of the original design of the Internet is inverted.”197   
 Concerning the CDA, Lessig pointed out that many people resist legislative efforts to 
facilitate the blocking of pornography based on First Amendment grounds.198 Accordingly, 
the absence of legal regulations increases demand for technical regulation, which is designed 
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to prevent circulation of pornography on the Internet. However, these technologies of 
filtering software are over-inclusive. He said that the software “enables a wild range of 
filtering, from pornography, to violence, to sites that criticize filtering.” 199  
 Lessig did not mention Section 230 and blanket immunity for ISPs. However, 
Lessig’s premise raises the significant question: What are the “some-regulation-better-than-
none” solutions concerning ISPs immunity?  
1.2.2.CONTROVERSY OVER SECTION 230 & THE ZERAN DECISION 
 The enactment of Section 230 and the Zeran decision generated considerable 
controversy among scholars. Two main issues have emerged in the literature. The first is the 
propriety of the blanket immunity from tort liability for ISPs, and second is the vagueness of 
the distinction between an ISP and an ICP.   
 Michael Rustad and Thomas Koenig asserted that cyberspace provides an ideal legal 
environment for torts and online criminals because ISPs have no duty to mitigate harm 
caused by illegal or irresponsible behavior by third parties.200 The negative side effects of 
blanket immunity for ISPs, he argued, manifest themselves not only in defamation but also 
fraud, sexual harassment, invasion of privacy, and financial injury.201 They diagnosed the 
“Good Samaritan” clause of Section 230 as a failed attempt because “ISPs currently have no 
duty to police the Internet or develop technologies to track down off-shore posters of 
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objectionable material.”202 To make matters worse, Section 230 made online consumers 
defenseless because “immunized ISPs are the only identifiable deep pocket.” 203 
  Christopher Butler also observed that the broad ISP immunity of Section 230 has 
“transformed the Internet into an almost liability-free zone for libelous content.”204 Butler 
urged courts to revive traditional defamation law. He pointed out that “common law 
distributor liability already provides strong protection to ISPs.” He argued that it was 
inefficient and unjust to grant ISPs a lower standard of liability even though they have 
already become “one of the greatest distributors.” Similary, Walter Pincus, drawing on his 
journalistic experience, criticized the unfairness of the law.205 Pincus, a reporter for The 
Washington Post, noted that the traditional printed version of the newspaper would be liable 
if it published a defamatory story written by him, but if the same story were posted on 
washingtonpost.com, the web site would not be liable due to Section 230 protection.206    
 Attorney Miree Kim pointed out that Section 230 immunity is so “overly broad that 
any person or entity that serves multiple users on the Internet qualifies as an ISP.”207 
According to Kim, several courts have regarded non-traditional service providers such as 
individuals, website hosts, and e-commerce sites as ISPs under Section 230 if “they serve 
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multiple users over the Internet.”208 She also noted that the courts have conferred ISP status 
on several kinds of entities: a chat room,209 an e-commerce site,210 a wire service web site,211 
an Internet bookseller,212 and a spam-mail forwarding-service company.213  
 Commentators also criticized the Zeran ruling. According to Stephanie Blumstein, the 
significant impact of Zeran is that even if an ISP knowingly carried defamatory material or 
ignored a complaint, it is protected by Section 230 as long as the content was posted by a 
third party.214  
 Lee also argued that the court’s broad interpretation had established a troubling 
precedent by allowing AOL to refuse to remove the defamatory message promptly, thus 
exceeding the scope set by the CDA.215 Furthermore, he argued that “the Internet has matured 
into a strong and vigorous adolescent,” that no more special protection is needed, and that it 
is time to return to the traditional standards of defamation liability including distributor 
liability.216   
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 Ian Ballon noted that Congress enacted Section 230 to overrule the Stratton Oakmont 
decision that held Prodigy was liable as a publisher.217 However, he pointed out that there 
was no reference in the legislative history to Cubby, in which the court apparently held that 
“an online provider that does not monitor content is subject to liability as a distributor.”218  
Accordingly, if Congress had intended to afford ISP immunity from distributor liability as 
well, it “arguably would not have limited its discussion to Stratton Oakmont.” 219    
 David Sheridan pointed out that the plain language of Section 230, which does not 
specify that ISPs cannot be held liable as distributors, supports the view that Congress 
enacted Section 230 to immunize only the publisher, not the distributor.220 He also argued the 
Zeran court overstated the danger of claims based on distributor liability.221 He maintained:   
 It is not at all clear that being exposed to distributor liability 
would be a disaster for online services. An interactive computer 
service does not commit the tort of distribution of defamatory material 
until it knows of the content and, with the requisite degree of fault, 
fails to take steps to remove the offending posting. It is likely that in 
most cases a service’s liability would not arise until well after the 
message at issue was posted. Since the service would be liable only for 
damages caused by its tortious conduct, and since most of the damages 
would occur before the service committed a tort, even a service that 
was found liable would not face a large damage award.222  
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 As a reaction to severe criticisms of blanket ISP immunity, some scholars defended 
the holding in Zeran. Fredman and Buono argued that “Section 230 has been properly 
interpreted by the courts.”223 They pointed out that both state and federal courts have 
welcomed not only the basic holding of Zeran that ISPs are immune from defamation 
liability but also have positively extended “the reach of Section 230 immunity.” 224 In other 
words, the courts concluded that Section 230 immunity generally covers all torts claims, not 
merely defamation, originating from third party postings.225 Furthermore, the courts have 
also enlarged the ruling in Zeran by recognizing even ISP’s business partner who have 
license contract his works with the ISPs as a third party. 226  Friedman and Buono said, 
aiming at Ballon’s argument that Congress only intended to overrule the Stratton Oakmont 
decision not Cubby through Section 230, that Congress did “not intend to split the difference 
between Cubby and Stratton Oakmont but rather sought to replace” the traditional defamation 
law with a clear policy of ISP immunity regardless of the distinction between publisher and 
                                                
223 Friedman and Buono, supra note 22, at 650. For example, in Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 
1996), the court granted AOL for the defamatory article written by Durdge. Even tough Druge made license 
contract with AOL, the court held that he was a third party without any distinction from other common users of 
AOL.  
224 Id. at 657-58. 
225 Id. Section 230 did not clearly define the reach of immunity. This clause only mentioned that an ISP should 
not “be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information” provided by third party. However, courts 
enlarged the reach of immunity. Friedman and Buono mentioned the Blumenthal courts holding as an example: 
“[i]n some sort of tacit quid pro quo arrangement with the service provider community, Congress has conferred 
immunity from tort liability as an incentive to Internet service providers to self-police the Internet for obscenity 
and other offensive material, even where the self-policing is unsuccessful or not even attempt.” 992 F. Supp. 44, 
52 (D. D. C. 1998). They said, for instance, that in Acquino v. Electriciti, Inc., a state court in California held 
that the Section 230 barred the state law claims against the ISPs including claims of negligence, breach of 
contract, and intentional infliction of emotional distress caused by other people.  
226 Id. For example, in Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1996), the court granted AOL immunity 
for the defamatory article written by Durdge. Even though Druge had a contract with AOL, the court held that 
he was a third party without any distinction from other common users of AOL.  
  40
distributor. 227 Friedman and Buono also rebutted the criticism based on the fact that 
CompuServe was not mentioned in legislative history. They argued that Congressmen Cox, 
the co-author of Section 230, mentioned his displeasure with both Cubby and Stratton 
Oakmont during floor debate concluding that the “existing legal system provide[d] a massive 
disincentive for the people who might best help us control the Internet to do so.”228 In their 
view, the Zeran court’s reasoning that distributor liability is merely a subset of publisher 
liability could be justified by common law principle. Supporting that argument, they cited 
one of the definitions of a publisher in the Restatement (Second) of Torts as an example, 
namely that “[o]ne who intentionally and unreasonably fails to remove defamatory matter 
that he knows to be exhibited on land or chattels in his possession or under his control.”229  
Therefore, they concluded that the Zeran court’s “broad reading of Section 230,” that is 
“immunizing all [I]sps from any species of publisher liability including distributor liability,” 
might apparently accord with intention of the Congress.230  
 Regarding the intention of the ISP immunity provision, Paul Ehrlich suggested an 
alternative approach. Ehrlich argued that legislative history demonstrates that Congress did 
not contemplate allowing full immunity to ISPs.231  However, regardless of Congress’s 
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reluctance to choose “zero liability,” the courts may have stepped toward “the correct 
solution,”232  furthermore, “blanket immunity created by Zeran seems a good fit for 
obscenity.”233  One reason was that the elimination of distributor liability could remove 
uncertainty for ISPs in their attempt to self-police and motivate innovation. 234  Ehrlich put 
more weight on the invisible hand of the market than the power of regulation. In other words, 
regardless of immunity, the market would “encourage internet service providers to filter 
where appropriate.” 235 Unless the uncertainty was removed, huge costs, which should be 
borne by the ISPs, might be incurred to screen the contents in order to prevent libel suits. 
Furthermore, “leaving liability to turn on a reasonableness test in the courts” might increase 
uncertainty because of the long period of litigation, confusion from the different courts’ 
holdings in similar cases of several jurisdictions.236   
However, in Ehrlich’s view, obscenity is best regulated by the market because “the unique 
characteristics of Internet speech and mobility [of users] will quickly guide the market 
toward equilibrium.”237 
                                                                                                                                                  
legislative history concerning the reaction against Stratton Oakmont suggested that “Congress intended ISPs to 
bear some liability for the acts of their users.” He asserted that “distributor liability was not even at issue in 
Stratton.” 
232 Id.  
233 Id. at 411. 
234 Id. at 412.  
235 Id. 
236 Id.  
237 Id. at 412-13. Ehrlich explained the process of equilibrium. Section 230 encourages the development of 
filtering technologies. If an ISP chooses a new filtering policy that angers its users, users can easily switch 
services to other ISPs with filtering policies to suit their taste. Therefore, no ISPs will remove too much speech 
because it will never face liability for leaving such speech alone, and ISPs wants to avoid a reputation for 
censorship. Accordingly, “at equilibrium there will be a very low amount of top-level filtering by large services, 
with local filters allowing for personalized access.” He argued that this was exactly Congress’ intension.  
  42
 To date, few scholars have paid attention to the notion of ICP in spite of the courts’ 
recent concerns about it.  Under the CDA, an ISP is immune from liability for third party 
posting if it is not a co-developer of the statement. However, Ryan W. King pointed out that 
the CDA does not clearly define “what actions constitute development.” 238 Furthermore, 
Fridman and Buono said that the courts have yet to identify clearly “the point at which an 
[I]SP crosses the line” from merely providing third-party content to “creating” or 
“developing” the content, which leads directly to publisher liability.239  
 King proposed that definition of development would subject an ISP to publisher 
liability if an ISP actively selected the information posted on website, and the CDA should be 
amended to include this broad definition of “development.” 240  According to King’s 
explanation, ISPs should be subject to publisher liability if they post information that they  
specifically selected for publication, but  not be subject to liability if they post all the non- 
objectionable material they receive.241 For example, if ISPs review all emails and post non-
objectionable message, ISP will be immune. However, an ISP is under publisher liability if it 
posts the particular messages. 242 
 Bryan Davis maintained that the hazy distinction between an ISP and an ICP has been 
a source of confusion.243 Under Section 230, an ISP has no defamation liability as a publisher 
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while an ICP is “where liability would attach.” 244 Davis addressed a few court cases that 
argued that a certain degree of editorial control over third-party content “could shift an ISP 
from a publisher role to an ICP role.” But this situation results in a “paradox” of logic, Davis 
said.245 An ICP can be understood as a kind of publisher because it creates or develops the 
content; therefore, “once a court determines that an ISP is an information content provider, 
the ISP would necessarily also be a publisher, and thus immune under Section 230.” 
However, ICPs are not covered by Section 230.246 Therefore, the current editorial control 
approach is not a useful standard for determining what actions would characterize an ISP as 
either an ICP or a publisher under Section 230, Davis said. As an alternative he suggested the 
adoption of the concepts of “joint work”247 and “work made for hire.”248 
 Unfortunately, it is difficult to find more scholarly literature regarding the ICP, in 
particular literature focusing on the criteria of the courts for defining the “creation or 
development” of content.   
1.2.3. COMPARISON OF THE CDA AND THE DMCA 
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 Concerning the distributor liability issue, some scholars have suggested adopting the 
approach taken in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.249 Congress has enacted two 
provisions limiting the liability of ISPs for third-party activity: Section 230 and Section 512 
of the DMCA. 250 While the CDA provides ISPs the umbrella of blanket immunity, the 
DMCA creates several complex “safe harbors,” codified in Section 512, which limit ISPs’ 
copyright liability for regularly conducted Internet activity under certain conditions: (1) 
“transitory digital network communications,” (2) “system caching,” (3) “information residing 
on systems or networks at direction of users,” and (4) “information location tools.” 251 
 Unlike the CDA, the DMCA introduced a “take-down” provision, which subjects an 
ISP to distributor liability for failing to remove copyright infringement materials by a third 
party if the ISP knew of or was sufficiently notified of the infringement. 252  
 Some scholars suggested the take-down provision of the DMCA, the so-called notice-
based system, as a solution to the controversy over distributor liability under the CDA. 253 
Rustad and Koenig proposed a new cybertort law into which they incorporated the DMCA 
                                                
249 Congress enacted the DMCA in October 1998, two years after the enactment of CDA, in an attempt to 
address some of the copyright issues presented by the advent of the Internet and digital media. See PUB. L.NO. 
105-190, at 2 (1998).  
250 Like the CDA, the safe harbor provisions of the DMCA were established as a reaction to a court decision. 
See Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-line Communication Service, Inc., 907 F.Supp. 1361 (1965). 
Unlike overruling Stratton Oakmont in the CDA, Congress largely adopted many of the principles of that 
decision in the case of the DMCA.  
251 17 U.S.C.§512.(a)-(d) (2000).  
252 17 U.S.C.§512(c)(1)(c).  Section 512 (c) of the DMCA immunizes service providers from copyright 
infringement claims only if they don’t have actual knowledge of the infringing activity and promptly block 
allegedly infringing sales once notified. To qualify for such protection, an ISP must (1) lack actual knowledge 
or awareness of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; (2) not receive a financial 
benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, if the provider has the right and ability to control such 
activity; (3) respond expeditiously to remove or disable allegedly infringing material from its service on receipt 
of an appropriate written notice.   
253 See Blumstein, supra note 110; Rustad & Koenig, supra note 200; Marc S. Reisler, Content Immunity for 
ISPs Is Jeopardized by Competing Law, NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL, Mar. 9, 2004. 
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take-down provision, 254 saying that “the DMCA provides an excellent blueprint.” In their 
proposal for “legal reform” of cybertorts, “ISPs would be liable only for failing to act swiftly 
in blocking or removing content known to be a venue for an ongoing tort.”255 According to 
Rustad and Koenig, takedown is not an unfamiliar tool used by ISPs to police the Internet. 
For example, some corporations, such as Microsoft, already remove objectionable content as 
a means of self-help, they argued. 256 In support of their argument, Rustad and Koenig cited 
the European Union Community’s E-Commerce Directive, which also introduced a similar 
procedure that imposes an affirmative duty on ISPs to take down offensive material.257 
However, warning of potential for the abuse of takedown power and the frequent and 
irresponsible subpoenas that have been seen under the DMCA, they said counter measures 
such as federal court oversight are necessary to put a stop to unwarranted takedown demands 
based on general, vague, or inaccurate allegations.258  
 Reisler also argued that Congress should reevaluate the CDA in light of its experience 
with the DMCA.259 In particular, Reisler said that it is difficult to see the advancement of a 
cogent policy behind the two different congressional approaches in the CDA and the DMCA. 
Reisler stated that in light of the increasing availability of legal copyrighted materials on the 
                                                
254 Rustad & Koenig, supra note 200, at 406. 
255 Id. at 399.  
256 Id. at 400.  
257 Id. at 408-11. 
258 Id. at 403. 
259 Marc S. Reisler, Content Immunity for ISPs Is Jeopardized by Competing Law, NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL, 
Mar. 9, 2004.  
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Internet, “it is hard to imagine that Congress now believes that notice provision imposes an 
impossible burden on ISPs to evaluate each notice.”260  
 Ryan W. King also supported the idea of transplanting the take-down provision of the 
DMCA into the CDA for three reasons. First, the take-down provision imposes liability only 
if ISPs ignore defamatory statements on purpose.261 Second, the provision does not stifle the 
unique nature of the Internet because this provision is the most efficient tool for ISPs to 
respond to notices of defamation. In his view, through the introduction of the take down 
provision, ISPs can save the investigation costs because “their only responsibility is to take-
down the statement according to formal procedure.”  262  Lastly, the take-down provision 
protects individuals from cyber-defamation by imposing liability when ISPs refuse to remove 
libelous statements. 263 
 Band and Schruers also compared the CDA and the DMCA provisions on ISP 
liability.264 However, unlike Rustad and Koenig, they used CDA distributor immunity as the 
standard for criticizing the take-down provision of the DMCA. 265 According to their 
argument, under the DMCA, “an ISP would be on notice concerning the possibility of future 
infringement” after receiving the first notification. Thus, ISPs would have to choose to either 
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264 Jonathan Band & Matthew Schruers, Safe Harbors against the Liability Hurricane: The Communications 
Decency Act and The Digital Millenium Act, 20 CARDOZO ART & ENT.  L. J. 295 (2002). 
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expose themselves to infringement liability or incur significant monitoring costs. Therefore, 
they argued that both would obstruct “the growth of the Internet.” 266  
1.3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 The main purposes of this thesis are to analyze the controversy over the ISP immunity 
provision and to suggest a solution. Ultimately, the thesis questions whether Section 230 has 
achieved its originally intended goal. Most importantly, this thesis addresses the basic 
question of  whether the Communications Decency Act, which was intended to regulate 
cyber-pornography, has changed into a law for protecting Internet Service Providers from the 
torts claims, including defamation suits, and if so why.  
 This thesis will address the following research questions: 
1. What is the legislative history of Section 230? How and why was it added to the 
CDA? What role, if any, did special interest groups play in the enactment of 
Section 230? How and why did Section 230 remain when the U.S. Supreme Court 
struck down the rest of the CDA in 1997? 
2. How have the courts interpreted and applied Section 230? How have courts 
interpreted “distributor liability” since Zeran v. AOL? Specifically how have 
courts distinguished between ISPs and ICPs? How have courts defined “creating” 
or “developing” content? Which rationales between Zeran and Anti- Zeran court 
group are more appropriate to apply to new Internet mass communication 
environments such as news portals? 
1.4. METHODOLOGY 
 This thesis is designed to conduct multiple analyses to evaluate Section 230.  
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This thesis will investigate the legislative history of the CDA, focusing on how interest 
groups influenced the enactment of Section 230. For this investigation, the thesis will 
examine the record of congressional debates and hearings related to the CDA from 1995 to 
1996, and also the newsletters of important interest groups. Furthermore, this study will 
analyze all court records, including amicus briefs, of Reno v. ACLU,267 which struck down 
the CDA, to find the reasons for the fact that the Court retained Section 230. 
 To explore Internet libel law and ISP liability issues, this thesis will analyze federal 
and state cases involving Section 230, retrieved through Westlaw and the Media Law 
Reporter.  For the study of the evolution of the courts’ conflicting opinions, this thesis 
divides the courts’ decisions into two groups – those that follow the Zeran court’s reasoning 
and those that oppose it – and then compares those opinions. Finally, the thesis will examine 
possible application of each group of court decision to news portals.
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CHAPTER 2 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CDA 
 President Clinton signed the Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation Act 
into law on February 8, 1996,268  stating, “Today, with the stroke of a pen, our law will catch 
up with the future.”269 This legislation transformed in a revolutionary way the U.S. 
communication law that had been in force for more than 60 years, i.e., the Communications 
Act of 1934. 270  President Clinton pointed out that the blessings of the Information Age will 
“be mixed” because new information technologies “make it more difficult for parents to raise 
their children” by protecting them from “images parents don’t want them to see.”271  As 
reflecting these concerns, Title V of this legislation included the Communications Decency 
Act of 1996,272 which made it a crime to knowingly disseminate “indecent” or “patently 
                                                
268 Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 (West Supp. 1997). Pub. 
L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (to be codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). The goal of this Act is to 
“establish a national policy framework designed to accelerate rapidly the private sector deployment of advanced 
telecommunication and information technologies and services” by opening the telecommunications markets “to 
competition.” 141 CONG. REC. S8570 (daily ed. June 16,1995).  
269  Remarks by the President in signing ceremony for the Telecommunications Act Conference Report,                                          
www.turnoffourtv.com/networks/telecom.Clinton.html.  
270 See 142 CONG. REC. S715 (daily ed. February 1,1996). Senator Warner said this “landmark” legislation “will 
revolutionize the telecommunications industry” and “will promote increased competition among 
telecommunications service providers.” The Telecommunications Act amended the Communications Act of 
1934. 
271 Id. 
272 Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, tit. 5, 502, 110 Stat. 136 (1996). The CDA is 
an amendment to Section 223 of the Communication Act of 1934. 
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offensive” materials to minors through the Internet.273 What is more, Congress also added a 
new section to the CDA, the “Online Family Empowerment” provision, which is entitled 
“SEC. 230. Protection for private blocking and screening of offensive material.” 274 This 
provision, known as the Good Samaritan provision, was designed to protect on-line service 
providers from civil liability if they chose to block offensive content from their system.275      
  However, strong opposition to the CDA arose from the Internet related industry and 
interest groups for a free Internet. Within hours of the bill being signed into the law, the 
statute was confronted with a First Amendment lawsuit seeking claiming injunctions by 
several interest groups led by the ACLU because of its vague or overly broad indecency 
standard.276 Finally, on June 26, 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the CDA was 
unconstitutional because its “indecent” and “patently offensive” provisions abridge the 
freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.277 However, Section 230 of the CDA  
survived this decision because the Court did not mention this provision.278 
 The controversy surrounding the constitutionality of the CDA has been very heated. 
Therefore, most of the scholarly studies about the legislative history of the CDA have 
                                                
273 141 CONG. REC. S9770 (daily ed. July 12, 1995).  
274 142 CONG. REC. S687 (daily ed. February. 1, 1996). 
275 142 CONG. REC. H1100 (daily ed. January 31, 1996).   
276  In two cases, federal trial courts in Pennsylvania and New York enjoined enforcement of the CDA in 1996. 
The Pennsylvania court unanimously struck down the CDA on the ground that the definition of “indecent” 
material is vague and that it effected a complete ban of constitutionally protected adult speech. See ACLU v. 
Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 855 (E.D. Pa.1996). The New York court held that the CDA was overbroad but not 
vague. While the government argued that the safe harbor defenses narrowed the scope of the statute, the court 
rejected that argument because current technology does not make the affirmative defense feasible and partially 
relied on third parties to be effective. See Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y.1996).  
277 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).   
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focused on the indecency provision related to cyber-porn in order to attack or to support its 
legitimacy,279 while Section 230 has received less study.  
  This chapter examines the legislative history of the CDA in terms of Section 230, that 
is, how and why the Internet service provider’s immunity provision was introduced and what 
kind of problems were caused by making this provision part of the CDA. In particular, this 
chapter highlights the political power games among related interest groups and their 
connections with political groups.  
2.1.ORIGIN AND ENACTMENT OF THE CDA AND SECTION 230 
2.1.1. Proceedings in the Senate –Criminal liability of ISPs 
EXON’S PROPOSAL OF THE CDA 
 On February 1, 1995, the late Senator James Exon (D-Neb.) and Senator Slade 
Gorton (R-Wash.) introduced the Communications Decency Act (S. 314).280 This proposal 
amended Section 223 of Title 47, United States Code, entitled “Obscene or harassing 
telephone calls in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign communications,” and 
was referred to the Senate Commerce Committee.281   
                                                
279 See Robert Cannon, The Legislative History of Senator Exon’s Communications Decency Act: Regulating 
Barbarians on the Information Superhighway, 49 FED. COMM. L. J. 51 (1996). Cannon’s research is the seminal 
legislative study of the CDA. In the paper, Cannon analyzed controversial points of the constitutionality of the 
CDA such as feasibility of regulating speech, distinctions between obscenity and indecency, and “least 
restrictive means” based on the legislative history. Several studies dealt with legislative history of the CDA as a 
part of their research. See Vikas Arora, The Communications Decency Act: Congressional Repudiation of the 
“Right Stiff,” 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 473 (1997); Laura J.Mckay, The Communications Decency Act: Protecting 
Children from On-line Indecency, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 463 (1996); Mary Kay Finn, Karen Lahey, and 
David Redle, Politics Underlying Congressional Approval of Criminal and Civil Immunity for Interactive 
Computer Service Providers under Provisions of the Communication Decency Act of 1996- Should E-Buyers 
Beware?, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 347 (2000).  
280 141 CONG. REC. S1920 (daily ed. Feb.1,1995). 
281 See Center for Democracy and Technology, An Analysis of S314, March 9, 1995., available at 
http://www.cdt.org/speech/cda/950309s314analysis.html. See also Appendix One. Senator Exon and Gorton’s 
proposal of CDA (S. 314). 
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 Introducing the CDA, Senator Exon warned that the Internet was in danger of being 
polluted by indecent materials and that more governmental regulation was needed: 
Sadly, there is a dark side to the bright flicker of the computer screen. 
The explosion of technology also threatens an explosion of misuse. … 
The information superhighway should not become a red light district. 
This legislation will keep that from happening and extend the 
standards of decency which have protected telephone users to new 
telecommunications devices. …Once passed, our children and families 
will be better protected from those who would electronically cruise the 
digital world to engage children in inappropriate communications and 
introductions. 282  
  
 He proposed imposing a fine of up to $100,000 or up to two years in prison for 
anyone who “makes, transmits, or otherwise makes available…obscene, lewd, lascivious, 
filthy, or indecent” messages or images to a person under the age of 18.283 The simple phrase 
“makes available” might have made all ISPs liable. In other words, if the bill had been 
enacted, anyone who provided communications service, including ISPs, would be criminally 
liable for the transmitting of indecent materials to minors.284  Consequently, criminal liability 
of ISPs became a big issue in the controversy over the CDA. It seemed clear that Senator 
Exon intended that ISPs should incur a certain amount of liability when circulating 
pornography, thus hoping to regulate effectively cyber-porn. In fact, Exon’s 1995 proposal 
was not his first attempt. In July 1994, Exon had previously proposed similar legislation (S. 
1822) to stop lewd or obscene communications over the Internet. 285 Although his first 
attempt failed to pass the Senate, Exon included the provision that held ISPs criminally liable 
                                                
282 141 CONG. REC. S1920 (daily ed. Feb.1,1995). 
283 The Center for Democracy and Technology, supra note 281, at section 223 (a)-(d). Exon’s proposal 
expanded FCC regulation of obscene and indecent audio text to cover all content carried over all forms of 
electronic communication networks.  
284 Id.  
285 140 CONG. REC. S9745 (daily ed. July 26,1994) 
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in his original proposal.286  Some supporters of the CDA argued in favor of this viewpoint. In 
the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on “Cyberporn,” child advocate, Barry Crimmins, 
argued that ISPs such as AOL held a substantial liability when circulating pornography on 
the Internet, insisting on “zero tolerance for Child Pornography.” 287 According to Crimmins, 
even though ISPs argued they were not aware of pornography trafficking, the crackdown 
against cyber-porn “must include serious punitive measures against companies like AOL.” 288 
He contended that if ISPs “put a fraction of the effort into dealing with this problem that they 
put into spin doctoring their culpability,” inexpensive and effective solutions could be 
found.289 
 However, Exon’s draft ran into opposition from the Internet industry and civil liberty 
groups because of its vague definition of such terms as “indecency” and broad criminal 
liability.290 For instance, the Center for Democracy and Technology criticized  the bill 
because it would compel service providers “to closely monitor every private communication, 
                                                
286 S. REP. NO. 103-367 at 102 (1994). In this proposal, Senator Exon tried to expand the scope of the 
Communications Act of 1934 by replacing the term “telephone” with “telecommunications device.” 
Furthermore, the Act, if passed, made it possible to punish whomever “makes any comment, request, suggestion 
or proposal which is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent” by means of a telecommunications device. 
287 Cyberporn and Children: The Scope of the Problem, the State of the Technology, and the Need for 
Congressional Action: Hearings on S. 892 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 169 
(1995) (Statement of Barry Crimmins, Child Advocate). available at 
http://www.dct.org/speech/cda/950724crimmins.html.  
288 Id. 
289 Id. Crimmins pointed out that AOL had been unresponsive and arrogant when approached in a good-faith 
effort to solve to prevent the circulation of pornography. In response to Crimmins’ complaints about pedophile 
chat rooms, AOL said, “For confidentiality reasons, we cannot disclose information on actions we’ve taken 
against other members … Actions within a private room do not fall under the jurisdiction of the Term of 
Service. We strongly suggest that if you are being harassed by someone in a private room, you use the “ignore” 
button to block their dialogue from your screen,” through the response mail. Id. Terms of staff American 
Online’s letter at Feb 2,1995. However, Crimmins argued that “ignoring child pornography does not stop its 
spread, nor does it relieve AOL of its responsibilities when its service is being used as a safe harbor for the 
criminals.” Id. Crimins letter at Feb 2, 1995.  
290 See Cannon, supra note 279, at 59.  
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electronic mail message,” and, therefore, the bill posed a “substantial threat to the freedom of 
speech.”291 Online petitions were gathered with 107,000 signatures against the proposed bill, 
and even the conservative group Morality in Media said that Exon’s draft was a “disservice 
to the American people” and “a giant step backwards.” 292 Even the Justice Department 
warned of the possible unconstitutionality of Exon’s proposal.293  
REACTION TO EXON’S PROPOSAL & THE IMPACT OF THE PRODIGY CASE 
 Meanwhile, two significant events occurred that directly influenced Exon’s draft by 
providing fuel to the controversy over the CDA. One was the legislative reaction. In April of 
1995, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont), who was a strong opponent of Exon’s approach to 
regulating the Internet, introduced a new bill, the “Child Protection, User Empowerment, and 
Free Expression in Interactive Media Study Bill” (S.714). 294 This bill would have ordered 
the Attorney General’s Office of the United States to study the Internet and then submit a 
report to the Senate on whether current criminal laws governing distribution of obscenity 
over the computer were adequate. 295 In Senator Leahy’s opinion, Exon’s bill was “a result of 
hasty decision” and a lack of understanding of the Internet and technology.296 On the 
                                                
291The Center for Democracy and Technology, CDT Policy Post No.1, Feb 9,1995. available at http:// 
www.cdt.org/publications/pp10209.html. 
292 David Loundy, Would he know IT when he download IT? CHICAGO DAILY LAW BULLETIN, Apr.13, 1995, at 
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293 See 141 CONG. REC. S8088 (daily ed. June 9, 1995). Senator Exon criticized the Justice Department because 
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294 See 141 CONG. REC. S8330 (daily ed. June 14,1995). See also Center for Democracy and Technology, CDT 
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296 Arora, supra note 279, at 482. See also 141 CONG. REC. S8342 (daily ed. June 14, 1995). Senator Leahy 
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contrary, in Senator Exon’s eye, Senator Leahy’s amendment was an effort “to kill all 
effective action” and “delay the bill.”297  
  One notable point is that Leahy’s bill was proposed as an alternative to the CDA. 298 
Opposing passage of the CDA, Senator Leahy argued that he had “different ways of trying to 
figure out ultimately how to protect them [children] and the First Amendment at the same 
time.”299 What Senator Leahy suggested as the alternative was “parental control.”  In his bill, 
Senator Leahy asked the Attorney General also to investigate the availability of technical 
means to enable parents and other users to control access to objectionable content. 300  This 
provision of Leahy’s amendment could be viewed as laying the foundation for the 
introduction of Section 230 because the term “parental control,” which was a key notion of 
section 230, appeared in congressional discussions as a viable alternative for the first time.  
The statement of Senator Russ Feingold (D-Wis.) in the Senate, supporting the Leahy bill, 
represented the liberal groups’ viewpoint: 
                                                                                                                                                  
enormously complex area, I feel we need more information from law enforcement and telecommunications 
experts.” Id.  
297 See 141 Cong. Rec. S8339 (daily ed. June 14,1995). Furthermore, Senator Exon pointed out that if the 
argument of “parental responsibilities” worked effectively, “parents must follow their children around all of the 
time” because children might access cyber-porn through the Internet not only at home but also outside home 
such as at a library or school. Id.    
298 Mckay, Supra note 279, at 480. Senator Leahy amended his bill several times, and he added his proposal 
about the study of Attorney General Office to Exon’s Amendment.   
299 See 141. CONG. REP. S8347 (daily ed. June 14,1995).  
300 See 141 CONG. REP. S8391 (daily ed. June 14,1995). Leahy’s Amendment No.1387 articulated that, “Not 
later than 150 days after date of the enactment of this act, the Attorney General shall submit” to the senate “(C) 
an evaluation of the technical means available (i) to enable parents to exercise control over the information that 
their children receive by interactive telecommunications systems so that children may avoid violent, sexually 
explicit, harassing, offensive, and other unwanted material on such systems; (ii) to enable other users of such 
systems noncommercial information that such users may avoid violent […] material on such systems; and (iii) 
to promote the free flow of information, consistent with the values expressed in the Constitution, in interactive 
media; and (D) recommendations on means of encouraging the development and deployment of technology, 
including computer hardware and software, to enable parents and other users of interactive telecommunications 
systems to exercise the control described in clauses (i) and (ii) of subparagraph (c). 
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   [C]learly there are ways parents can exact control over what their 
children can access on their home computers. It is clearly preferable to leave 
this responsibility in the hands of parents, rather than have the Government 
step in and assert control over telecommunications. Whenever there is a 
choice between Government intervention and empowering people to make 
their own decisions, we ought to try first to use the situation of the approach 
that involves less government control of our lives. 301  
 
 In the Senate other solutions were proposed even though they failed to pass. Senator 
Grassley proposed revising the existing prohibitions on indecent broadcasting to make them 
applicable to cyberspace. 302 Senator Inouye proposed the voluntary use of tags in the name, 
address, or text of an electronic file containing indecent contents to ensure identification.303  
 The other important factor that derailed Exon’s attempt to regulate cyberporn was 
Stratton Oakmont, Inc v. Prodigy,304 in which the court ruled that ISPs should be liable for 
their editorial control over the harmful transmission of objectionable materials despite good 
faith efforts to make family-oriented sites safe from offensive material.  The Prodigy court 
expected its decision would “compel all computer networks to abdicate control of their 
bulletin boards” including family oriented computer services. 305 The court in its decision 
urged that this issue ultimately be solved by Congress when it made the CDA. 306   As for 
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Senator Exon, this decision was not acceptable because his main aim was to “provide much 
needed protection for children” by forcing ISPs actively to self-police the Internet.307  
  In the end, on March 23, 1995, Exon tried to reach a compromise with dissenting 
groups by amending his proposed bill (S. 314)308 and re-introduced his amendment to the 
Senate.309 In his amendment, Senator Exon incorporated a number of “safe harbor” defense 
provisions designed to avoid criticism of infringing on freedom of expression on the 
Internet.310 The idea of a “safe harbor” defense originated with Lance Rose, the author of the 
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310 See 141 CONG. REC. S8386-87 (daily ed. June 14, 1995). Exon’s amendment No 1364 states that : 
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account of any activity which is not in violation of any law punishable by criminal or civil penalty, which 
activity the person has taken in good faith to implement a defense authorized under this section or otherwise to 
restrict or prevent the transmission of, or access to, a communication specified in this section. 
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book Net Law. 311 A few days after Senator Exon proposed his original bill, Rose proposed a 
safe harbor provision to Senator Exon, which with a few changes could make him “a big 
winner.” 312 David Loundy commented, “Rose’s suggestion would protect system operators 
who try to keep their systems clear of illegal materials, yet are not able to screen out 100% of 
all illicit materials.”313 
 Exon’s amendment embodied Rose’s idea. First, there is no violation if entities 
merely provide access to networks or systems not under their control without creating 
content. 314 This provision narrowed the scope of the CDA relating to ISPs liability because it 
means that if ISPs are not aware of the contents of communications, they should be exempt 
from criminal penalty. 315 However, Exon maintained limited ISP criminal liability, that is, 
this defense would not be applicable if ISPs were involved in “creation, editing or knowing 
distribution” of offensive material.316 A second exemption was made to protect employers 
from liability for the actions of employee unless the employee’s conduct was within the 
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on system contents.” Otherwise, liability should be assigned only when the system operator was actually 
familiar with, knew, or should have known of the obscene material.  
313 Loundy, supra note 292. 
314Id. Exon’s Amendment of CDA, Section 223(f)(1).  
315See Cannon, supra note 279, at 59. Senator Exon stated, “Defense (f)(1) explicitly exempts a person who 
merely provide access to or connection with a network like the Internet for the act of providing such access. 141 
CONG. REC. S8345 (daily ed. June 14, 1995). 
316 See 141 CONG. REC. S8387 (daily ed. June 14, 1995) Section 223 (f)(1).  
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scope of employment.317 The third was generally called “the good faith defense.” That is, it is 
not a violation for those providers to take, in good faith, reasonable, effective, and 
appropriate actions to restrict access by minors to offensive materials.318  
 As for Exon and his supporters, the defense provisions were a kind of strategic retreat 
to save the CDA. Senator Exon explained to the Senate that he had made revisions “in 
response to the concerns that have been raised by the Justice Department, the pro-family and 
anti-pornography groups, and the First Amendment scholars.” 319 Furthermore, in introducing 
the amendment, Exon emphasized “a great deal of cooperation from the online service 
providers,” who are “key members of [this] new industry.” 320  
    In particular, the “good faith provision” was the legislative answer to the Stratton 
Oakmont decision. Senator Coat clearly declared that “the intent of the amendment is not to 
hold a company who tries to prevent obscene or indecent material under this section from 
being liable as a publisher for a defamatory statement for which they would not otherwise 
have been liable,” after he explained the Stratton Oakmont decision to the Senate. 321  
 Consequently, the proposal calling for full criminal liability for ISPs was abandoned. 
Instead, Exon’s amendment provided ISPs with a wide-ranging safe harbor by declaring that 
                                                
317Id. Section 223 (f)(2). 
318Id. Section 223(f)(3).    
319 See 141 CONG. REC.S8088-89 (daily ed. June 9,1995). As to Exon’s revision of the original draft, Senator 
Leahy (D-Vt), one of the strongest opponent of Exon’s bill, said that the revisions “reflect diligent and 
considered effort by him and his staff to correct serious problems.” See also Appendix Two. the full text of 
Exon’s amendment. 
320 See141 CONG. REC. S8088 (daily ed. June 14, 1995). 
321 141 CONG. REC. S8345 (daily ed. June 14, 1995). 
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“this defense [should] be construed broadly to avoid impairing the growth of online 
communications through a regime of vicarious liability.” 322 
 Civil liberties groups still remained actively opposed to the CDA. Immediately after 
Exon revised his draft, the Center for Democracy and Technology, a leading civil group 
opposing the CDA, evaluated the draft as “an important improvement” over the original 
version because of the creation of several exemptions to limit ISPs’ liability. 323 However, the 
CDT stated, “[T]he bill is still an unconstitutional intrusion on the free speech and privacy 
rights of Internet users and all content providers,” and vowed to keep fighting “this 
dangerous legislation.” 324  
  Conservatives in the Senate reacted against the liberal groups’ movement by 
introducing an even more draconian bill than Exon’s original draft. On June 7, 1995, 
Senators Bob Dole (R-Kan.) and Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) proposed the “Protection of 
Children From Computer Pornography Act of 1995” (S. 892) as a free standing bill, which 
was designed to provide prison sentences for five years if ISPs or BBSs “knowingly or 
recklessly transmit indecent pornographic materials to children.” 325 This bill was patently 
aimed at ISPs and at Exon’s appeasement position toward the ISPs.326 Introducing the bill, 
Senator Grassley stated: 
Some so-called access providers facilitate this [transmitting pornography] by 
refusing to take action against child molesters, even after other computer users 
                                                
322 See H.R. CONF. REP. 104-458.  
323 The Center for Democracy and Technology, CDT Policy Post No 6, Mar. 24, 1995, available at http:// 
www.cdt.org/publications/pp060323.html. 
324 Id.  
325 See 141 CONG. REC. S7922 (daily ed. June 7, 1995).  
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have complained. So, my bill would make it a crime for access providers who 
are aware of this sort of activity to permit it to continue.327  
 
 After a long debate, on June 14, 1995, the Senate passed the CDA, Exon’s amended 
version, as attached to the Telecommunication Reform Bill (S. 652) by a vote 84 to 16.328 
Before the vote, Senator Exon made a shocking presentation to insure the passage of the 
CDA. During the heated debate, Senator Exon waved a so-called “Blue Book,” which 
contained pornography downloaded from the Internet, including photos and stories featuring 
torture and child abuse, emphasizing that such pornography was “only a few click-click-
clicks away from any child on the Internet” and free of charge.329  Senator Exon’s tactic was 
very effective. While the Exon bill passed overwhelmingly, Leahy’s alternative failed to pass 
the Senate with little discussion “due to [its] overwhelming support for Exon’s bill.”330   
2.1.2. PROCEEDINGS IN THE HOUSE – CIVIL IMMUNITY FOR ISPS 
ORIGINAL FORM OF SECTION 230 AND COMPARISON WITH EXON’S BILL 
 Even though Exon’s bill successfully passed the Senate, the situation in the House 
was very different from that of the Senate. On June 20, 1995, soon after the passage of the 
CDA in the Senate, House Speaker Newt Gingrich expressed public opposition to the Senate 
                                                
327 Id.  This proposal gave great concern to civil liberty groups because Senator Dole was the Senate Majority 
leader and Republican presidential candidate. The CDT commented that this proposal “represents an even 
greater threat” to the First Amendment than the CDA. See the Center for Democracy and Technology, CDT 
Policy Post No 16, June 6, 1995, available at httxzp:// www.cdt.org/publications/pp160606.html. On the 
contrary, this bill played a role in supporting Exon’s bill. Senator Exon argued in Senate debate that “the 
effective role of alternative measure, like that of Senators Grassley and Dole, cannot be overlooked as part of 
pressure that brought this matter [protecting children] to a successful point.” See 141 Cong. Rec. S8339 (daily 
ed. June 14, 1995). 
328 141 CONG. REC. S8347 (daily ed. June 14, 1995). 
329 141 CONG. REC. S8088-89 (daily ed. June 9, 1995). In addition, Senator Exon encouraged his colleague 
senators to read and watch the objectionable materials. Furthermore, Senator Dan Coats (R-IN) illustrated the 
graphic nature of the material they had in their Blue Book. See Id. 
330 Jessica Thaler, From the Senate Exon’s Blue Book,  CMC Magazine, Aug. 1, 1995, at 6. See also, 141 CONG. 
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bill on a television show, calling it “clearly a violation of free speech,” and went on to say 
that the debate had not been a “serious way to discuss a serious issue.”331 Separately from the 
Senate’s legislation, the House of Representative had sought to develop its own 
Telecommunication Reform Bill, H.R. 1555, which was introduced May 3, 1995, by 
Representative Thomas Bliley.332 In this bill, Leahy’s alternative successfully was attached 
by Rep. Klink (D-Penn). However, there was no room for Exon’s CDA. 333 On June 30, 1995, 
Representative Chris Cox (R-Calif.) and Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) introduced the “Internet 
Freedom and Family Empowerment Act” (hereafter, IFFEA, HR. 1978) as an alternative to 
                                                
331 See Center for Democracy and Technology, Gingrich Says CDA Is a “Clear Violation of Free Speech 
Rights,” available at http;//www.cdt.org/policy/freespeech/ging_oppose.html. Gingrich made his remarks on 
June 20, 1995, on a national television show, the Progress Report carried on National Empowerment Television. 
Gingrich said:  
 “I think that the Amendment you referred to by Senator Exon in the Senate will have no real 
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also protecting children in a medium which is available to both? That’s also frankly a problem with television 
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step.”  
332 See 141 CONG. REC. H4520, H4545 (daily ed. May 3,1995). The bill made the particular subsection for 
barring FCC regulation:  “(d)  FCC REGULATION OF THE INTERNET AND OTHER INTERACTIVE 
COMPUTER SERVICES PROHIBITED.-- Nothing in this Act shall be construed to grant any jurisdiction or 
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computer services.”  
333 Id. In fact, On Feb. 21, 1995, Representative Tim Johnson (D-SD) introduced the House counterpart to the 
Exon/Gorton Communications Decency Act (HR 1004), which would criminalize the transmission of any 
content deemed “obscene, indecent, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or harassing.” However, HR 1004 has not been 
modified since its introduction. See Center for Democrarcy & Technology, House CDA Sponsor Urges “Go-
Slow” approach, calls for hearings, April 3, 1995, available at 
http://www.cdt.org/speech/cda/950403johnson_ltr.html.  Full text of HR 1004 is available at http://web.lexis-
nexis.com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/congcomp/document?_m=14252ccfe010e88c637778070f40b4dd&_docnum=1
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Exon’s CDA, which was designed to be added as Section 230 of the amendment of the 
Communications Act of 1934.334  
 Representatives Cox and Wyden’s solution to the circulation of pornography through 
the Internet was utterly different from that of Senator Exon. The Senate bill depended on 
rigid enforcement of regulation by imposing criminal penalties for transmitting cyberporn. 
However, by developing the Leahy amendment, the Cox-Wyden Act presented “parental 
control” instead of governmental regulation as a solution.335  Introducing the IFFEA, 
Representative Cox stated, “[P]arents and families are better suited to guard the portals of 
cyberspace and protect our children than our Government bureaucrats.” 336 New computer 
technology, according to the Cox’s proposal, made it possible to protect children by 
installing software that could block out pornography in family computers. 337 Supporting Cox, 
Representative Goodlatte stated on the House floor that this Act could eliminate the danger 
of unconstitutionality by allowing parents to “make important decisions with regard to what 
their children get access.” 338 
 The original version of the IFFEA consisted of two significant parts: The no 
regulation provision and the creation of “Good Samaritans” protection for ISPs.339  
                                                
334 141 CONG. REC. H8468 (daily ed. August 4, 1995). See also Appendix Three. The original version of Cox-
Wyden Bill (H.R.1978).  
335 Id. See also Cannon, supra note 279, at 69.  
336 141 CONG. REC. H8470 (daily ed. August 4,1995). 
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First, the IFFEA explicitly prohibited the FCC from imposing content regulations on the 
Internet or other interactive communication services. 340 Reflecting the legislators’ emphasis 
on no regulation by government, Section 230 was originally designated “Protection for 
private blocking and screening of offensive material; FCC Economic Regulation of 
Computer Services Prohibited.”341 Furthermore, subsection (d) clearly articulated, “Nothing 
in this Act shall be construed to grant any jurisdiction or authority to the Commission with 
respect to content or other regulation of the Internet.” 342  
 As mentioned above, the Senate bill would have produced the effect of heightening  
FCC regulation and bestowing more power on the FCC.343 However, in Representative Cox’s 
view, government censorship over the Internet was “inefficient and ineffective” 344 by 
making the FCC spend huge amounts of money “trying to define elusive terms [such as 
indecent communication] that lead to a flood of legal challenges.”345 Furthermore, the FCC 
regulation “will freeze or at least slow down technology” and, therefore, “will threaten the 
future of the Internet.” 346  Thus, Representatives Cox and Wyden hoped to establish as “the 
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344 Id.  
345 141 CONG. REC. H8470 (daily ed. August 4, 1995).  
346 141 CONG. REC. H8471 (daily ed. August 4, 1995).  
  65
policy of United States that we do not wish to have content regulation by the Federal 
Government” of what is on the Internet.347   
 More importantly, IFFEA retained the Good Samaritan provision that removed 
liability for ISPs that make a good-faith effort to edit objectionable material in order to 
protect minors.348 Subsection (2) of the original draft of IFFEA provided:   
 (c) PROTECTION FOR 'GOOD SAMARITAN' BLOCKING AND 
SCREENING OF OFFENSIVE MATERIAL.-- No provider or user of 
interactive computer services shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of 
any information provided by an information content provider.  No provider or 
user or interactive computer services shall be held liable on account of --  
  (1) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to 
material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, 
filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or 
not such material is constitutionally protected; or  
 (2) any action to make available to information content providers or 
others the technical means to restrict access to material described in paragraph 
(1). 349   
 
 This provision was the reaction of the House version against the Statton Oakmont 
decision.350 Introducing the IFFEA, Cox clearly stated that the Good Samaritan provision 
would protect ISPs “from taking on liability such as occurred in the Prodigy case in New 
York that they should not face for helping us to solve this problem.”351 
The language of the Good Samaritan provision was very similar to the “safe harbor defense” 
provision of the Senate-passed Exon CDA. However, wide differences existed between the 
two approaches. To protect the private blocking of pornography on the Internet, the safe 
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harbor provision provided limited immunity from possible criminal prosecution. However, 
under the Good Samaritan provision of the IFFEA, criminal liability of ISPs intrinsically did 
not exist because this bill rejected federal regulation of the ISPs. One important point is that 
Section 2 (e)(1) articulated that the Good Samaritan provision would not have any effect on 
the established “dial-a-porn statute or other Federal criminal statutes.” However, these laws 
were hardly applicable to ISPs.352 Accordingly, the goal of the Good Samaritan provision 
was to make ISPs free from “civil liability” for good-faith editorial control. Except for the 
lesson from the Prodigy case, other reasons why the House enlarged the scope of ISPs’ 
immunity from both criminal and civil liability were not provided in the legislative history of 
the IFFEA.  
 The significant point was that the Good Samaritan provision had an intrinsic 
contradiction in its concept. That is, the bill was designed to protect ISPs who were doing the 
editing in a good-faith,353 however simultaneously the bill did not intend to encourage ISPs 
to monitor or screen content. Furthermore it did not create “any obligation for providers” to 
block objectionable material on the Internet from minors.354  
                                                
352 Id. It was one of the controversial issues over the introduction of the CDA whether established criminal law 
standards, such as the Communication Act of 1934, apply to the ISPs and Internet. Senator Exon and his 
supporters in the Senate thought the Communication Act of 1934 was only applicable to “telephone 
communications,” therefore an amendment was needed in order to enlarge the scope of the criminal liability 
toward the Internet. However, Anti-Exon members, such as Senators Leahy and Feingold, said, “It is not clear 
that existing criminal statutes are incapable of enforcing law to protect children on interactive 
telecommunications. There have been many reports of prosecution of illegal activity related to the transmission 
of obscenity using interactive telecommunications.” See 141 CONG. REC. S8336 (daily ed. June 14, 1995). 
353 See 104 H. R. CONF. REP. No.104-458. at 194. The Committee of Conference Report stated that “this section 
provides Good Samaritan protections from civil liability for providers or users of an interactive computer 
service for actions to restrict or to enable restriction of access to objectionable” material. 
354 See Center for Democracy and Technology, CDT Policy Post No. 23 (Aug. 4, 1995). 
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 What Representatives Cox and Wyden really wanted to encourage was not ISPs’ self-
policing of their content but parents’ self-screening of their children. For instance, one 
specific goal of this provision was “to overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other 
similar decisions” because such decisions would create serious barriers “to the important 
federal policy of empowering parents to determine the content of communications their 
children receive through interactive computer services,” the Conference Committee report 
said.355  
 Senator Leay’s statement at the hearing on cyberporn and children provided more 
vivid language about this conflict:  
 
  If we grant too much power to online providers to screen for indecent 
material, public discourse and online content in cyberspace will be controlled 
by the providers and not the users of this fantastic resource. On the other hand, 
we want our laws should encourage and not discourage online providers from 
creating a safe environment for children.  356 
 
 Senator Feingold, a strong supporter of the “parental control” approach, also regarded 
ISP control as a kind of censorship, which would cause “a tremendous chilling effect on 
speech over the Internet.” He argued that “the fact that America Online censored the word 
‘breast’ on its service, albeit temporarily, should forewarn members of things to come.”357   
 What was it that the House wanted to encourage ISPs to do? It might be to develop 
blocking software for parents to control online contents. On the House floor, Senator Cox 
stated, after mentioning the Prodigy case:  
                                                
355 See 104 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996). 
356 Cyberporn and Children: The Scope of the Problem, the State of the Technology, and the Need for 
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Patrick Leahy).  
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That [the Prodigy decision] is backward. We want to encourage people like 
Prodigy, like CompuServe, like America Online, like the new Microsoft 
network, to do everything possible for us, the customer, to help us control, at 
the portals of our computer, at the front door of our house, what comes in and 
what our children see. This technology is very quickly becoming available.358 
 
What is more, the language of the IFFEA also clearly stated that supporting the development 
of filtering and blocking technology was U.S. policy. 359    
 These facts implied that the IFFEA was written entirely in ISPs’ favor. Under the 
logic of the IFFEA, ISPs should be exempt from both criminal and civil liability for their 
objectionable contents so long as they did not create them. Furthermore, ISPs did not need to 
make any effort to screen their contents because they don’t have any moral and legal 
responsibility. Screening was not the role of ISPs but that of parents. Consequently, this logic 
could lead to the conclusion that self-regulation, the notion which is contrasted with 
government regulation, means only by parents not by ISPs.  
 The fact that the IFFEA was based on “parental control” could cause another 
significant problem. That is, it can hardly be expected that “parental control” would be 
applied to objectionable material beyond the cyberporn. For example, defamatory stories 
could not be expected to be blocked by parental control, and parental control could not be a 
solution to protect the e-commerce customer from fraudulent commercial advertisements on 
the web.   
                                                
358 141 CONG. REC. H8470 (daily ed. August 4, 1995).  
359 141 CONG. REC. H8469 (daily ed. August 4, 1995). The IFFEA articulated:  
 (b) policy- It is the policy of the United States to- […] 
 (3)to encourage the development of technologies which maximize user control over what information 
is received by individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and other interactive computer services; 
 (4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies 
that empower parents to restrict their children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate online material. 
  69
  On August 4, 1995, the House approved the Cox-Wyden amendment by a 
overwhelming majority of 421 to 4 and attached it to the Telecommunication Reform Act 
(HR. 1555).360 It seemed a victory for civil liberties groups, which blocked Exon’s CDA in 
conference.  
 However, at the same time, the House also passed the “Manager’s Mark” amendment, 
which contained a new Exon-like criminal penalties provision, known as the Hyde 
amendment, in direct conflict with the Cox-Wyden amendment.361 It was a strong reaction by  
conservatives in the House. That is, the Hyde amendment made it possible to punish those 
who “intentionally communicate by computer, … to any person the communicator believes 
has not attained the age of 18 years, any material that, in context, depicts or describes, in 
terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or 
excretory activities or organs.” 362  
  The Hyde amendment caused strong criticism from supporters of the Cox-Hyden 
amendment. John Bryant (D-Tex.) charged that this amendment was “written in the 
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darkness” because the committee or its members “did not have any input into this.”363 
According to the Electronic Frontier Foundation, one of the leading free-Internet groups, this 
amendment was submitted at the last minute and “most legislators had no idea that they 
voted on this last amendment and the summary of the Manager’s Mark did not mention these 
new criminal provisions.”364 The ACLU also criticized the Exon-like provision, saying it 
would “effectively reduce all online content to that which is suitable only for children” and 
raised the question of ISP liability.365 Without doubt, the Hyde amendment made the Cox-
Wyden amendment a hollow victory.  
2.1.3. PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONFERENCE COMMITTEE- 
WHITE’S COMPROMISE OF DIFFERENT APPROACHES  
 Two fundamentally different versions of the bill from the Senate and the House were 
referred to a conference committee to reconcile the conflicting bills.366 Strictly speaking, a 
modified Exon proposal, the Hyde-Christian coalition proposal,367 th  e Grassley proposal,368 
and Cox-Wyden proposal were reviewed by the conferees. 369 The committee included 
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Senator Exon, Representative Rick White (R-Wash.), and Representative Henry Hyde. 
Neither Cox, nor Wyden was on the committee.370 The conference committee witnessed a 
battle between liberal and conservative groups in Congress to get more portions of their 
initiatives regarding the scope of ISP liability and the standard of objectionable materials to 
be regulated. 
 While the committee put the finishing touches on several controversial provisions of 
the Telecommunication Act, Representative White, an original co-sponsor of Cox-Wyde, 
prepared a new proposal to settle the conflict between the Exon and Cox-Wyden 
amendments.371  
 Based on the Cox-Wyden amendment, White’s proposal added the criminal penalties 
for transmission of objectionable materials from the Exon amendment.372 First of all, the 
White proposal “would not impose liability on online service providers merely for 
transmitting the message of their users.”373 White’s proposal also retained the “good faith 
defense” provision that offered safe harbor to ISPs from criminal liability when they 
instituted measures to try to protect minors from offensive content.374 One of the most 
important points concerning the issue of constitutionality was that White narrowed the vague 
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language of “indecent material” in the Exon amendment by replacing it with the more 
specific “harmful to minors.” 375 In addition, the compromise maintained the provision that 
prohibited the FCC “from regulating online content or from having oversight over the 
underlying technologies of the net.” 376 
 In summary, behind this compromise, there were significant big deals made between 
Representative White and Senator Exon. In fact, White made small change in the language of 
the bill; however, there were big deals beyond the language modification between two forces 
supporting each bill. Fundamentally, the logic of Exon’s CDA was to impose strict criminal 
penalties on those circulating cyberporn. On the other hand,  
the Cox-Wyden amendment in the House was opposed to imposing such criminal liability of  
Exon bill and argued users’ self –regulating was a more effective way to protect children by 
providing ISPs with immunity from civil liability. Therefore, according to Cox and Wyden’s 
logic, strict criminal liability could not be imaginable to introduce. However, representative 
White forced the stance of the Cox-Wyden amendment to move into acceptance of criminal 
liability. On the contrary, no idea of the protection of ISPs from civil liability was enshrined 
in Exon’s bill. As for conservative groups, ISPs’ immunity from civil liability was beyond 
their concern. When Exon added the good faith defense provision in his amendment, he did 
not remove the civil liability but limited immunity from criminal prosecution. But Exon and 
conservatives in Congress also changed their stance to give more immunity to ISPs so as to 
pass the CDA.  As a result, the two bills that had expressly different views as to cyberporn 
and regulating the Internet survived as two section of the CDA. 
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Furthermore, by adding a narrowly tailored “harm to minors” standard instead of the vague 
“indecent” standard, the White compromise presented a gift for civil liberty groups even 
though it invited immediate reaction.  
 In sum, to meet both amendments’ main interests, the White’s compromise attempted 
to make a formal combination of two totally different approaches without any consideration 
of what kind of problems would be created. Furthermore, such combination of two different 
approaches foreshadowed the controversy over the scope of CDA and Section 230 in the near 
future.   
REACTION OF CONSERVATIVES IN THE HOUSE 
   On December 6, 1995, members of the House and Senate conference committee 
voted 20-13 to accept the White proposal.377 Before voting, Rep. Henry Hyde (R-Ill) offered 
his proposal, which was designed to grant the federal government stronger power to regulate 
online content than Exon’s amendment.378 In particular, his proposal patently aimed at 
imposing strict criminal liability on ISPs. His proposal would have forced ISPs like Prodigy, 
CompuServe, and American Online to be held responsible for every aspect of their service, 
that is, ISP executives could have been jailed for two years and fined up to  
$100,000 when “indecent” contents were transmitted to minors by their services, even in 
areas beyond their control.379 His proposal was not adopted by the committee. However, 
                                                
377 See 141 CONG. REC. D1421 (Daily ed. Dec. 6, 1995). See also, William C. Myer, Key Issues before the 
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379 See Id. See also, Anna Eshoo, Nanny on the Net, EFFECTOR ONLINE Vol 9, No.1 (Jan. 5, 1996), 
http://www.eff.org/effector/HTML/effect09.01.html#telecom   
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White’s victory did not last long. Representatives Hyde and Bob Goodlatte (R-Va.) proposed 
an amendment to replace the “harmful to minors” standard in the language in the White 
compromise with “indecency,” i.e., going back to Exon’s original standard.380 This time, the 
committee reversed its position in favor of the Hyde-Goodlatte proposal. The Goodlatte 
amendment was approved on a vote of 17-16.381 However, it caused strong criticism from 
civil liberties groups, and it refueled a dying controversy over the bills unconstitutionality.382 
FINAL VERSION OF THE AMENDMENT 
 On January 4, 1996, the conference committee presented a preliminary draft of the 
final telecommunications reform bill, which would mandate broad governmental regulation 
of online speech.383 The most important change to the legislation was doing away with the 
provision prohibiting federal government regulation of the Cox-Wyden bill.384  
 In the final draft the conferees eliminated the title of the Cox-Wyden amendment that 
had passed in the House: “FCC CONTENT AND ECONOMIC REGULATION OF 
                                                
380 Id. See also, 141 CONG. REC. H1164 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (Senator Stearns’ statement). 
381 Myer, supra note 377, at 1. Thirteen Republicans supported the indecency standard with the help of four 
Democrats. According to Craig A. Johnson, American Reporter correspondent in Washington, Representative 
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384 Id. 
  75
COMPUTER SERVICE PROHIBITED.”385 In addition, White deleted the subsection (d) of 
Section 230 in the Cox-Wyden amendment, which articulated that “FCC regulation of the 
Internet and other interactive computer services [was] prohibited.”386  
 As mentioned in the section titled “Original form of the Section 230 and Comparison 
with Exon’s Bill,” the prohibition of federal regulation of the Internet was the critical goal of 
the Cox-Wyden amendment along with protection of ISPs.387 Therefore, for civil liberties 
groups, the abandonment of this policy meant significant regression.  
 However, this change was predictable when Representative White had accepted the 
criminal liability approach because government regulation and criminal penalties were 
inseparably related to each other. Representative Anna Eshoo pointed out that imposing 
criminal penalties such as those contained in the Hyde proposal “open[ed] the door for the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to engage in broad-based regulation of the 
Internet.” 388 Representative Lynn Woolsey (D-Calif.), showing the relationship between 
criminal penalties and governmental regulation, stated that under the final draft by the 
conference committee, “individuals who disseminate material that the Federal Government 
                                                
385 The title of the section 230 of the Cox-Wyden amendment was  “SEC. 230. PROTECTION FOR PRIVATE 
BLOCKING AND SCREENING OF OFFENSIVE MATERIAL; FCC CONTENT AND ECONOMIC 
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believes may violate contemporary community standards of decency could face prison 
terms.” 389  
 When White’s compromise was introduced to the conference committee, many civil 
liberties groups supported it as an inevitable but workable compromise.390  However, exactly 
because of its acceptance of criminal penalties, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 
did not endorse the White proposal.391 According to the ACLU’s argument, like the Hyde 
proposal the White proposal would not only violate the First Amendment but also “impose a 
complex regulatory scheme.”392 The ACLU statement pointed out the White proposal’s 
intrinsic problem: 
  The White proposal criminalizes the communicating to anyone under 18 any 
content that is deemed “harmful to minors.” Such standard would be created 
at the federal level for the first time, so that the White proposal created at 
entirely new federal category of speech crimes. … The ACLU strongly 
believes that no new speech crimes are justified, and that interests such as 
parental concerns are adequately addressed without such governmental 
intervention. 393 
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390 See Electronic Frontier Foundation, EFF Statement on Proposals Regarding Content Control on the Net 
(Dec.5, 1995), http://www.eff.org/Censorship/Internet_censorship_bills/net_censorship_120595_eff.statement. 
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392Id.  
393 Id.  However, the ACLU did not reject all possibility of criminal liability. The ACLU said that “if such 
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identify proscribed content; target and punish active wrongdoers.” However, even in this case, the ACLU 
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            Representatives White, Cox, and their colleagues fought to retain the provisions 
barring the FCC from regulating online contents, however, their attempt was in vain.394  As a 
result, the White compromise was reached at great a cost. It accepted criminal liability, 
which resulted in abrogation of their important goal of non-governmental regulation. 
Moreover, it failed to include the “harm to minors” standard in the end. However, 
Representative White and civil liberties groups had a half victory in maintaining the ISPs’ 
civil liability protection provision and in implanting the “online family empowerment” idea 
in the law. 
           On February 1, 1996, Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996 by 
overwhelming margins in both the House and Senate. Only 14 members of Congress voted 
against the legislation; the vote was 416 to 9 in the House395 and 91 to 5 in the Senate.396  
The TITLE V “OBSCENITY AND VIOLENCE” of the Telecomm bill was named the 
Communications Decency Act of 1996.397 The same language as that of the original version 
of Exon’s bill, which was introduced on the same day one year prior, became Section 223 of 
the CDA.398 Under Section 223, anyone found guilty of knowingly transmitting “indecent” 
material over the Internet would face up to two years in prison and fines of up to $250,000.399 
Simultaneously, this bill also included most parts of the “Internet Freedom and Family 
                                                
394 See Center for Democracy and Technology, supra note 381.  Just before the passage of the 
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Empowerment Act,” which granted ISPs broad civil immunity for Good Samaritan self-
policing as a special Section 230 of the CDA.400 
  2.2 ACTIVE ROLE OF INTEREST GROUPS :TWO LEADING FORCES OF THE  
         CONTROVERSY  
 At noon on Monday June 12, 1995, Senators gathered on Capitol Hill to deal with  the 
anti-cyberporn bill, the CDA, sponsored by Senator Exon.401 In accordance with custom, the 
session began with a prayer at the call of the Chaplain, Dr. Lloyd: 
Almighty God, Lord of all life, we praise You for the advancements in 
computerized communications that we enjoy in our times. Sadly, however 
there are those who are littering this information superhighway with obscene, 
indecent, and destructive pornography. …Cyber solicitation of teenagers 
reveals the dark side of online victimization. … Oh God, help us care of our 
children. Give us wisdom to create regulations that will protect the 
innocent.402  
 
 Two days after this prayer, the Senate rushed a vote to the floor, as the Chaplain said, 
to control the “pollution of computer communication.”403 The Exon bill was passed 
overwhelmingly by “inspired” Senators.404  
 However, immediately after the President signed the Telecommunication Act 
including the CDA which was part of it, on February 9, 1996, thousands of websites put up a 
blue-ribbon graphic supporting the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s “Blue Ribbon 
Campaign” for free speech, and more than 500 websites, led by the Center for Democracy 
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and Technology, one of the leading civil liberties groups, turned their screens to black for 48 
hours to protest the passage of the CDA. 405    
 The controversy surrounding the introduction of the CDA inside and outside the 
Congress was a “most crucial battle of the on-line community’s brief history” over 
governmental regulation and free speech in cyberspace.406 Two main forces, religious right 
groups and a coalition of civil liberties and online industry groups, played key roles in 
leading the controversy. In general, religious right groups, the proponents of the CDA, were 
best characterized as politically and socially conservative, Judeo-Christian, and strong 
believers in family values, with deep concern over the corruption of minors.407                                                 
 On the opposite site of the religious right groups, a coalition of civil liberties groups 
fought the religious right groups to protect freedom of Internet speech. Internet business 
groups such as American Online, CompuServe, and Microsoft acted in strong solidarity with 
civil liberties groups as they shared opposition to the CDA in order to safeguard their 
business interests. 
  Literally, the controversy surrounding the CDA was about “cyber-porn.” The 
religious right groups focused on combating pornography, “a dark side” of Internet,408 while 
civil liberties group emphasized cyberspace, an affirmative side of the Internet and new 
                                                
405 See Dan Kennedy, Cyberspace Censors Leave Trail of Anger and Confusion (Feburary 16,1996), http:// 
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technologies.409 Therefore, their approach to cyber-porn was basically different, and 
furthermore, conflicts between the two groups were inevitable. In their attempts to win the 
battle, both pro-CDA and anti-CDA groups were tightly connected to key politicians in 
Washington.    
2.2.1. PRO-CDA GROUPS’ APPROACH 
 The Communication Decency Act was a reflection of the religious right’s moral 
standards. The CDA itself was a “creature of the religious right,” which designed and 
sculpted it, organized political leaders to support it, and provided politicians with 
ammunition when they engaged against civil liberties groups. 410  
WHO INVENTED THE CDA? 
 Though Senator Exon was the author of the CDA, ex-prosecutor Bruce Taylor of the 
National Law Center for Children and Families actively helped create the CDA. When 
Taylor was in office, he gained a reputation as a specialist in this field with more than sixty 
prosecutions of obscenity cases.411 The relationship between Taylor and Exon stemmed from 
at least 1994. When Exon first attempted to introduce the CDA, Taylor helped Exon by 
drafting the CDA.412 Thereafter, Taylor’s efforts to establish the law that protected children 
from cyberporn continued. Civil liberties groups alleged that Taylor was deeply involved in 
                                                
409See the Center for Democracy and Technology, CDT Policy Post No 1 (February 9,1995), 
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publication of the “Rimm study,”413 which greatly contributed to passing the Exon’s bill by 
reporting the extent of the circulation of pornography on the Internet.414 This study, first 
published in the Georgetown Law Journal, was a front-page “exclusive” in Time magazine 
on July 3, 1995.415 Senator Charles Grassley used the Rimm study as one justification for the 
introduction of the CDA in his Senate statement on June 26, 1995. 416 However, civil liberties 
groups questioned how Senator Grassley exploited statistics from the Rimm study two weeks 
before it was released in Time magazine, and they established some persuasive inference.417 
According to Mike Godwin, staff counsel to the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Taylor 
assisted Rimm in preparing his thesis project about cyberporn as early as November 1994, 
when Rimm was a junior at Carnegie Mellon University.418 Furthermore, Talyor shared 
office space with Deen Kaplan, an editor of the Georgetown Law Journal, in a complex that 
also housed the National Coalition for Children and Families.419  Furthermore Senator Exon 
was known to have obtained his “blue book” materials from Deen Kaplan, Godwin wrote. 420 
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This circumstantial evidence showed that Taylor might have been closely related to Rimm’s 
study from the beginning.  
 Cathy Cleaver, director of legal studies for the Family Research Council, was another 
key designer of the CDA.421 According to Bryant and Plotnikoff’s news story, she was asked 
by Senator Coats to help create the decency provision just like Taylor was asked.422 In Reno 
v. ACLU, Taylor and Cleaver co-authored the amicus curiae brief in support of the CDA on 
behalf of 26 members of Congress.423  
ACTIVE ROLE OF RELIGIOUS RIGHT GROUPS  
 After Senator Exon introduced the CDA, a pro-CDA coalition led by religious right 
groups moved in harmony with their companion groups in Congress. Several religious right 
groups, including the Christian Coalition, Enough is Enough, Cleaver’s Family Research 
Council, and Taylor’s the National Law Center for Children and Families, began to link 
themselves as a strong political force and began to negotiate with key politicians such as 
Senators Exon and Coats.424 On June 13, 1995, one day before the voting on the Exon-Coats 
anti-pornography amendment, which faced strong opposition from pro-civil liberties 
politicians such as Senator Leahy, five religious right groups and the Chamber of Commerce 
of the United State of America sent letters to senators strongly supporting the bill.425 The 
Christian Coalition, in its letter, argued that increasing computer pornography required 
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“action, not more study,” and then urged senators to support the Exon bill “on behalf of the 
1.6 million members.” 426 Gary L. Bauer, president of the Family Research Council, also 
asked senators to support Exon’s bill “to eliminate cyberspace as a safe heaven for 
pornography.”427 These letters were circulated on Capitol Hill just before the vote on the 
Exon bill.428  
 When the anti-pornography act faced a serious attack on the “indecency standard” in 
the conference committee, religious right groups acted most aggressively to protect the CDA. 
They sent a letter proposing “a more restrictive net censorship proposal” than the Exon 
amendment under the name of eleven pro-CDA groups to Representative Thomas Bliley and 
Senator Larry Pressler, the co-chairmen of the conference committee.429 Representative Hyde, 
chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, endorsed this proposal made by the Christian 
Coalition and other members of the religious right by officially proposing it to the conference 
committee as an effective alternative to the White proposal.430 McCandish and Godwin 
pointed out that “with any Republican but Henry Hyde in control of the House conferees, the 
CDA would have died in committee.”431 However, if powerful interest groups did not 
support him, his conservative approach would have been ineffective. For example, when the 
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lawsuit against the CDA was pending in court, Enough is Enough, one of the leading 
religious right groups, presented Senator Exon the first ‘For Such a Time as This’ award for 
his leadership in passage of the CDA.432  
THE VIEW OF ISPS’ LIABILITY 
 During the controversy concerning ISPs’ liability for circulating cyberporn, religious 
right groups had attempted time and again to extend the range of ISP liability.  
Incorporating the good faith defense provision, Senator Exon stepped back from his position 
favoring strong ISP liability in order to mitigate civil liberties groups’ opposition. However, 
religious right groups did not withdraw their negative view of ISPs. 
 The testimony of Patricia Shao, a volunteer for Enough Is Enough, in the Senate 
Judiciary Committee Hearing on “Cyberporn” explained the religious rights groups’ point of 
view:    
Early this summer, my thirteen-year old daughter went to her friend’s house to 
play on the computer. … The girls were in a teenage chatroom on America 
OnLine, and were propositioned for “cybersex.” … I am aware of software 
and other “lock-out” features that I can download into my computer. But what 
happens when my children are at a neighbor’s house? … I believe in freedom 
of speech. I also believe in responsibility; responsibility by the providers of 
the online service companies to protect the innocence of children. If hard-core 
pornographic materials are illegal in the mainstream distribution channels, it 
should also be illegal on the Internet. 433 
 
 One of the important rationales of the CDA was based on imposing criminal liability. 
In the rationale of the religious right groups, persons have the responsibility of monitoring all 
the activities that occur on their services including transmitting indecent materials. 
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Consequently, imposing criminal liability was an effective and efficient tool to force ISPs to 
self-screen objectionable content on their services. As Cathy Cleaver, a director of the 
Family Research Council, pointed out, religious right groups refused to “give up the right to 
prosecute the worst offenders online,” and they believed that society had “a right to have that 
kind of criminal law.”434 Therefore, it was natural that religious right groups moved to 
impose stricter liability on ISPs.  
 When Senators Grassley and Doles proposed “The Protection of Children from 
Computer Pornography Act of 1995,”435 which was aimed at imposing on ISPs broader 
criminal liability than that of Exon’s bill, the Family Research Council actively endorsed the 
Act.436 In this bill, Senators Grassley and Doles introduced the willfulness standard.437 The 
meaning of the willfulness standard or degree of knowledge required to impose liability was 
unclear.438 However, in a letter responding to Grassley’s request, Cathy Cleaver of  the 
Family Research Council advised that “the Act is fully consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
indecency precedents,” with no serious constitutional concerns.439 When the issue of criminal 
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liability for ISPs seemed to move backwards, conservative groups such as the American 
Family Association tried to stop the movement by direct protest and suggesting alternative 
legislation. When Exon introduced his “good faith defense” provision in order to negotiate 
with the civil liberties groups, the American Family Association sent a letter to Senator Exon 
warning him that if significant changes were made, “the pro-family movement will uniformly 
oppose” his bill. 440  
 The climax of legislative attempts to impose strict criminal liability on ISPs was the 
Hyde proposal in conference committee, as mentioned above.441Even though the Hyde 
proposal ended in failure, the argument continued that the Act was not stringent enough 
because it granted too much of a safe harbor to ISPs. In particular, German legislation 
regarding ISP liability provided pro-CDA groups with an argument for imposing criminal 
liability on ISPs. In Germany, CompuServe, one of the access providers, temporarily blocked 
more than 200 sexually explicit sites and presented a list of these sites because it received a 
letter from a prosecutor to take necessary steps to avoid possible criminal penalties for 
pornography in cyberspace under German law.442 Patrick Trueman, the director of 
governmental affairs of the American Family Association, in his article observed, 
“CompuServe may have reason to fear German law but seems safe in providing pornography 
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to American citizens.” 443 Furthermore, he pointed out that it was an irony that CompuServe 
and other ISPs “may have to block pornography to German children, but are free to provide it 
to the children of America.”444 Supporting the Hyde proposal that would force ISPs 
voluntarily to restrict access to pornography by providing no defense provision, he asked, 
“[W]hy is Congress so willing to protect those who distribute and profit from computer 
pornography?” 445 In his view, the Exon-White compromise would “impose on ISPs all the 
benefits of a common carrier but none of burden.”446 Therefore, this provision would result in 
the failure to eradicate pornography on the Internet because “bad actors” would not be 
deterred from placing pornography on websites.447 The best carrot-and-stick approach was a 
“tough law,” he wrote, which represented the view of most religious right groups.448  
2.2.2. ANTI-CDA GROUPS’ APPROACH 
A COALITION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES AND INTERNET BUSINESS GROUPS.  
 Soon after Senators Exon and Gorton introduced the draft of the CDA, civil liberties 
groups noticed that it was primarily aimed at “plac[ing] substantial criminal liability on 
telecommunications service providers including telephone networks, commercial online 
                                                
443 Id.   
444 Id. 
445 Id.     
446 Id. Truemans’ article was introduced in its entirety to the House by Representative Robert K. Dornan on 
Febrary 1, 1996, just before the Congress voted on the Exon-White amendment. 
447 Id. In his letter to Senator Exon, Truman stated that Exon’s amendment “provi[ed] several defenses against 
prosecution which have the effect of gutting the current dial-a-porn law, making it useless for the prosecution of 
computer obscenity crimes.” Letter from Patrick A.Trueman to Senator Exon (April 4, 1995), available at 
http://www.cdt.org/speech/cda/950404amfam_exon_ltr.html.  
448 Id. 
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services, the Internet, and independent BBS’s.” 449 If the bill were to be enacted, it would 
compel ISPs to closely monitor every communication carried on their networks, and this 
situation “poses a substantial threat to the freedom of speech.”450 Accordingly, an alliance 
between civil liberties groups and Internet business groups was a necessary consequence.451 
The alliance organization, named the “Interactive Working Group” led by the Center for 
Democracy and Technology (hereafter CDT) immediately started to protest against the 
CDA.452 The first action of the Interactive Working Group was to send a letter to Senators 
Exon and Larry Pressler, chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, with the suggestion 
of joint research for a forward-looking solution.453 In this letter, sent in early March 1995, 
twenty-seven civil liberties groups and Internet business corporations took part, including the 
ACLU, AOL, and Time Warner.454 What is more, the number of organizations that joined the 
                                                
449 The Center for Democracy and Technology, CDT Policy Post No.1 (February 9, 1995), 
http://www.cdt.org/publications/pp10209.html.  
450 Id. 
451 The Internet business groups might divide broadly into two categories based on their specific function or 
business areas on the Internet: software makers and Internet service providers.   
452The Center for Democracy and Technology, CDT Policy Post No. 3 (March 3, 1995), 
http://www.cdt.org/publications/pp30302.html.  The core of this coalition was formed years ago as the Digital 
Privacy and Security Working Group and several other overlapping EFF-coordinated coalitions the exact 
membership and focus of which has varied depending on the legislative/regulatory calendar, new developments 
in technology, shifts in legal precedent, etc.” McCandlish and Godwin, supra note 431.  
453 Id.  
454 Id. The members of the Interactive Working Group that had signed the letter contained various kinds of 
interest groups. The list of the members was that: American Civil Liberties Union, America Online, Inc. 
Association of Research Libraries, American Society of Newspaper Editors, American Association of Law 
Librarians, American Library Association, Apple Computer, Business Software Alliance, Cavanagh Associates, 
Center for Democracy and Technology, Compuserve Incorporated, Consumer Federation of America, Cox 
Enterprises, Inc., Electronic Frontier Foundation, Electronic Messaging Association, Information Technology 
Industry Council, Interactive Services Association, Media Access Project, Newspaper Association of America, 
National Newspaper Association, National Retail Federation, People for the American Way Action Fund, 
Recreational Software Advisory Council, SmithKline Beecham, Software Publishers Association, Targetbase 
Marketing, The Internet Company, and Time Warner. In addition, some conservative organizations, such as 
CatoInstitute and PFF were on pro-CDA side. See McCandlish and Godwin, supra note 431. 
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Interactive Working Group rapidly increased. When they started the “Campaign to Stop the 
Unconstitutional Communications Decency Act,” sixty-three organizations joined the anti-
CDA force.455 
 According to McCandish and Godwin, the two interest groups, i.e., civil liberties and 
Internet business groups, had a subtle difference in their fundamental goals and lobbying 
style even though their agendas of both groups overlapped in many respects.456 The civil 
libertarians put emphasis predominantly on the need to protect the public interests, while the 
industry groups were largely concerned with protecting their business interest, that is, 
exemption from possible liability.457 However, the main goal of  the Interactive Working 
Group coalition was to bring both groups, with their somewhat different agendas, into line 
with each other.458 The fact that most of the anti-CDA congress members came from western 
states where Internet businesses such as entertainment and software industries were 
concentrated was also an important factor.  For example, Representatives Cox and Wyden 
came from respectively California and Oregon. Furthermore, Rick White was a 
representative from the state of Washington, Microsoft’s district.459    
 
 
                                                
455 The Center for Democracy and Technology, Alert- Congress May Vote Tuesday 2/1 on the CDA: Campaign 
To Stop the Net Censorship Legislation (January 1, 1996), http//www.cdt.org/speech/cda/960131alert.html. 
456 See McCandlish and Godwin, supra note 431.  
457 Id. 
458 Id 
459 White served as a representative until 1999, and then became CEO of TechNet, the technology industry 
lobbying group, based in Palo Alto. In early 2005, he left that position for another run against Maria Cantwell in 
2006. 
  90
Who Invented Section 230 
 When Senator Exon introduced his new amendment on February 1, 1995, civil 
liberties groups analyzed its harmful effect on free speech and began to develop alternative 
approaches that could replace the Exon and religious groups’ strict government regulation 
approach. Just eight days later, CDT developed an alternative approach and published it even 
though it was not elaborated.460 It stressed “user control” in opposition to the religious right’s 
“government control.” 461 In its first Policy Post, CDT explained:   
The power and flexibility of interactive media offers a unique 
opportunity to enable parents to control what content their kids have 
access to, and leave the flow of information free for those adults who 
want it. … Most interactive technology, such as Internet browsers and 
the software used to access online services such as America Online 
and Compuserve, already has the capability to limit access to certain 
types of services and selected information. … In the case of criminal 
content the originator of the content, not the carriers, should be 
responsible for their crimes. And, users (especially parents) should be 
empowered to determine what information they and their children 
have access to.462 
 
 In summary, this Policy Post proposed the basic concepts of IFFEA, such as parental 
control, “no ISPs’ criminal liability on third party content,” and “encouragement to develop 
filtering technology.” Two weeks and a few days later, CDT issued five more principles that 
alternative legislation should include to enable parents to protect children from objectionable 
material:463 federal legislation essential to protect free speech on the net, maximum reliance 
on technology to empower parents, protection for statute’s constitutionality, emphasis on 
                                                
460 The Center for Democracy and Technology, supra note 449.  
461 Id. 
462 Id. 
463 The Center for Democracy and Technology, CDT Policy Post No. 6 (March 24, 1995), 
http://www.cdt.org/publications/pp060323.html. 
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enforcement of existing statutes;464 and codification separately from the existing dial-a-porn 
statute.465  
  It was not long before CDT’s argument was echoed in the Senate. Senator Patrick 
Leahy sent a letter to Jerry Berman, the director of the CDT, and the Interactive Working 
Group, to ask for a collaborative effort.466 That effort resulted in proposal of the “Child 
Protection, User Empowerment, and Free Expression in Interactive Media Study Bill” 
(S.714) in June of 1995.467 According to a CDT Policy Post, after the passage of the Exon 
bill in the Senate in June, the Interactive Working Group began to work directly with 
Representatives Cox and Wyden to find an effective alternative that could bolster the 
parental control technology. 468 
 In the end, the basic concepts of anti-CDA groups were codified by representatives 
Cox and Wyden, who introduced the “Internet Freedom and Family Empowerment Act 
                                                
464 CDT explained that federal and state law already prohibited transportation of obscene materials. Therefore, 
Congress should examine whether new law is required. Id. This concept implanted directly into the Leahy 
amendment. This principle implied and could be extended that no other criminal penalty provision would be 
necessary; therefore, the Exon criminal law, the amendment of Section 223, also would be not required. This 
principle was embodied by the Cox-Wyden’s IFFEA. Id.   
465 CDT said that “modification of the existing section 223, originally written for the analogue telephone system, 
to regulate new interactive media causes unnecessary confusion, both for the treatment of the new technology 
and with respect to the stability of the regulation of audiotext services. If new [bill] is written, it should be stand 
on its own.” This opinion also presented in Cox-Wynde’s IFFEA, which uniquely applied to Internet business 
companies such as ISPs. Id. 
466 The Center for Democracy and Technology, CDT Policy Post No. 4 (March 16, 1995), 
http://www.cdt.org/publications/pp040316.html. 
467 See 141 CONG. REC. S8330 (daily ed. June 14, 1995). See also The Center for Democracy and Technology, 
POLICY POST No. 8, April 7, 1995, available at http:// www.cdt.org/publications/pp10209.html., or subsection 
of this thesis “Reaction to Exon’s Proposal & Impact of Prodigy case.” Senator Leahy openly stated in the 
Senate, “A number of groups support the approach  of the Leahy study, including civil liberties groups, 
librarians, online providers, newspaper editors and others.” See 141 CONG. REP. S8341 (daily ed. June 14, 
1995). Furthermore, Leahy said that over 35,000 people signed an electronic petition in support of the Leahy 
study. Id.   
468 The Center for Democracy and Technology, POLICY POST No. 23, August 4, 1995, available at  
http://www.cdt.org/publications/pp230804.html.    
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(IFFEA, HR.1978),” which included the provisions concerning parental control, no criminal 
penalties for ISPs, and granting ISPs civil immunity for Good Samaritan blocking. 469 The 
Cox-Wyden amendment favored the Internet business industry because it would offer the 
broadest immunity among the amendments that had been introduced until then. At this time, 
Internet business groups championed the Cox-Wyden amendment in the frontline of the 
battle and tried to create a more favorable environment for its acceptance. The Commercial 
Interest Exchange Association, an organization with a membership of 160 ISPs, had sent a 
letter to urge every representative to support the Cox-Wyden amendment just one day before 
the House voted on it. 470 On July 17, 1995, America Online announced that it had entered a 
partnership with SurfWatch Software and would provide its service to prevent children from 
accessing sites that contained sexually explicit material.471 CompuServe also announced a 
partnership with SPRY Inc., which developed the parental control software “Internet in a 
Box” about the same time. 472  
 According to the Reno court, parental control software was first introduced in August 
1995 by Microsystems Software, Inc., when the controversy was heating up over the 
                                                
469 141 CONG. REC. H8468 (daily ed. August 4, 1995). See also Appendix Three. The original version of Cox-
Wyden Bill (H.R.1978).  
470 Letter from Robert D. Collet, the president of the Commercial Internet Exchange Association, to 
Representatives (August 3, 1995). In November 9, 1995, thirty seven Internet business companies and related 
Interest groups, including AOL, AT&T, Bell Atlantic, Time Warner Inc., and CompuServe, sent a letter to the 
conference committee in the Senate and the House. In this mail, they urged the support for Cox-Wyden-White 
bill and asked the opportunity to brief the committee in their ongoing efforts to assist the law enforcement. 
471 The Center for Democracy and Technology, Interactive Working Group Report to Senator Leahy: Parental 
Empowerment, Child Protection, & Free Speech in Interactive Media (July 24, 1995), 
http://www.cdt.org/speech/cda/950724iwg_leahy.html. According to this report, Surf Watch Software was 
designed to provide parental control for families who do not subscribe to commercial online services. Surf 
Watch allows parents to block their children's access to Usenet newsgroups, World Wide Web sites that are 
known to contain sexually explicit material. When activated with a private password held only by a parent, Surf 
Watch completely prevents any user from accessing these areas. This software resides on the home PC. Id. 
472 Id. 
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introduction of the CDA and the Cox/Wyden amendment passed the House.473  Soon after 
the CDA passed both Congress on February 1, 1996, Microsystems signed a licensing 
agreement with CompuServe and Prodigy.474 The facts that Congress’s legislation passed 
simultaneously with the development of the filtering technologies and that ISPs adopted 
those technologies immediately showed how members of congress and the Internet industry 
closely interacted with each other, moreover, how Section 230 reflected on Internet business 
industries.    
THE VIEW OF ISPS’ LIABILITY 
 Anti-CDA groups contended that regulating ISPs was an inappropriate strategy from 
the beginning because of the nature of the Internet. In the Senate hearing, Jerry Berman, 
executive director of the Center for Democracy and Technology, stated that “criminalizing 
behavior of service providers [was] not an effective means of protecting children from 
indecent material.”475 According to his argument, it would be impractical for ISPs to control  
each and every one of the millions of U.S. and international citizens who speak daily 
online.476 Furthermore, the global nature of the Internet would be another barrier to control of 
the Internet contents because “much of obscene material is accessible from the United States 
but transmitted from other countries, beyond the practical reach of U.S. law.” 477 
                                                
473 See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 840-41 (E.D. Pa.1996). 
474 Id. 
475Cyberporn and Children: The Protection of Children from Computer Pornography Act of 1995: Hearings on 
S. 892 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 169 (1995) (Testimony of Jerry Berman, 
Executive Director Center for Democracy and Technology), available at 
http://www.dct.org/speech/cda/950724crimmins.html.  
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 Therefore, ISPs and civil liberties groups’ fundamental position was opposition to any 
kind of criminal liability for ISPs. Interestingly, like the extreme conservative groups’ 
opposing the introduction of the “good faith defense” provision of the Exon amendment, civil 
liberties groups also did not welcome that provision because the limitation of the ISPs’ 
liability would still be “weak and threaten” the nature of the internet. 478CDT criticized 
Exon’s new bill saying it would force ISPs to exercise control as “new gatekeepers” instead 
of the federal government.479  In their view, facing potential criminal liability would force 
ISPs to employ all available measures to restrict or prevent access by minors in order to 
maximize their likelihood of availing themselves of this defense. Thus, in the long run, it 
would “spell the end of the open, decentralized communication environment” of the 
Internet.480 
 It is difficult to find any statement about civil liability of the ISPs during the period 
from the introduction to the enactment of the CDA in civil liberties groups’ writings.481 
When the Cox-Wyden bill (H1978) passed the House, the CDT welcomed just removal of 
“disincentives for online service providers” to exercise editorial control over their content, 
but made no mention of civil immunity beyond this.482 Civil liberties groups focused on 
                                                
478 The Center for Democracy and Technology, CDT Policy Post No. 19 (June 20, 1995), 
http://www.cdt.org/publications/pp190620.html. 
479 Id. 
480 Id. 
481 See Electronic Frontier Foundation, EFF Statement on 1996 Telecommunications Regulation Bill (February 
1, 1996), http://www.eff.org/Censorship/Internet_censorship_bills/cda_960201_eff.statement.  
482 The Center for Democracy and Technology, CDT Policy Post No. 23 (August 4, 1995),  
http://www.cdt.org/publications/pp230804.html. According to the Good Samaritan provision, the CDT post said, 
“The bill would remove liability for providers of interactive communications services who take good faith steps 
to restrict access to obscene or indecent materials to minors or provide software or hardware to enable their 
users to block objectionable material.(section (2)(c)) In addition, the bill would overturn the recent court 
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eliminating criminal liability and the disadvantage of Good Samaritan blocking, not granting 
broad civil immunity, to ISPs. 483    
2.2.3.  EVALUATION OF RENO V. ACLU 
EVOLUTION OF THE CASE 
 The ink used by President Clinton in signing the Telecommunication Act of 1996 into 
the law was hardly dry when battle began in court over the constitutionality of the CDA. 
Civil liberties groups led by the ACLU filed a lawsuit against Attorney General Reno and the 
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) in a U.S. District Court in Pennsylvania.484 Internet 
business groups such as AOL, Microsoft Network, Apple Computer Inc, and CompuServe 
Inc. actively came out in the frontline of the battle by filing a similar action in the same court 
                                                                                                                                                  
decision (Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) which held Prodigy 
liable for content on its network because the service screens for sexually explicit material and language.  
Prodigy now faces a $200 million lawsuit.” CDT’s interpretation is significant because the language of the 
CDA clearly explains that the Good Samaritan provision is applicable only when ISPs exercised editorial 
control, not granting perfect civil immunity for ISPs.  
483 Id. 
484 See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 827 (E.D. Pa. 1996). The plaintiffs were the American Civil Liberties 
Union; Human Rights Watch; Electronic Privacy Information Center; Electronic Frontier 
Foundation; Journalism Education Association; Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility; National 
Writers Union; Clarinet Communications Corp.; Institute for Global Communications; Stop Prisoner Rape; 
AIDS Education Global Information System; Bibliobytes; Queer Resources Directory; Critical Path AIDS 
Project, Inc.; Wildcat Press, Inc.; Declan McCullagh d/b/a Justice on Campus; Brock Meeks d/b/a Cyberwire 
Dispatch; John Troyer d/b/a The Safer Sex Page; Jonathan Wallace d/b/a The Ethical Spectacle; and Planned 
Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. Id. What is more, Joe Shea, a newspaper editor, also brought a First 
Amendment challenge to the CDA at a district court of New York on Feb. 17, 1996. See Shea v. Reno, 930 F. 
Supp. 916, 922 (S.D.N.Y.1996). Plaintiffs of this suit included the American Liabrary Association; American 
Online, Inc.; American Booksellers Association, Inc.; American Booksellers Foundation for Free Expression; 
American Society of Newspaper Editors; Apple Computer, Inc.; Association of American Publishers, Inc.; 
Association of Publishers, Editors and Writers; Citizens Internet Empowerment Coalition; Commercial Internet 
Exchange Association; CompuServe Incorporated; Families 
Against Internet Censorship; Freedom to Read Foundation, Inc.; Health Sciences Libraries Consortium; 
Hotwired Ventures LLC; Interactive Digital Software Association; Interactive Services Association; Magazine 
Publishers of America; Microsoft Corporation; The Microsoft Network, L.L.C.; National Press 
Photographers Association; Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc.; Newspaper Association of 
America; Opnet, Inc.; Prodigy Services Company; Society of Professional Journalists; Wired Ventures, Ltd. Id. 
at 829. Two cases were consolidated for all matters relating to the preliminary injunction. Id. at 827-28.  
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on Feb. 27, 1996.485 Anti-CDA groups challenged not the entire the CDA, but sections 
223(a)486 and 223(d)487 of the CDA. They argued these “indecent transmission” and “patently 
offensive display” provisions, which made it a crime to send offensive Internet material to 
persons under the age eighteen, would chill adult speech.488 The district court decided the 
case on June 11, 1996, finding the CDA facially unconstitutional. 489 Judge Buckwalter and 
Chief Judge Sloviter found the CDA unconstitutionally overbroad under the First 
Amendment and unconstitutionally vague under the Fifth Amendment.490 Judge Dalzell 
                                                
485 Id. at 828.  
486 Section 223(a)(1)(B) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly  
(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and (ii) initiates the transmission of, any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, 
image, or other communication which is obscene or indecent, knowing that the recipient of the communication 
is under 18 years of age, regardless of whether the maker of such communication placed the call or initiated the 
communication; 
487 Section 223(d) Whoever (1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly (A) uses an interactive 
computer service to send to a specific person or persons under 18 years of age, or 
(B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a manner available to a person under 18 years of age, 
any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication that, in context, depicts or 
describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory 
activities or organs, regardless of whether the user of such service placed the call or initiated the 
communication; or 
(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under such persons control to be used for an activity 
prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that it be used for such activity, 
shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. 
488 ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 829. 
489 Id. A three-judge panel convened to adjudicate the ACLU’s claim. Judges Dolores Sloviter, came from the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; Ronald Buckwalter, from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania; and Stewart Dalzell, also from the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania wrote a separate opinions but unanimously held that the CDA was 
unconstitutional. 
490 ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 858-59 (Judge Buckwalter), 857 (Judge Sloviter). Chief Judge Sloviter argued,  
“Whatever the strength of the interest the government has demonstrated in preventing minors from accessing 
‘indecent’ and ‘patently offensive’ material on-line, if the means it has chosen sweeps more broadly than 
necessary and thereby chills the expression of adults, it has overstepped onto rights protected by the First 
Amendment.” Furthermore, she also agreed with the ACLU’s claim that CDA’s provision could be used to 
censor the materials which were widely considered educational, artistic, or newsworthy. She concluded, “The 
CDA is patently a government-imposed content-based restriction on speech, and the speech at issue, whether 
denominated ‘indecent’ or ‘patently offensive,’ is entitled to constitutional protection” See, ACLU, 929 F. Supp. 
at 919-25. Judge Buckwalter stated that the safe harbor defense would not be available because current 
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found the CDA overbroad but not vague. 491 Based on the speech-enhancing and democratic 
character of the Internet, he concluded that “the disruptive effect of the CDA on Internet 
communication, as well as the CDA’s broad reach into protected speech, not only render the 
Act unconstitutional but also would render unconstitutional any regulation of protected 
speech on this new medium.”492  
 On June 26, 1997, in a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s 
decision invalidating the CDA’s “indecent” and “patently offensive” provisions by finding 
those provisions abridged freedom of speech.493 Even though anti-CDA groups failed to bar 
the passage of the CDA in Congress, they led the court battle against pro-CDA groups. The 
Court’s ruling was a “a clear rejection of the views of far-right groups.”494 Ira Glasser, 
ACLU executive director, also pointed out, “Everyone knew the CDA was unconstitutional, 
but Congress passed the law and the President signed it.”  He concluded, “This was why 
independent courts are required to protect liberty.”495   
 The Court addressed seven main reasons why 223(a) and 223(d) were 
unconstitutional : (1) the two provisions were content-based blanket restrictions on speech; 
(2) there was no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be 
applied to Internet; (3) unclear definitions of “indecent” and “patently offensive” caused First 
                                                                                                                                                  
technology cannot support it, “thus rendering the statute unconstitutional under analysis of this issue.” See id. at 
858. 
491 Id. at 867-69, 883. 
492 Id. at 867 
493 521 U.S. 844 (1997).  
494 Citizens Internet Empowerment Coalion, U.S. Supreme Court Rules on Communications Decency Act (June 
26, 1997) (Statement of Elliot Mincberg, Executive Director of People for the American Way). 
http://www.ciec.org/SC_appeal/970626_CIEC.shtml 
495 ACLU, Hails Supreme Court Victory in Internet Censorship Challenge (June 27, 1997) 
http://www.aclu.org/privacy/speech/15493prs19970627.html 
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Amendment controversies; (4) the overly broad of scope of the two provisions would impose 
a heavy burden on the federal government to explain why a less restrictive provision would 
not be as effective; (5) the two provisions were not narrowly tailored to the goal of protecting 
minors; (6) the safe harbor defenses provision did not serve to narrowly tailor the regulation; 
(7) the government’s assertion that an interest in fostering the growth of the Internet provided 
an independent basis for upholding the constitutionality of 223(a) and 223(d) was 
unpersuasive.496 
Revisiting the Court’s Decision  
 In Reno v. ACLU, the Court provided a very clear decision on the basis of the First 
Amendment: “the important words in the CDA were unconstitutionally vague.”497  Strictly 
speaking, the Court’s decision was an answer to the scope of the CDA and its 
constitutionality, not an answer to Senator Exon’s approach to protect minors from cyberporn, 
in other words, to whether government regulation of the Internet by imposing criminal 
liability on ISPs could be constitutional.  
                                                
496 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
497 MIDDLETON et all, supra note 43 at 416. According to the Court, the CDA’s undefined terms incurred special 
concerns because the CDA constituted “content–based regulation of speech,” therefore it would be able to 
influence the free flow of expression. Furthermore, the CDA was a criminal statute which possiblely threaten to 
silence. Concerning this point, the Government argued that the CDA’s “patently offensive” standard was no 
more vague obscenity standard than the obscenity standard that was established in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 
15 (1973). In Miller, the Court established three-prong text for obscenity. Government maintained that the 
CDA’s standard was a part of the second prong of the Miller test, which defined that “(b) whether the work 
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state 
law.” However, the Court rejected this argument because the CDA’s standard lacked critical requirement of 
Miller test, i.e., “specially defined by the applicable state law.” Therefore, the CDA would ban offensive or 
indecent material that has literary, artistic, political, or scientific value although that material would be protected 
for the adult due to its social value. Furthermore, unclearly defined terms “patently offensive” and “indecent” 
would cause self-censorship even though their massage would be entitled to constitutional protection. See 521 
U.S. at 872-74.  
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 In terms of governmental regulation of the Internet, the Court’s stance was unclear.498 
Showing an opposition to censorship of the Internet, the Court said that “governmental 
regulation of the content of speech is more likely to interfere with the free exchange of ideas 
than to encourage it.” 499 Therefore, “the interest in encouraging freedom of expression in a 
democratic society,” wrote Justice John Paul Stevens, “outweighs any theoretical but 
unproven benefit of censorship.”500  
 However, the Court agreed to use the severability clause of the Act501 to sever the 
“indecency” provision, both Section 223 (a) and 223 (d) of the CDA, leaving the rest of the 
obscenity section standing.502 It suggested that government could constitutionally prohibit 
obscenity on the Internet and did not entirely reject the imposition of criminal liability on the 
transmitters and creators of cyberporn as long as it met the legal definition of obscenity. 
Furthermore, the Court left open the possibility that if the CDA regulation of indecency were 
to be a more narrowly tailored, it could be held constitutional. Even though its main parts, 
indecency provisions, were held unconstitutional, the rest of the CDA, including the “safe 
harbor” provision protecting ISPs from being liable for the words of others, was not affected 
by this decision and remained law. 
 Significantly, Section 230 of the CDA, the provision granting ISPs civil immunity for 
third-party postings, also remained in effect. The reason was very simple. This provision was 
                                                
498  But the Supreme Court’s ruling that the Internet is entitled to the highest level of First Amendment 
protection means government regulation would be difficult.  
499521 U.S. at 885.  
500 Id. 
501 47 U.S.C.A. § 608 (West Supp. 1997). 
502 521 U.S. at 883. 
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not at issue in the case because the ACLU did not challenge it. In fact, when the ACLU filed 
a suit at Pennsylvania District Court, it claimed there was confusion since there was a 
different defense for ISPs liability in Section 223, the good faith defense provision, and 
Section 230 (c)(1), the Good Samaritan protection provision. However, that claim 
disappeared in the trial.503  
  The anti-CDA groups’ main purpose in the suit was not only to nullify the core 
provisions of the CDA but also to invalidate the criminal penalty approach of the religious 
right groups. For the Internet business groups, the latter was more important. For example, 
the Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.A. argued in an amicus curiae brief that the imposition 
of sweeping criminal penalties based on the content of the Internet would “produce a chilling 
effect on business use of online communications and severely threaten the development of 
this important infrastructure.”504 
  In Reno v. ACLU, the Court did not expressively endorse Section 230. However, the 
Court revealed its opinion by supporting “parent control,” the essential idea of  Section 230, 
saying that technology would be a constitutionally acceptable way to prevent children’s 
access to indecent material. Justice Stevens addressed his affirmative view of parent control 
                                                
503 ACLU, Compl. ACUL v. Reno, No. 96-963 (E.D. Pa. Feb.8, 1996). Available at 
http://www.epic.org/free_speech/censorship/lawsuit/complaint.html.  In Complaint, the ACLU argued that “. 
Section 230(c)(1) provides: “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the 
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” This section 
appears to conflict with new 47 U.S.C. Sec. 223(e), which only provides a defense if a “facility, system, or 
network” on which “indecent” or “patently offensive” material appears is not under the control.” The ACLU 
also argued, “The defenses provided under the statute are vague and contradictory. It is not clear what 47 U.S.C. 
Sec. 223(e)(1) means by a “facility, system, or network” not being “under [the] control” of a person since even 
online providers who do not themselves create the content of communications over their systems can 
technologically exercise “control” over the communications for which they are conduits. It is also not clear 
whether 47 U.S.C. Sec. 230(c)(1) provides a defense for anyone who is not a “publisher or speaker.” Thus, 
those who act in part as access providers or hosts for interactive communications cannot know to what extent 
they will be held liable for “indecent” or “patently offensive” communications to minors.”  
504 See Brief for ACLU as Amicus Curiae, the Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.A, Reno v. ACLU (929 
F.Supp.824 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (No.96-511).  
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citing the lower court finding: “Currently available user-based software suggests that a 
reasonably effective method by which parents can prevent their children from accessing 
sexually explicit and other material which parents may believe is inappropriate for their 
children will soon be widely available.”505 Such a statement by the Court brought to mind the 
language of Section 230, that one important goal of the Act was “to remove disincentives for 
the development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents 
to restrict their children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate online material.”506 
 In contrast, the Court rejected the government argument that the good faith defense 
provision of the CDA507 could constitute the sort of “narrowly tailoring” that would save the 
CDA.508 The Court stated this defense was technologically illusory because no proposed 
screening software existed that could block all tagged material. Furthermore, the Court did 
not recognize the effectiveness of credit card and age verification to narrow the CDA 
provision’s scope.509 According to the Court, there was no effective way to determine the 
identity or the age of a user accessing material through e-mail or a chat room. Credit card 
                                                
505 521 U.S. at 877.  
506 47 U.S.C.A.§ 230 (b)(4) (West Supp. 1997).  
507 47 U.S.C.A. § 223 (e)(5) (West Supp. 1997). The text of the provision is: § 223 (e) (5) It is a defense to a 
prosecution under subsection (a)(1)(B) or (d), or under subsection (a)(2) with  respect to the use of a facility for 
an activity under subsection (a)(1)(B) that a person (A) has taken, in good faith, reasonable, effective, and 
appropriate actions under the circumstances to restrict or prevent access by minors to a communication 
specified in such subsections, which may involve any appropriate measures to restrict minors from such 
communications, including any method which is feasible under available technology; or (B) has restricted 
access to such communication by requiring use of a verified credit card, debit account, adult access code, or 
adult personal identification number.  
508 See 521 U.S. at 848. According to the government argument, ISPs may take protective “good faith action,” 
for example, by “tagging” their indecent communications in a way that would indicate their contents, thus 
permitting recipients (parents) to block their reception with appropriate software. Therefore, such actions of 
ISPs could be effective.  
509 See 521 U.S. at 857. 
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verification would not be economically feasible for most noncommercial websites due to the 
cost of installing and maintaining such a system.510  
 One important aspect that must be pointed out is that the Court’s standard toward two 
kinds of technologies, parental control software and ISP defense software, was quite different 
although both of them had technological weaknesses. In fact, parental control software could 
screen only “certain suggestive words or known sexually explicit sites,” and it could not 
screen “sexually explicit images” at that time.511 However, the Court recognized parental 
control software as being an “effective method” to protect children from cyberporn.512 This  
implied the Court preferred user control to ISP control or government regulation of the 
contents of the Internet. 
 In summary, Reno v. ACLU was a “decisive victory” for civil libertarians. They 
successfully invalidated the crux of the CDA reversing their failure in Congress. Section 230, 
which embodied the family empowerment idea represented by parental controls, was left as 
the only solution for cyberporn because Section 230 was not affected by the Court’s decision. 
More importantly, even though the Court did not clearly rule, Internet business groups got an 
endorsement of the effectiveness of parental control technology and opposition to 
government regulation on cyberspace.   
2.3.  FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 From the time when Senator Exon proposed it to when the Court held that its 
indecency provisions violated the Constitution, the CDA had its ups and downs. In the Senate, 
                                                
510 See 521 U.S. at 855-57. 
511 See 521 U.S. at 855. 
512 Id. 
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the original version of the CDA was passed as a legal detergent to clean up Internet 
pollution.513 However, the House chose the IFFEA, the original version of Section 230, as a 
reaction to the Exon bill. Even though the conference committee reached a compromise 
between the two drafts, the Court held the core provisions of the CDA unconstitutional. 
However, Section 230 remained intact. Furthermore, the legislative history showed that it 
was a reasonable assumption that all actions and reactions to the CDA were the result of the 
conflict between two sharply divided forces inside and outside of Congress and their 
conflicting views of the Internet. To reflect both forces’ interest, Congress made a deformed 
law, which contained two conflicting approaches in one law concerning who should and how 
to govern cyberporn and the new information superhighway.514 It was an easy and hasty 
compromise with a combination of the two provisions.  
 In the end, the vicissitudes of the CDA resulted in several adverse effects. Different 
groups involved in the drafting of the CDA had different ideas about the meaning of the 
Section 230. In particular, misinformation on a number of issues has led to much confusion 
regarding the purpose, scope, and necessity of Section 230. 
 1. Rough Law with No Consideration of Tort.  
 The most remarkable lesson to be gained from the legislative history of the CDA is 
that the scope and the meaning of the Section 230 cannot be understood without 
consideration of the entire perspective of the CDA.  
 The CDA, both Section 223 and Section 230, is fundamentally designed to find a 
legal solution for protecting children from pornography on the Internet. Senator Exon clearly 
                                                
513 See 104 CONG. REP S8329 (daily ed. June 14, 1995). 
514 See Cannon, supra note 279, at 68. 
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started that the CDA “stands for the simple premise that it is wrong to provide pornography 
to children on a computer just as it is wrong to do it on a street corner or anywhere else.” 515 
Furthermore, supporting the IFFEA, Representative Goodlatte also emphasized that the Cox-
Wyden amendment is a “thoughtful approach to keep smut off the net without government 
censorship.”516  
 If that is so, how did Section 230 become the law for governing defamation and other 
torts on the Internet?  There is no direct reference to defamation or tort law in the legislative 
history of the CDA. Neither senators nor representatives clearly mentioned tort liability in 
Congress. The only reference was in the Conference Report of Section 230, which said that 
“one of the specific purposes of this section is to overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy,”517 
which dealt with the matter of a defamatory story, not pornography.518   
 However, it seemed that the main reason Congress paid attention to this case was 
unrelated to the fact that it was a libel case. More exact reasons might have been that Prodigy 
was a family oriented website, and that Prodigy employed “screening and blocking software 
that keep obscenity off” its network.519 According to Representative Cox, the “existing legal 
system provided a massive disincentive” rather than encouragement for the people who 
might best help control the Internet, and Stratton-Oakmont was a typical example of this 
                                                
515 Jim Exon, 95 The Communications Decency Act, 49 FED. COMM. L. J. 95 (1996).  
516 141 CONG. REC. H8471 (daily ed. August. 4, 1995). The House Report on H.1555 (the House version of 
Telecommunication Reform Bill) summarized that Section 230 was to provide liability protection for on-line 
service providers who take steps to “clean up the Internet.” See H. REP. NO.104-458, summary of the section 
230 (1996). 
517  H. R. CONF. REP. NO.104-458, at 194 (1996). However, in Conference Report provided no more comment 
about the scope of section 230, that is, whether this provision could cover defamation and other tort cases or not. 
518 See subsection of the thesis chapter 1. 1.1.3. INTERNET LIBEL CASES BEFORE ADOPTION OF THE CDA. 
519 141 CONG. REC. H8469 (daily ed. August 4, 1995).  
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ironic situation.520 Therefore, Congress stated in Section 230 that one of the policies of the 
U.S. was “to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and 
filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict their children’s access to objectionable 
or inappropriate online material.”521 Decisions such as Stratton-Oakmont “create serious 
obstacles” to attaining this policy, according to the Conference Report.522  
 Both the good faith defense provision of Section 223 and the Good Samaritan 
protection provision of Section 230 were reactions to Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy. However, 
no congressman discussed this defense in terms of defamation or tort liability.  
 In the civil liberties groups’ records there is also no reference to defamation or tort 
liability of ISPs during the period of congressional consideration of the CDA.523 For instance, 
when the Cox-Wyden amendment passed the House, the Center for Democracy & 
Technology focused its analysis on the difference between the Senate-passed Exon bill and 
its new approach to protecting children from pornography.524 Concerning the Good 
Samaritan provision, the CDT reiterated Representative Cox’s argument. One interesting 
point is that the CDT focused the scope of Section 230 very narrowly on “obscene or 
indecent material” without extension to tort liability:  
                                                
520 Id. 
521 47 U.S.C.A. § 230 (b)(4).  
522 H. REP. NO.104-458, at 194 (1996).  
523 The Center for Democracy & Technology, the leading anti-CDA group, published their Policy Post 57 times 
and also Proposal analysis 5 times from February 1995 when Exon proposed his original proposal in the Senate 
to July 1997 when Congress held the CDA unconstitutional. However, no mention about defamation or Tort law 
with the context of ISPs liability or Section 230. available at, http://www.cdt.org/publications/pposts1995.shtml, 
and http://www.cdt.org/publications/pposts1996.shtml 
524 The Center for Democracy and Technology, CDT Policy Post No 23, August 4,1995. available at http:// 
www.cdt.org/publications/pp10209.html. The CDT addressed, “Unlike the Senate-passed Exon/Coats 
Communications Decency Act (CDA), the Cox/Wyden amendment ensures that individuals and parents can 
decide for themselves what information they or their children receive.” 
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The bill would remove liability for providers of interactive communications 
services who take good faith steps to restrict access to obscene or indecent 
materials to minors or provide software or hardware to enable their users to 
block objectionable material. 525 
 
The letter from Commercial Internet eXchange Association (“CIX”) to House 
members also asserted that the purpose of the Cox-Wyden bill was to immunize ISPs that 
monitor and screen content “in order to create family-oriented service.”526  
 What does it mean that there was no reference to defamation or tort liability for ISPs 
in the record of Congress and civil liberties groups? This situation might reasonably lead to 
three significant assumptions.  
 First, in spite of the language of the congressional record about Stratton-Oakmont v. 
Prodigy, this is not sufficient to imply that section 230 can be applied to libel cases and 
furthermore, to all torts cases. The main concern of Congress was not only to absolve ISPs of 
liability but also to protect the plaintiffs’ reputation from the possible defamatory posting. 
Congress’ concern was focused on how to protect children from cyberporn. In other words, 
this law is not for libel or tort, but the law for to regulating cyberporn.  To effectively 
regulate the cyberporn, Congress just intended to eliminate the disincentive of Good 
Samaritan blocking.     
 Second,  until Section 230 of the CDA made it into law by passing both the Senate 
and the House, no stakeholder in the CDA might have considered the extension of the reach 
of the CDA from cyberporn to defamation or all torts.  
                                                
525 The Center for Democracy and Technology, CDT Policy Post No.31 (December 4, 1995). http:// 
www.cdt.org/publications/pp311204.html. Regarding to the White amendment, the CDT Post simply mentioned 
that this bill would protect ISPs from “vicarious liability for transmitting their subscribers messages or for 
merely providing access to the Internet.”. 
526 Letter from CIX , the president of the Commercial Internet Exchange Association, to Representatives 
(August 3, 1995). http//:www.eff.org/Censorship/Internet_censorship-bills/cix_hr1555-95_cox-
wyden_080395.letter.  
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 The last but most important point is that, even though the Good Samaritan provision 
can be broadly applied to all tort cases including defamation because of the simple 
mentioning of the Stratton-Oakmont case, it cannot avoid the criticism that it should be 
considered poor law.  
 When the CDA finally passed Congress, Representative Howard Berman (D-Calf.) 
criticized the conference committee’s hasty processing of the bill. Bernard stated, “No 
hearings were held by any committee of jurisdiction” with regard to the conference 
committee’s bill.527 Furthermore, “[H]aving failed to engage in this inquiry and analysis, we 
have a conference report which assumes that the broadcast indecency standard can simply be 
applied whole-sale to displays of the online content.”528 “A quick review of the political 
process” showed “how bad legislation occurs when the content of a bill is kept from public 
scrutiny,” the Electronic Frontier Foundation argued in a statement.529 These criticisms are 
appropriate and can be directly applied to Section 230. There were no references, no 
discussion, no public hearings on Section 230, in particular, in terms of extension to the libel 
and torts law. Neither the suitability of the legislation nor the scope of the Good Samaritan 
provision was under scrutiny. As a result, unclear and unverified assumptions became a 
principle law governing defamation and other torts on cyberspace.     
2. CAN SECTION 230 TO APPLY TO DEFAMATION ON THE INTERNET? 
 A closer look at Section 230 raises doubt about the logic of its application. Is it 
appropriate to apply the rationale of Section 230 to defamation or other torts cases?   
                                                
527 142 CONG. REC. H1166 (daily ed, February 1, 1996).  
528 Id. 
529 Electronic Frontier Foundation, Your Constitutional Right Have Been Sacrificed for Political Expediency, 
EFF Statement (Feb. 1, 1996). http://www. Eff.org/Censorship/ 
Internet_censorship_bills/cda_960201_eff.statement. 
  108
 The starting point of the rationale of Section 230 is the concept of “parental control,” 
a kind of user control. That is, the most effective way to protect children from pornography is 
for parents to decide for themselves what information their children receive.530 Thus, the 
philosophy in the original version of Section 230, that self-regulating without penalty is “the 
best way to police the Internet,” is enshrined.531 Proponents of this legislation believed that 
available blocking technology can make this approach successful.532  In summary, the 
rationale of Section 230 may be assumed to be that ISPs should be immunized from liability 
for circulating pornography because parental control is sufficient to protect children with the 
help of cutting-edge filtering technologies.    
 Here, the rationale of Section 230 raises the two significant questions.  
 First, we must review whether the parental control rationale can be an available and 
effective way to police Internet libel in the same way as pornography. To answer this 
question, it is important to understand the different natures of online defamation and 
pornography on the Internet.  
                                                
530 See 142 CONG. REC. H8470 (daily ed. August 4, 1995), See also Cyberporn and Children: The Scope of the 
Problem, the State of the Technology, and the Need for Congressional Action: Hearing on S.892, before the 
Senate,104th Cong. 104-438 (1995) (Statement of Sen.Patrick Leahy).  
531 Id. Senator Leahy argued, “This [Cox/Wyden amendment] is the best way to police the Internet without 
unduly restricting free speech or squelching the growth of this fantastic new communications medium. It is 
parents, not the government, who should decide what restrictions to place on their children's access to that 
which they consider objectionable: whether it is beer advertising, or fantastic card games that some parents 
believe promote interest in the occult. Available blocking technology can make pornographic Usenet news 
groups or World Wide Web sites off-limits to children.” 
532 Id. 
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 Section 230 employed the term “user control” instead of parental control as a broader 
concept.533 Parental control is not appropriate to Internet libel because the objects of Internet 
libel are mainly adults not children. According to this logic, users are empowered to decide 
what they want to get on the Internet.534 On the contrary, in case of libel, the defamed have a 
right to protect their reputation with the hundreds of thousands users who want to get the 
information about the alleged defamation.  
 The intrinsic distinction between cyberporn and online defamation can become 
clearer when comparing them in terms of damage. Under the logic of parental control, 
regardless of whether ISPs display or transmit indecent materials, they can enjoy 
immunity.535 As “computer coffee shops” providing access to information,536 ISPs have no 
responsibility for pornography on the Internet. The responsibility to protect children from 
cyberporn would lie with the parent (user) because parents choose what their children are 
entitled to see.  
 Significantly, no harm to children is caused until children get pornography from the 
Internet under the parental control rationale. If only children don’t watch the indecent 
materials whether by means of filtering and screening technology or not, hundreds of 
millions cyberporn that are circulated on the Internet are beyond the concern of Section 230. 
                                                
533 See 47 U.S.C.A.§ 230 (b)(3). In this sub-provision, section 230 articulates that it is a U.S policy to 
“encourage the development of technologies which maximize user control over what information is received by 
individuals, families, and schools who used the Internet and other interactive computer service.” 
534 See 142 CONG. REC. H8470 (daily ed. August 4, 1995). 
535 When ISPs or individuals knowingly transmit pornography on the Internet, they would be punishable by the 
Section 223 of the CDA. However, Section 223 was invalidated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Reno. 
However, regardless of section 223, the parent control rationale basically rejects any criminal penalty or civil 
liability for transmitting the cyberporn.  
536 Reno, 521 U.S. at 850. 
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That is, just republication by posting pornography on their service does not invite the civil 
damages to users (parent or children), if  parents successfully isolate children from the 
cyberporn.           
 However, the nature of defamation is quite different from that of cyberporn. Under 
common law, harm to reputation “would normally be assumed to flow from a defamatory 
publication of the nature involved,” 537 that is, general damage to reputation will be assumed 
as soon as defamatory statements are [re]published and circulated to others. Furthermore, this 
presumption of harm to reputation from a defamatory publication may mean that the defamed 
is entitled to claim general damages.538 In a defamation case, unlike cyberporn, it does not 
matter whether particular users filter defamatory stories. What is important is whether 
defamatory story is [re]published or not. Once defamatory stories are republished by posted 
by third party, damage to reputation may be occurred because of the high possibility of being 
viewed by other people. Furthermore, in case of cyber-porn, users may be simultaneously 
plaintiffs who suffered injury. On the contrary, in case of the Internet libel, most of the 
plaintiffs are not users but third parties who are defamatory described. Accordingly, user’s 
interest is directly related to self-control in cyberporn, in case of online defamation, self-
control is much less relevant to user’s interest because defamatory stories may not aim at 
user.   
 Second, it should be verified whether technologies for user control are available for 
online defamation.      
                                                
537 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 621(1977). 
538 Id. 
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 No detailed information about filtering technologies exists in the legislative record of 
the CDA.539 However, in ACLU v. Reno, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania reviewed user control software programs, and concluded that these 
technologies were a “reasonably effective method” for shielding children from objectionable 
material based on the parents’ own values and tastes.540 According to the district court, 
parental control technologies can screen for certain suggestive words or for known sexually 
explicit sites.541 For example, Cyber Patrol, software designed for parents control, had the 
“CyberNot list,” which contained approximately 7,000 sites in twelve categories. 542 The 
software made it possible for parents to selectively block access to any or all of the twelve 
CyberNot categories simply by checking boxes in the Cyber Patrol program manager. To 
make the list, Microsystems employed staffs to search the sites.543 
 This technology may enable parents to block pornography and inappropriate websites 
from their children. However, it is very iffy assumption that this software can filter libelous 
postings to prevent users from viewing them. The Seigenthaler case, mentioned in the 
Introduction of this thesis, is a good example. Can Cyber Patrol software filter Seigenthaler’s 
defamatory biography posted on Wikipedia?  
                                                
539 Before the vote to Cox/Wyden amendment in the House, Representative Wyden presented some filtering 
software in the House floor. Wyden stated that the products were “reasonably priced and available”, simply to 
make clear that it is possible for parents “to child-proof the family computer” with this technology. However, he 
provided more detailed information about how the software can screen technically pornography on the home 
computer. See 141 CONG. REC. H8470 (daily ed. August4, 1995). 
540 See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 839-42 (E.D. Pa.1996). (Finding 55~73). 
541 Id. 
542 Id.  Twelve categories contained: Violence/Profanity; Partial Nudity; Nudity; Racism/Ethnic Impropriety; 
Satanic/Cult; Drugs/Drug Culture; Militant/ Extremist; Gambling; Questionable/Illegal; and  Alcohol, Beer & 
Wine.    
543 Id. CyberNot list were updated on a weekly basis. Once installed on the home computer, the copy of Cyber 
Patrol receives automatic updates to the CyberNot list over the Internet every seven days.  
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Wikipedia was definitely not filtered by the Cyber Patrol program, because it was not subject 
to any category of the CyberNot list. It is impossible to categorize numerous kinds of online 
defamatory postings as specific forms of defamation. 
 Furthermore, if the users screened for certain suggestive words, Seigenthaler’s 
defamatory biography was not filtered by the user control program for two reasons. One 
reason is that it is impossible for user programs to define defamatory statements. 
Defamations are linguistically indeterminate statements. Thus one cannot search for specific 
words such as sex or other terms of pornography. Furthermore, defamatory statements 
require the decision whether the entity is true or false; however user control software can not 
do that. The other reason is that it is impractical for a software company to check 
innumerable websites in the world, incalculable entities of each site as the Court pointed out 
in Reno.544   
 Basically parental control is a passive approach to protect minors from obscenity. 
Online defamation cannot be controlled by this passive approach. To offer a substantial 
remedy to the defamed and to lessen damage to individual reputations, the solution to 
Internet defamation lies in a more positive approach.   
 Several arguments mentioned above show that it is inadequate to apply Section 230 to 
Internet libel because of the superficial language of Section 230. One must study the hidden 
rationale that forms the basis of that Section. 
3.  CONFUSION OVER THE SCOPE OF SECTION 230 
 Even though Section 230 can be applied to defamation and tort law, the actual scope 
of ISP immunity raises another significant question. Did Congress really intend to create an 
                                                
544 See Reno, 521 U.S. at 851. 
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absolute defense for ISPs from all causes of actions involving information such as a 
defamatory story created by a third party? The legislative history of Section 230 raises strong 
doubts about it. It suggests that the Section 230 should be interpreted only to the extent 
necessary to remove the disincentives of Good Samaritan blocking of the objectionable 
materials. That is, only when ISPs screen or filter contents in good faith, should this 
provision can be applied.  
 Section 230 consists of two subsections: (c)(1) the “Treatment of Publisher or 
Speaker” provision545 and (c)(2) the “Civil Liability” provision, this one concerns good faith 
blocking.546 Subsection (c)(1) stated, “No provider or user of an interactive computer service 
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another 
information content provider.”547  In Zeran v. Amenrican Online, the court decided that 
subsection (c)(1) grants ISPs broad immunity on the First Amendment, stating that tort 
liability would create “another form of intrusive government regulation of speech.” 548  
 However, the legislative history of the CDA makes it reasonable to argue for only 
limited immunity for ISPs.  
                                                
545 See 47 U.S.C.A.§ 230 (c)(1). 
546 See 47 U.S.C.A.§ 230 (c)(2). “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on 
account of – (A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the 
provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise 
objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected; or (B)  any action taken to enable or 
make available to information content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material 
described in paragraph (1). 
547 47 U.S.C.A.§ 230 (c)(1). 
548 See Zeran v. America Online, Inc. 129 F.3d 327, 330. (4th Cir. 1997).  In Zeran, the court held that faced 
with potential liability for “millions postings”, citing the Reno decision, would cause a chilling effect. 
Accordingly, ISPs might choose to severely censor the messages posted. The Zeran court concluded that 
“Congress consider the weight of the speech interests implicated and chose to immunize service providers to 
avoid any such restrictive effect.”  
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            First of all, in the language of Section 230 (c), this provision is under the title of 
“PROTECTION FOR GOOD SAMARITAN BLOCKING AND SCREENING OF 
OFFENSIVE MATERIAL.” This implies that Section 230 (c)(1) should be applied to 
defamation cases only when ISPs make Good Samaritan blocking efforts.  
 Related to these argument, it is remarkable point that if Section 230 was 
unquestionably designed to change the result in future cases like Stratton Oakmont, that goal 
was accomplished with only section 230 (C)(2), the God Samaritan defense provision 
without broad immunity provision. The troubling result of Stratton Oakmont was the fact that 
more good faith effort to self-police objectionable material will increase the danger to hold 
liability, therefore, Section 230 (c)(2) eliminates this potential danger. Accordingly, a 
broader immunity extension is not needed to overrule Stratton Oakmont, and section 230 
(C)(1) would have to be construed within the context of the Good Samaritan efforts.549 
 Significantly, the history of this provision strongly supports this view. When the Cox-
Wyden amendment (IFFEA, H1978) passed the House, the two subsections of the Section 
230 (c) were not separated.550 Therefore, at that time, it could be reasonably understood that 
subsection (c)(1) of the final version of the CDA was established in order to be subject to the 
Good Samaritan blocking provision. Introducing IFFEA, Representative Cox emphasized 
that the first purpose of his amendment was to “protect computer Good Samaritans,” but no 
                                                
549 Related to this issue, the Court of appeal of California, in Barrett v. Rosenthal, presented interesting 
interpretation on the Section 230. The Court held, “if, as Zeran says, Congress’s use of word “publisher” covers 
distributors as well as original publishers, and therefore reflects an intent to create an absolute immunity, it 
would not have been necessary for Congress to specifically protect providers and users who monitor content; 
section 230(c)(2) would be mere surplusage.” 114 Cal. App 4th 1379, 1399 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).  
550  141 CONG. REC. H8468 (daily ed. August 4,1995). See also, Appendix Three. 
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mention was made of other kinds of civil immunity. 551 Civil liberties groups’ interpretation 
of this section of the IFFEA was the same as Cox’s view. The Center for Democracy and 
Technology in its Policy Post said that the bill would “remove disincentives for online 
service providers to exercise editorial control over their networks and to deploy blocking and 
screening technologies for their subscribers.”552 However, no comment about broad 
immunity for ISPs appeared in the CDT Policy Post.  
 The separation between the two sub-sections took place when Representative White 
proposed his compromise bill after negotiating with Senator Exon. The White-Exon 
amendment made no specific mention of the reason for separation of the two sub-sections. 
One important point is that the Conference Committee Report indicated limited ISP 
immunity, with no reference to broad immunity. The exact purpose of Section 230 was to 
provide “Good Samaritan protection from civil liability for providers or users of an 
interactive computer service for actions to restrict or to enable restriction of access to 
objectionable online material,” the Conference Report said.553 There was no reference as to 
why this separation of the two sub-sections occurred.  
 In short, both the language of Section 230 itself and its meager legislative history 
support the conclusion that there is little indication that Congress intended to grant ISPs 
absolute immunity from all kinds of libel actions resulting from third party postings.    
                                                
551 141 CONG. REC. H 8470 (daily ed. August 4, 1995).  
552 The Center for Democracy and Technology, CDT Policy Post No.23, (August 4, 1995). 
http://www.cdt.org/publications/pp230804.html. The CDT said that bill would remove liability for ISPs “who 
take good faith steps” to restrict access to obscene materials to minors or provide software or hardware to 
enable their users to block objectionable material. In addition, the CDT put on emphasis that this bill overturned 
the Stratton Oakmont case.  
553 H. R. CONF. REP. NO.104-458, at 194 (1996). The Conference Committee adopted the White/Exon 
amendment with some modification. However, Section 230 (c) remained intact. Italics is emphasized by author. 
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4. CONTROVERSY OVER DISTRIBUTOR LIABILITY 
 The most critical point in the Zeran decision was that the court concluded that 
Congress intended to preempt not only ISPs’ publisher liability but also ISPs’ distributor 
liability under state defamation law.554 According to Zeran, Section 230 guarantees blanket 
immunity even though ISPs knowingly disseminate or participate in spreading objectionable 
materials.  
 This interpretation might overrule the rationale of common law that the distributor is 
subject to liability only if he/she “knows or has reason to know of the material’s defamatory 
character,” as mentioned in the “Legal Background” section of chapter 1. 555 
 In light of the plain language of the statute, Section 230(c)(1) indicated that an ISP 
should not be considered a publisher, and, therefore, should be granted immunity from 
publisher liability. However, the statute did not specifically immunize ISPs from distributor 
liability.556 Thus, the ISP immunity provision can be construed either narrowly as 
immunizing ISPs from only publisher liability or broadly as immunizing ISPs from both 
publisher and distributor liability.557 However, the legislative history of the CDA shows that 
the Zeran court’s interpretation was supported on meager grounds.  
 Section 223 of the CDA, the criminal counterpart of Section 230, was based on the 
logic of imposing distributor liability on ISPs. The language of the core subsections of 
Section 223 clearly states that it worked on the basis of knowledge. For instance, Section 
223(a)(2) provides that one who “knowingly permits a telecommunications facility under his 
                                                
554 129 F.3d 327,332.  
555 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 581(2). 
556 See Patel, supra note 44, at 677. 
557 Id. 
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control to be used for any activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that it be used 
for such activity, shall be fined […] or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.” 558 
 Furthermore, the Good Faith defense provision of Section 223 demonstrated clearly 
that Congress distinguished publisher liability from distributor liability when it passed this 
statute. In subsection (e)(1), Congress immunized publisher liability if ISPs only act as a 
passive transmitters of content.559 However, this defense cannot be applicable when ISPs are 
actively involved in the creation of content or “knowing distribution of communications that 
violate this section, or who knowingly advertise the availability of such communications.” 560 
Significantly, when Senator Exon added the good faith defense provision to his original 
amendment, the language of this subsection was the same as the premise under the distributor 
liability of the common law:  
This defense shall not be available to an individual who ceded editorial 
control to an entity which the defendant “knew or had reason to know” 
intended to engage in conduct that was likely to violate this section. 561 
 
                                                
558 Section 223(a) (1)(b) also states that whoever communicates “by means of a telecommunications device 
knowingly- (i) makes, creates, or solicits […] suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication which is 
obscene or indecent knowing that the recipient of the communication is under 18 years of age.” Furthermore,  
subsection (d) (2) articulate that whoever “knowingly permits any telecommunication facility under such 
person’s control to be used for an activity prohibited by paragraph (1) […] shall be fined […] or imprisoned  not 
more than two years, or both.” 
559 See 47 U.S.C.A.§ 223 (e)(1). Entire language of the this subsection is:  
(e) In addition to any other defenses available by law: (1) No person shall be held to have violated subsection 
(a) or (d) solely for providing access or connection to or from a facility, system, or network not under that 
persons control, including transmission, downloading, intermediate storage, access software, or other related 
capabilities that are incidental to providing such access or connection that does not include the creation of the 
content of the communication. 
560 47 U.S.C.A.§ 223 (e)(1). 
561 S. 314, Amendment 1268, 104 Cong. (1995). See also 141 CONG. REC. S8087 (daily ed. June 9, 1995). This 
editorial control defense provision dropped before the Exon bill passed the Senate.   
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Thus, this limitation of ISPs’ immunity supports the presumption that Congress intended to 
distinguish between distributor liability and publisher liability.562  
 On the other hand, it is possible to argue that Section 230 and Section 223 came from 
totally different roots, and, therefore, making a simple comparison is inappropriate. However, 
the two provisions were considered by the conference committee. Furthermore, the 
conference committee made an effort to keep the policy consistent between the two sections. 
Section 223(f)(1),which assures that ISPs will not be prosecuted for implementing a defense 
which is not a violation of law, is a good example to support such view.563 The Conference 
Committee Report stated that this section “supplements without in any way limiting the 
Good Samaritan liability protection of Section 230.” 564  
 In short, it is hard to understand why Congress would have intended to impose a 
distributor liability on ISPs only in criminal cases, not in civil cases. In the Committee, 
                                                
562 Senator Exon clearly explained this point in the Senate, “No one has a defense to obscenity when they 
distribute or make obscenity available. The only exception to this is for the carriers and connectors in their roles 
as a mere access connectors, only then they would be exempt from the obscenity traffic of others. However, if 
the online service providers go beyond solely providing access, and attempt to pander or conspire with 
pornographer, for instance, then they would lose their obscenity exemption and be liable along with everyone 
else. This is a limited remedy   to prevent the bill from causing a “prior restraint” on First Amendment rights.”  
See 141 CONG. REC. S8838 (daily ed. June 14,1995). In fact, the Stratton Oakmont case was concerning not the 
distributor liability but publisher liability. Because the Stratton Oakmont court ruled the Prodigy should hold a 
publisher liability because it had software for editing control. Accordingly, Congress solved the problem caused 
by this case by introducing a good defense provision. Therefore, Congress seemed not to have a specific reason 
to immunize the distributor liability. The statement of Senator Coats, coauthor of the Exon/Coat bill, 
demonstrated their clear understanding in Stratton Oakmont case and its instruction. “[T]he court held that an 
online provider who screened for obscenities was exerting editorial content control. This led the court to treat 
the online provider as a publisher, not simply a distributor, and to therefore hold the provider responsible for 
defamatory statements made by others on the system. I want to be sure that the intend of the amendment is not 
to hold a company who tries to prevent obscene or indecent material under this section from being held liable as 
a publisher for defamatory statements for which they would not otherwise have been liable.” See 141 CONG. 
REC. S8345 (daily ed. June 14,1995). 
563 47 U.S.C.A.§ 223 (f)(1). “No cause of action may be brought in any court or administrative agency against 
any person on account of any activity that is not in violation of any law punishable by criminal or civil penalty, 
and that the person has taken in good faith to implement a defense authorized under this section or otherwise to 
restrict or prevent the transmission of, or access to, a communication specified in this section.” 
564H. R. CONF. REP. NO.104-458, at 190 (1996).  
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Senator Exon and Representative Hyde, who strongly argued the need for strict ISP liability, 
also pushed through two sections in agreement with other members of the committee. 
Considering the legislative history, the Zeran court’s interpretation, which did not recognize 
distributor liability, was unreliable because the court interpreted Congress’s intention within 
the context of Section 230 without considering the whole perspective of the CDA.    
5. INTERNET LIBEL AND INTEREST GROUP POLITICS 
  The legislative history of the CDA demonstrates the significant influence of interest 
groups in the making of new laws for regulating the Internet and online communications. 
From the beginning three stakeholders in the controversy-the religious right, online business, 
and civil liberties groups- had explicit agendas. To attain completely different goals, main 
forces in this controversy directed their full efforts from the stage of legislation to battles in 
the courts. Both religious groups and the coalition between civil liberties and Internet 
business groups directly communicated with individual members of Congress and drafted 
several bills that reflected their interests. The Exon amendment, the Grassley-Dole proposal 
in the Senate, the Hyde “Manager’s Mark” amendment in the House, the Hyde proposal, and 
the Goodlatte proposal in the conference committee were designed and inspired by religious 
right groups. On the other side, the Leahy amendment in the Senate, the Cox-Wyden 
amendment in the House, and the White compromise in the Conference Committee were 
encouraged and co-authored by the civil liberties and Internet business groups. When each 
group’s bill faced a crisis, each group took stronger proposals to protect its interests. In this 
respect, Congress, in many ways, worked as a “spokesperson” for interest groups to advance 
their agendas.  
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 In the long the history of the CDA, no interest group stood up for the victims of 
online defamation. There might be several reasons. One main reason is that the notion that 
“defamation is personal” has been embedded in libel laws.565 The aim of the defamation law 
is to protect an individual’s reputation; however “no person can sue for damage to the 
reputation of another,” because reputation is personal to each individual.566  No one knows in 
advance if he or she will ever be a libel plaintiff. Segenthaler certainly did not know this in 
1996 that a decade later over he’d be the subject of a false, defamatory bibliography on 
Wikipedia. Accordingly, it would not be feasible to organize online defamation plaintiffs 
themselves as a political force to influence both the courts and Congress due to the 
individualistic character of the defamation. 
  “Interest groups are opportunists”; they make efforts “where they can have the 
greatest impact.”567 In this respect, protecting individual reputation held an item of little 
attraction to interest groups; therefore it is difficult to expect interest groups’ help for online 
victims. The intrinsic conflicts between defamation law and freedom of speech may have 
added to the difficulty.568  
                                                
565 Alexis v. Williams, 77 F. Supp.2d. 35, 40 (D.D.C. 1999); See also, supra note 7. “A defamatory 
communication is made concerning the person to whom its recipient correctly, or mistakenly but reasonably, 
understands that it was intended to refer.” 
566 MIDDLETON et al, supra note 43, at 97. 
567 LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 79 (8th ed., 2004). 
568 The law that allows individuals to sue for damaged reputations creates financial risks for the media and 
professional communicators. See MIDDLETON et al, supra note 43, at 93-94. Furthermore, libel law may limit 
the power of the media “by opening their newsgathering and decision-making processes to public scrutiny and 
accountability.” In general, the rights of individuals to protect their reputations are weighed against the rights of 
others to be heard on important issues. Libel defendants argue that “the importance of issues of public concern 
should be debated in a free, open and uninhibited manner.” See Joseph A. Russomanno, Libel: defense Issues 
and Strategies, in COMMUNICATION AND THE LAW 105,105 (Wat Hopkins ed, 2001).  
  121
 The active role of interest groups does not end with the passage of legislation; on the 
contrary, they continue to try to exert strong influence on the courts. According to law 
scholar Lawrence Baum, it seems highly improper for interest groups to lobby a judge 
directly.569 But interest groups can attempt to influence a court by participating in the 
litigation processes in several ways such as initiating litigation, helping to bring it to a court 
by sponsorship of the case, and submitting amicus curiae briefs that ask a court to rule a 
certain way or urge the Supreme Court grant or deny a writ of certiorari.570  
 The coalition between civil liberties and Internet business groups filed a lawsuit 
against the CDA and led the Court’s decision in Reno v. ACLU, moreover, the coalition has 
continued after Reno v. ACLU. In several defamation and tort cases related to ISP immunity, 
civil liberties groups have supported ISPs by submitting amicus curiae briefs.571   
 Their coalition is still strong and steady. In Barrett v. Resenthal, one of most 
important Internet libel case concerning ISP liability, AOL, Ebay, the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, ACLU, and Law professors with expertise in the Internet law (civil liberties 
group) submitted briefs of amicus curiae for Ilena Rosenthal, defendant and website 
operator.572 However, no interest group submitted amicus curiae for Barrett, the plaintiff. 
Importantly, religious right groups, which were counter partners of  civil liberties groups, 
were not involved any more in ISP immunity case because their main concern was to protect 
children from cyber-porn not Internet victims from libel. 
                                                
569 See Baum, supra note 567, at 80-82.  
570 Id. 
571 See Brief for City of Livermore as Amicus Curiae, ACLU et al, Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore (104 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 772) (Cal. Sup.Ct.1998) (No.V-015266-4). See also Brief for Ilena Rosenthal as Amicus Curiae, ACLU et al, 
(114 Cal. App. 4th 1379) (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (No.A096451).  
572 114 Cal. App. 4th 1379, (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). 
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 As mentioned above, generally a defamation suit is brought by an individual. This 
means that in order to overturn Zeran an individual would have to fight against not only big 
Internet business companies such as AOL with huge capital but also civil liberties groups 
with strong social influence, legal knowledge, and experience. As a result, if the courts do 
not try to strike the balance of the social interests, Section 230 would be an invincible law for 
ISPs regardless of its adverse effects and lack of legal justification. The next chapter will 
analyze the courts cases concerning ISP liability from this point of view.
  
 
CHAPTER 3 
TWO APPROACHES TO ISP IMMUNITY IN INTERNET LIBEL 
  Since the Zeran decision the courts’ interpretations of Section 230 regarding ISP 
immunity have been divided into two camps. The Supreme Court has not addressed the 
question of whether ISPs should be held liable for third party defamation on the Internet.  
The courts that follow the seminal decision Zeran v. America Online have adopted a 
relatively expansive definition of an ISP and have considered the immunity provision of 
Section 230 to be robust.573 Since 2003, however, a few courts have attempted to challenge 
the Zeran decision, arguing that absolute immunity for ISPs is unreasonable and beyond the 
intention of the framers of the CDA. Points at issue are (1) the validity of Zeran, which held 
that Section 230 granted distributor immunity from libel suits, and (2) the possibility that an 
ISP might be subject to joint liability for defamation with an information content provider. 
 In this chapter, the thesis will compare the two court groups of court opinions in order 
to examine how Congress’s legislative purpose has been construed by the courts and what 
kinds of problems have been caused.    
 Another important goal of this chapter is to investigate whether the rationale of 
Section 230 is still valid in light of the rapid changes in the Internet environment. When 
passing Section 230, Congress had in mind bulletin boards as a main Internet communication 
model. However, in the ten years since enactment of the CDA, the Internet has dramatically 
                                                
573 See Carafano v. Matchmaker.com, Inc. 339 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003); Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 
31 P. 3d 37 (Wash. App. 2001). 
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developed. Several kinds of Internet communication models such as blogs were invented. 
Now, ISPs are not a simple conduit of Internet communications. In recent years, Internet 
Service Providers’ news portals574 such as Yahoo! News, AOL news,575 and Google news576 
have emerged as major news distribution channels in cyberspace.577 Any person with access 
to the Internet may, without charge, register as a Yahoo! user and then engage in various 
online activities and access to numerous entities made by Internet content providers and other 
users. 578 Furthermore, several brand-new technologies for enhancing ISPs’ commercial 
functions, such as rating systems and aggressive distributing tools, have been developed. 
How have courts interpreted the CDA in response to these developments of the Internet and 
to ISPs’ functional diversification? 
 
                                                
574 Scholars have yet to agree on a clear definition of an ISP’s news service. Several names such as “news Web 
page,” “news pages of ISPs,” “on-line news aggregator,” and “digital media,” have been employed in a 
functional manner, but they seem to lack rigorous academic analysis or reasoning. In this article, “ISP’s news 
portal” (hereinafter the “news portal”) is used to indicate news pages that are managed and disseminated by 
ISPs. News portals are different from other online news media or traditional offline media because they employ 
no reporters directly and publish no original work; however, they play a multimedia role offering as various text, 
video, and images from numerous sources.  
575 http://news.channel.Aol.com. 
576 http://news.google.com. 
577In fact, Jupiter Media Metrix found that Yahoo! News was the third most popular news site in the United 
States, more popular than NYTimes.com and ABC News. See ComScore Network, Jupiter Media Metrix U.S. 
Top 50 Web and Digital Media Properties for December 2001, (Jan. 18, 2002), available at 
http://www.comscore.com/press/release.asp?press=268.  Nearly 70% of Internet users go online to get news.  
See Deborah Fallows, The Internet and Daily Life, (Aug 11, 2004), available at http:// www.pewinternet.org. In 
the Campaign 2000, for example, 27% of people used the news sites of commercial online services such as 
AOL as their primary source for election news, and Yahoo! News was the second most visited Web site, 
following CNN.com. See Andrew Kohut and Lee Raine, Pew Internet & American Life Project: Internet 
Election News Audience, (Dec. 3, 2000) available at http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PRC_Politics_Report.pdf.  
News portals have captured a major segment of the online news market as a new form of media. For many 
people, news portals already are likely to be employed as the primary outlet from which they frequently obtain 
information. See Barb Palser, Is it journalism? Yahoo! News attracts a large audience but does no original 
reporting. American Journalism Review, June 2002 v24 i5 at 62(1).  
578 See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc. 2005 WL 3005602 at 1, (D. Or. 2005).  
  125
3.1. Distributor Liability 
 3.1.1. THE EVOLUTION OF PRO-ZERAN APPROACHES 
 The immunity provided by Section 230 of the CDA and endorsed by the Zeran courts 
has evolved into a “durable defense” for ISPs.579 In short, the Zeran court’s reasoning was 
summarized in two main points: (1) Congress recognized the threat of tort-based lawsuits and 
therefore enacted Section 230 to provide “broad immunity” for ISPs; (2) the CDA granted 
ISPs immunity both as publishers and distributors because distributor liability is nothing 
more than a subset of publisher liability.580 Most courts firmly abide by the Zeran precedent, 
reinforcing the rationale of Zeran, and have extended the range of application.581 Recently, 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon called the Zeran decision “Ninth Circuit 
law” and followed its rationale.582 Furthermore, in Austin v. Crystaltech Web Hosting in 
December 2006, the Court of Appeals of Arizona concluded that “the interpretation of a 
                                                
579 Driscoll, supra note 84, at 111. 
580 129 F.3d 332.  
581 See, Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F.Supp.44, 52  (D.D.C.1998); Ben Ezra v. AOL, 206 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 
2000); John Doe v. Franco Productions, 2000 WL8116779 (N.D.Ill. 2000); Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc. 108 
Wn.App 454 (Wash. App 2001); Jane Doe v. AOL 783 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 2001); Patentwizard, Inc. v. Kinko’s, 
Inc., 163 F.Supp. 2d 1069 (D.S.D. 2001); Kathleen v. City of Livermore, 87 Cal.App.4th 684 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2001); Gentry v. eBay, 99 Cal. App. 4th 816 (App. Div. 2002); Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc. 261 F. Supp. 2d 
532 (E.D. Va. 2003); Optinrealbic.com, LLC v. Ironport Systems, Inc. 323 F.Supp. 2d 1037, 1045 (N.D. Cal. 
2004); Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc. 2005 WL 3005602 (D. Or. 2005); Austin v. Crystal Web Hosting, 125 P.3d 389 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2005). Furthermore, least two lower court cases that contravened the Zeran court’s opinion were 
overruled by higher courts.  See, Batzel v. Smith, 333 F. 3d 1018 (9th Cir.2003); Carafano v. Matchmaker.com, 
Inc. 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003).  
582 See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc. 2005 WL 3005602 (D. Or. 2005). The Oregon court stated that, “this case is 
controlled by Ninth Circuit law holding that <section> 230 provides service providers such as defendant with 
“broad immunity for publishing content provided primarily by third parties.”” The court also addressed that 
“there can be no dispute that in the nine years since Section 230 was enacted that courts across the country have 
held that  Section 230 generally bars claims that seek to hold the provider of an interactive computer service 
liable for tortuous or unlawful information that someone else disseminates using that service.”  
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federal statute by federal courts [is] persuasive” and applied the Zeran rule that “notice alone 
could not transform an original publisher into a distributor.”583 
 The Logic of Policy Choice The heart of the Zeran decision is the “policy choice” 
theory. That is, Congress had two important goals: “to keep government regulation of the 
Internet to a minimum” and “to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal law” to 
deter trafficking in objectionable material via the Internet. However, Congress made a 
“policy choice not to deter harmful online speech through the separate route of imposing tort 
liability” on ISPs for other parties’ potentially injurious damages.584 
 One year after Zeran, in Blumenthal v. Drudge, the court made another important 
decision that elaborated on the Zeran court’s reasoning by rejecting AOL’s liability for 
posting a defamatory story by an independent contractor (Drudge), even though AOL paid a 
license fee to Drudge.585 This case has two significant points in terms of distributor liability. 
First of all, the Blumenthal decision reconfirmed “any attempt to distinguish between 
publisher liability and notice-based distributor liability” would be unavailing. 586  Federal 
District Judge Paul L. Friedman decisively stated, “Congress made no distinction between 
publishers and distributors in providing immunity from liability.”587  
                                                
583 Austin v. Crystal Web Hosting, 125 P.3d 389 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005). 
584 Zeran, 129 F.3d. at 331.  
585 992 F.Supp. 44 (D.D.C.1998). The Drudge Report, an electronic publication written by Matt Drudge, said 
that assistant in Clinton administration Sidney Blumenthal had a history of spouse abuse. This statement later 
turned out to be false. However, the Drudge Report appeared not only on his Web site but also on AOL service. 
Because Drudge had a license agreement with AOL that made the Drudge Report available to all AOL members. 
AOL paid Drudge a royalty of $3,000 monthly under its 1 year contract and reserved the right to remove 
content that was in violation of its terms of service. Blumenthal filed a lawsuit both Drudge and AOL, and the 
court held that AOL was just an ISP on which the Drudge Report was carried.  
586 Id, at 52. 
587 Id.  
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 Second, the Blumenthal court developed the “policy choice” rationale. The 
Blumenthal court was the first court that acknowledged unfairness of such broad 
immunity.588 The court stated, “If it were writing on a clean slate, this Court would agree 
with plaintiffs” because AOL had a right to exercise editing control over the Drudge Report, 
promoted it “as a new source of unverified instant gossip on AOL” under the license contract 
with Drudge.589 Therefore, the Blumenthal court reached the conclusion that the AOL was 
not “a passive conduit like the telephone company, a common carrier with no control and 
therefore no responsibility.”590 Instead, it would seem “only fair to hold AOL to the liability 
standards” applied to a publisher or, at least, to a distributor such as a library.591 However, 
the Blumenthal court, in the end, recognized AOL had no responsibility. “Congress has made 
a different policy choice by providing immunity even where the interactive service provider 
has an active, even aggressive role in making available content prepared by others,” Judge 
Friedman wrote.592  
 The logic of policy choice was elaborated by other federal courts. In Batzel v. 
Cremers, the Ninth Circuit court of appeals understood Congress’s “policy choice” as giving 
more protection to the “new and burgeoning Internet medium” than traditional media.593 The 
                                                
588 Barrett, 114 Cal. App. 4th at 1394. 
589 Blumenthal, 992 F.Supp. at 51-52.  
590 Id. 
591 Id. 
592 Id. 
593 Batzel v. Smith, 333 F. 3d 1018 (9th Cir.2003) Furthermore, the court stated “every court, so far, to reach 
issue of liability of publisher and distributor has decided that Congress intended to immunize both distributors 
and publishers. The court explained that Congress had two reasons for making this choice. One is that Congress 
wanted to encourage the unfettered and unregulated development of free speech on the Internet and to develop 
e-commerce.  The other is that Congress hoped to encourage ISPs to self-police the Internet.  
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court stated that “Congress has chosen to treat cyberspace differently” from traditional mass 
media, consequently the CDA “overrides the traditional treatment of publishers, distributors, 
and speakers under statutory and common law.”594  
 The Batzel court stated that there is an apparent tension between two goals of Section 
230, namely “promoting free speech while at the same time giving parents the tools to limit 
the material their children can access over the Internet” because the latter is a speech-
restrictive purpose.595 However, “laws often have more than one goal in mind, and that it is 
not uncommon for these purposes to look in opposite directions,” the court wrote.596 
Consequently, the Batzel court held that even though the CDA overall may have had the 
purpose of restricting content, Section 230 “sought to further First Amendment and e-
commerce interests on the Internet while also promoting the protection of minors.” 597 
 The logic evolved that “Congress deliberately chose not to deter harmful online 
speech by means of civil liability” for ISPs because Congress intended to encourage self-
regulation, and immunity is the form of that encouragement.598 One district court went 
further, stating that “Congress reasoned that any liability would threaten development of the 
online industry.” Therefore, Congress determined liability “should rest with the actual 
wrongdoers,” not intermediary servers.599  
                                                
594 Id. at 1026. 
595 Id. at 1027-28. However, the Batzel court’s holding that two goals would create tension is questionable 
because Representatives Cox and Wyden wrote the original version of Section 230 for the purpose of reject the 
Federal government regulation on the Internet (content) in order to protect freedom of speech on the Internet.   
596 Id. at 1028. 
597 Id. 
598 Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 108 Wn. App 454, 463 (Wash. App 2001).      
599 Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 2005 WL 3005602 (D. Or. 2005). 
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 However, the Zeran court’ policy choice theory has focused on one specific goal, i.e. 
promoting Internet business, among the several goals of Section 230, without consideration 
of the entire perspective of the CDA.600 One of the main grounds of the policy-choice theory 
that the Zeran court explained was that it is impossible for ISPs to screen millions of postings 
and the specter of potential liability would chill ISPs pushing them to choose to restrict the 
number and types of messages.601 However, if such concern were the real intention of the 
Congress, it might incur the question directly: why did not Congress did not apply such rule 
to criminal liability? On the contrary, in Section 230 (b) (5), Congress articulated that it is 
their intention “to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish 
trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of computer” 602  
 Another reason, the Zeran court said, was to remove the disincentives to self-
regulating by the Stratton Oakmont decision. However, such concern was more appropriate 
ground for granting ISPs not absolute immunity from civil liability but limited immunity 
only to apply when ISPs exert Good Samaritan blocking. The Section 230 (c)(2) “Civil 
liability” provision only mentioned that a good faith action of an ISP might be immune, 
while broad immunity did not appear.  
 The Zeran court’s policy choice theory was based on the subjective interpretation of 
the plain language of Section 230. The Zeran court did not explain why Congress made the 
policy choice not to impose all kinds of civil liability on ISPs. Therefore, it is reasonably 
understood that such logic is not a policy choice of Congress but that of courts. 
                                                
600 The scope of immunity under the Section 230 which really congress wanted to grant is unclear. See, chapter 
II. (3) Finding and Discussion.    
601 See Zeran, 129 F. 3d. at 332. 
602 47 U.S.C.A.§ 230 (b)(5). Italic is emphasized by author. 
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 The Legal Background and the Extension of the Zeran Decision  In theory, the 
Zeran court found the authority for its logic in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.603 Section 
577’s definition of “publication” of defamatory material states:  
(1) Publication of defamatory matter is its communication intentionally or by a negligent 
act to one other than the person defamed.  
(2) One who intentionally and unreasonably fails to remove defamatory matter that he 
knows to be exhibited on land or chattels in his possession or under his control is 
subject to liability for its continued publication.604   
 Thus, a “publisher is not merely one who intentionally communicates defamatory 
information. Instead, the law also treats as a publisher or speaker one who fails to take 
responsible steps to remove defamatory statement from property under her control.” 605 In 
other words, if the one who had the responsibility to remove a defamatory story has not done 
his/her duty, he should be held liable as a publisher.606 Thus, the Zeran court reached the 
conclusion that distributors were considered to be publishers for purpose of defamation law 
and therefore, notice (or knowledge)-based liability as a distributor was also eliminated.  
 The Zeran rationale, which was established in the case of  an AOL bulletin board, 
was expanded beyond defamation and the simple Internet access function of ISPs. The Court 
of Appeals of Washington, in Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., ruled that Internet website 
operators were immune from interference with business expectancy and contractual liability 
arising from allegedly false statements about the plaintiff and his business made by third 
                                                
603 See Zeran, 129 F.3d. at 332. 
604 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §577 (1977). 
605 Jane Doe v. AOL, 783 So.2d 1010, 1015 (Fla. 2001). 
606 Id.  
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parties and failure to remove the posting in the book review section.607 The court could 
discern “no difference between website operators and ISPs in the degree to which immunity 
will encourage editorial decisions that will reduce the volume of offensive material.”608 Copy 
centers that provide access by renting computer services were not liable for allegedly 
defamatory comments made in chat room by customers using copy center computers.609 The 
online auction site eBay was also immune from liability for negligence arising out of 
plaintiffs’ purchase of allegedly forged autographed sports items under Section 230’s broad 
immunity. 610  
  Under the Zeran court approach, whether ISPs ignore the notice of defamatory 
posting does not matter. Mark Austin, owner of Bali travel business, brought an action 
against Crystaltech Web Hosting, a website hosting company, after an article appeared on 
Crystaltech’s website alleging that Bali officials would file criminal charges against him. 
Even though Austin requested to have the articles removed, Crystaltech refused.611 However, 
following the decision in Zeran, the court held that a web hoster’s receipt of notice of the 
allegedly defamatory nature of a statement did not trigger liability as a distributor of the 
statement. 612 According to the court, “notice alone [for defamatory posting] could not 
transform an original publisher into a distributor” because receiving the notice of potentially 
defamatory posting means to thrust the distributor into the role of a traditional publisher, who 
                                                
607 Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc. 108 Wn. App 454 (Wash. App 2001).  
608 Id.  
609 Patentwizard, Inc. v. Kinko’s, Inc., 163 F.Supp. 2d 1069 (D.S.D. 2001). 
610 99 Cal. App. 4th 816 (Cal.Ct. App. 2002). 
611 Austin v. Crystal Web Hosting, 125 P.3d 389 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005). 
612 Id.  
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“must decide whether to publish, edit, or withdraw the material.”613 According to the Zeran 
approach, pre-publication selecting and post-publication screening cannot make ISPs subject 
to defamation suits.614  
 Furthermore, the failure to remove the defamatory posting in spite of ISP’s promise to 
eliminate it is also immune under the CDA. In Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., even though the 
plaintiff alleged that Yahoo! employees did not fulfill the promise to remove the defamatory 
profile, Yahoo! was protected by Section 230. The court held that “broken promise” claims 
were based on defendant’s “exercise of editorial discretion,” which was subject to section 
230’s prohibition of publisher liability.615  
 In a similar context, an ISP’s violation of the Membership Agreement including 
removal of the offending content, based on the breach of contract, also was beyond the civil 
liability by Section 230, according to the District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania bound by the Zeran precedent. 616 In addition, the court determined that the 
Membership Agreement did not obligate AOL to take action against the violator, accordingly 
inaction was not a breach of contract.617   
AGGRESSIVE DISTRIBUTION Under the Zeran approach, ISPs’ active role in distributing 
content does not create distributor liability. In Optinrealbig.com, LLC v. Ironport Systems, 
                                                
613 Id.  
614 Batzel, 333 F. 3d at 1032.  
615 Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc. 2005 WL 3005602 (D. Or. 2005). 
616 See Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc. 261 F. Supp. 2d 532 (E.D. Va. 2003). Saad Noah was a Muslim AOL 
subscriber. Noah suffered numerous insults from other users when he visited two Islam-themed AOL-run chat 
rooms. Noah immediately reported offensive posting, even emailed directly to CEO Steve Chase, and finally 
sued AOL claiming that AOL’s inactions constituted a breach of contract.   
617 Noah, 261 f. Supp. 2d. at 545. 
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Inc., commercial e-mailer OptinRealBig sue against SpamCop, a spam-mail blocking 
company, alleging that inflated the actual number of the spam mail reports against Optin by 
multiple copies of the same reports to ISPs.618 Defendant OptinRealBig argued that 
SpamCop deliberately sent spam reports to non-subscribers (ISPs) who did not choose to 
receive the reports; therefore SpamCop’s active distribution removes its immunity.619 
However, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California found that the 
activities of SpamCop were not subject to liability. In the court’s view, distributing content to 
non-subscribers might be considered as “aggressive activity” but “it does not destroy the 
distributor immunity.” 620  
 3.1.2. ANTI-ZERAN COURTS’ APPROACH 
 Since its publication in 1997, the Zeran decision has become a powerful precedent in 
interpreting Section 230. However, it faced criticism from a few other courts. The courts 
following an anti- Zeran approach are relatively few, but have recently been found.  
  The courts’ criticisms of the Zeran rationale have gradually increased, beginning with 
Jane Doe v. America Online.621 In this case, Justice Lewis of the Supreme Court of Florida 
                                                
618 Optinrealbic.com, LLC v. Ironport Systems, Inc. 323 F.Supp. 2d 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2004). SpamCop operated 
a website where individuals could report the receipt of e-mails that they got a spam. SpamCop reported the 
spam to the ISPs from which they had been sent. In order to find where this spam originated, SpamCop 
software broke down the e-mail header into its component parts and run a search through IP addresses to 
determine the originating network. In some cases, the sender of bulk e-mails might send messages through 
multiple ISPs. It is difficult to determine the exact originating ISP, so Spam Cop forwards the e-mail report to 
all of the ISPs through which the e-mail might have been sent. Defendant OptIn alleged that this practice 
artificially inflates the number of reports against it.  
619 Id. at 1046. 
620 Id. 
621 783 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 2001). 
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openly criticized the Zeran court’s decision regarding Section 230 for providing “carte 
blanche immunity for wrongful conduct” beyond Congress’s intention.622 
 Challenging Zeran ’s Legal Framework  
 The most remarkable argument of Justice Lewis is the challenge against Zeran’s legal 
foundation. Writing for three judges in dissent, Justice Lewis took issue with the Zeran court 
and the majority’s reliance on the Restatement (Second) of the Torts, in particular application 
of § 577 of  the treatise623 when interpreting the immunity provision of Section 230.     
 According to the acrimonious criticism of Justice Lewis, the Restatement of the Torts, 
although it was a venerable treatise, was out of date when it was published in 1977. 624 
Consequently, Justice Lewis argued, “While the general common law tort principles 
contained in the Restatement are still viable, of course, the treatise has yet to incorporate the 
realities of the World Wide Web.” 625 Basically, the 1977 edition of the Restatement of the 
Torts encompassed radio and television; moreover, it has yet to address the role of the 
Internet.626  
 More significantly, Justice Lewis argued that the fatal flaw of  Zeran’s logic was the 
erroneous conclusion that distributors are merely an internal category of  under section 577 
(2) of the Restatement of the Torts. As to distributor liability, section 577 (2) said that “[o]ne 
who intentionally and unreasonably fails to remove defamatory matter that he knows to be 
exhibited on land or chattels in his possession or under his control is subject to liability for its 
                                                
622 Id. at 1019. 
623 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §577 (1977). See also, supra note 598. 
624 Jane Doe, 783 So.2d at 1020. 
625 Id. at 1021.  
626 Id. 
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continued publication.”627 Therefore, the law treated as a publisher or speaker one who fails 
to take reasonable steps to remove defamatory statements when interpreting distributor 
liability.628  
 However, Justice Lewis argued that distributor liability is not correctly defined in the 
section 577, but in section 581(1). This section defined distributor liability as “one who only 
delivers or transmits defamatory matter published by a third person is subject to liability if, 
only if, he knows or has reason to know of its defamatory character.” 629 
 A clear difference exists between the two provisions. In the case of the former, as 
employed by the Zeran court, “an ISP can never be subject to liability based upon its own 
patently irresponsible role as a distributor,”630 because the distributor is a subset of publisher 
and therefore, this provision can be applied to Section 230 (c)(1).631 However, the latter 
means distributor liability can take place when ISPs “only deliver or transmit” defamation 
published by a third party; and more exactly, if an ISP fails to remove known defamatory 
material on its website, then it may be subject to tort liability. 632 According to the dissenting 
opinion, Section 577 (2) has not been cited as “pervasive authority in many cases.” 
                                                
627 Id. at 1015. 
628 Id 
629 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §581 (1) (1977). This sub section is under the title “Transmission of 
Defamation Published by Third Person.” 
630 Jane, 783 So.2d. at 1024. 
631 Zeran, 129 F.3d. at 332. 
632 Jane, 783 So.2d. at 1023. According to the dissent’s application to section 581, AOL, in this case, would 
have potential liability as a distributor because “it is alleged that AOL actually knew of the illicit character of 
the material which it was transmitting over its Internet Service.”   
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Furthermore, the function served by ISP is very similar to that of a telephone, ticker, teletype 
or telegraph company which transmits third party message for a fee.633 
 In conclusion, Zeran court’s legal frame was based on the wrong and outdated section 
of the Restatement of Torts. 
 Reinterpretation of Broad Immunity Provision  
 The Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Jone Doe v. GTE Corporation 634  showed its 
unwillingness to give ISPs a “free ride” when innocent individuals were injured through the 
Internet.635  
 The Seventh Circuit questioned, “Why not read Section 230 (1) as a definitional 
clause rather than as immunity from liability?”636 According to the appellate court’s point of 
view, while Section 230 (c)(2) contains plain language granting immunity from liability to 
Good Samaritan ISPs, Section 230(c)(1) does not contain any express language limiting 
liability. Therefore, it might be the better interpretation to read Section 230(c)(1) as primarily 
definitional. In this case, an ISP would enjoy the benefit of immunity from liability only 
when it affirmatively takes steps in good faith to protect the victims (users) of defamation or 
                                                
633 Id. at 1021. According to Justice Lewis, Section 577(2) would be covered by section 577(2), while section 
588 (1) covered telephone, ticker, telegraph company. Justice Lewis stated that “since the subjective activity 
involves the transmission of messages trough an electronic medium, which can only be sent or received through 
a telecommunications interconnection for which the customer pays a fee, the latter appears more appropriate” to 
apply to an ISP. Id.    
634 347 F. 3d. 655 (7th Cir. 2003). See supra note 612. As addressed earlier, the Seven Circuit affirmed trial 
court’s decision that rejected claims of athletes, who were secretly taped naked in their locker rooms, bathrooms, 
and showers, that ISPs should be liable for circulating these illegal video tapes through the website. In spite of 
their ruling based on the Zeran decision, the court gave significant suggestions, i.e., that the plaintiffs should 
have claimed with regard to interpreting Section 230. The Seventh Circuit patently disagree with Zeran and 
lower court opinions, however it did not overrule the Zeran rationale because plaintiffs did not contend that 
“GTE published the tapes and pictures for purpose of defamation and related theory of liability.” Id. at 660. 
635 Joseph Dowling, Noah v. AOL Time Warner: Are There Legitimate Barriers to Civil Ridht’s Protection On 
the Internet?, 141 ALB.L.J.SCI. & TECH. 777,796 (2004). 
636 Doe, 347 F. 3d, at 660. 
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other torts. On the other hand, if an ISP fails to do so, “it would become a publisher or 
speaker and lose the benefit of <section> 230 (c)(2).”637 
 The Seventh Circuit pointed out that Section 230(c) bore the title “Protection for 
Good Samaritan Blocking and Screening of offensive material.” The court stated that its 
approach to Section 230(c) would “harmonize the text with the caption.”638 
 In addition, the Seventh Circuit also suggested “another possibility” that if section 
230 (c)(1) “forecloses any liability that depends on deeming the ISP a publisher,” the 
immunity may be limited to claims which would succeed only if the ISP acts specifically as a 
publisher or speaker, not a distributor.639 
 The Seven Circuit’s approach regarding Section 230 is very similar to and well 
supported by this thesis’s analysis of the legislative history because of the original form of 
Section 230, in which subsection (C)(1) and (c)(2) were not separated, may be read in the 
same way as the Seventh Circuit did.640  
Controversy of Self-control  
 Even though Justice Lewis and the GTE court did not refuse to follow the Zeran 
reasoning, they foreshadowed the parade of rejections to follow Zeran rule. Finally, in 2004, 
two California Courts of Appeal expressly disagreed with the Zeran rationale maintaining 
that the statute does not explicitly absolve providers or users of third party content from all 
                                                
637 Id.  
638 Id. 
639 Id. 
640 See Chapter II (C)(3) Confusion of the Scope of Section 230. 
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liability.641 The courts held that immunity should not be upheld if an ISP knowingly ignores 
the claim of falsity.  
 In Barrett v. Rosenthal, a Court of Appeal of California held that “the statute cannot 
be deemed to abrogate the common law principle that one who republishes defamatory 
matter originated by a third person is subject to liability if he or she knows or has reason to 
know of its defamatory character.”642 In Grace v. E-Bay, Inc. another Court of Appeals of 
California, followed the Barrett decision for the same reasoning.643 Both courts directly 
employed Justice Lewis’s logic in Jane Doe v. America Online, applying Restatement 
§581(1) instead of §577 (2) as their legal framework regarding the distinction between 
publisher liability and distributor liability. 644 
                                                
641 Barrett v. Rosenthal, 114 Cal. App. 4th 1379, (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); Grace v. E-Bay, Inc., 120 Cal. App. 4th 
984 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). However, the California Supreme Court granted review of Barret and Grace, and as a 
result they have been depublished pursuant to California rule of Court 976 (d)(1).   
642 Barrett, 114 Cal. App. 4th at 1392.  Stephen J. Barrett and Terry Polevoy were physicians who sought to 
discredit alternative or nonstandard healthcare practices and products. And respondent Ilena Rosenthal 
participates in two Usenet “newsgroups” which focus on “alternative medicine.” On or about August 14, 2000, 
Rosenthal commenced distributing on newsgroups an e-mail message that she received from Timothy Bolen, 
another defendant in this case. The message accused Polevoy of “stalking women” and urged “health activists 
… from around the world to file complaints to government officials….” Bolden’s message contained more 
defamatory language. Soon after Rosenthal distributed Bolen’s message, Barrett informed her that it was false 
and asked that it be withdrawn. However, Rosenthal refused to do so and, what is more posted more additional 
defamatory messages about them referring toBarrett as “quacks.” Id., at 1384-1386. The trial court held that 
Rosenthal was immune from defamation liability under Section 230 as an ISP user. The trial court found the 
distributor’s republication was not actionable because the distributor did not originate but merely republished 
the defamatory story with same reasoning as the Zeran court.  However, the California Court of Appeals 
overturned the lower court decision.  
643 Grace, 120 Cal. App. at 997-998. Roger Grace, editor and co-publisher of Los Angeles’ Metropolitan News-
Enterprise, purchased vintage magazines on eBay and then criticized their delivery and condition. The seller 
responded with postings that called Grace “dishonest all the way!!!!” and demanding that he be banned from the 
Web site.  The court said that Section 230 did not immunize eBay against liability for distributing information it 
knows or had reason to believe was false.  
644 See Barrett, 114 Cal. App. 4th at 1394. The Barrett court criticized the Zeran decision that focusing solely on 
section 577 of the Restatement (Second) of the Torts, the Zeran court “ignored the complementary common law 
rule described in section 581(1) of the Restatement.”  The Grace court also  chose section 581(1) when they 
explain distributor liability without mentioning of section 577. See  Grace, 120 Cal. App. at 994. 
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 The opinions of the two courts started with a totally different premise from Zeran. 
First, the two courts disagreed with the crux of the Zeran rationale concerning self-regulation.  
 In the Zeran-line, courts have a positive view as to the effect of broad immunity, in 
other words, blanket immunity may lead the ISPs to exercise more self-regulating. They 
believed that Congress sought to remove disincentives to self-regulation and “encourage 
service providers to self-regulate the dissemination of offensive material over their server” 
without fear they would incur liability as a result of their behavior. 645 However, as for the 
Zeran-line reasoning, failure of self-regulating was not important646 because the primary 
policy-choice of Congress was to promote the Internet and related businesses.647  
 However, the Barrett and Grace courts contended that the blanket immunity 
advocated in Zeran frustrated the purpose of the CDA by discouraging Good Samaritan 
Blocking.648  According to the two courts, blanket immunity for ISPs would make them not 
“bother to screen their content at all because they will never be subject to liability.”649 On the 
other hand, if ISPs could be held liable for their failure to remove or neglecting to screen 
objectionable materials, then “ISPs would have a greater incentive to screen.” 650   
                                                
645 Zeran, 129 F.3d. at 331. Reflecting this viewpoint, Zeran-line courts interpreted that Congress enacted 
Section 230 to forbid the imposition of publisher liability on ISPs for the exercise of its editorial and self-
regulatory function. See Ezra, 206 F. 3d at 986.  
646 Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 52. The Blumenthal court also stated that “Congress has conferred immunity 
from tort liability as an incentive to Internet service providers to self-police the Internet for obscenity and other 
offensive material, even where the self-policing unsuccessful or not even attempted.”    
647 See id. at 50. 
648 Barrett, 114 Cal. App. 4th at 1403. 
649 Id. 
650 Id. 
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In the two courts’ view, this promise is based on common sense in that “an ISP will not 
waste its time and money monitoring content” because of no disadvantage for not self-
policing. 651  
The Zeran court concluded that establishing distributor liability would make ISPs 
screen each of their millions of postings for possible problems, and thus chill speech. 652 
However, maintaining that Zeran had overstated the danger of distributor liability, the 
Barrett court, citing another tort-based case,653 said that “a distributor is obliged to review 
messages from a particular source in advance of posting only when informed.”654 Therefore, 
the court stated that “distributor liability would not require a service provider to review the 
communications in advance of posting them but only to act reasonably after being placed on 
notice that the communication is defamatory.” 655 Apparently, courts dissatisfied with the 
Zeran ruling advocated including defamation common law in interpreting Section 230.656  
                                                
651 Id. In fact, two courts analysis as to the adverse effect of absolute immunity under the Zeran rationale 
originated from Justice Lewis’s argument. In Jane Doe v. America Online, Justice Lewis, in the dissent opinion, 
criticized the majority view that “carte blanche immunity for wrongful conduct” under Zeran was not intended 
by Congress, and this view “ignores the common law underpinnings of the present controversy; fails to 
accommodate the traditional distinction between publishers and distributors consistently recognized in 
American jurisprudence.” See  Doe, 783 So.2d at 1019, (Fla. 2001). The GTE court, the Seven Circuit, shared 
this view other anti-Zeran courts asking that “why should a law designed to eliminate ISPs’ liability to the 
creators of offensive material end up defeating claims by the victims of tortuous or criminal conduct?” See Doe, 
347 F. 3d at 660. The Barrett court cited scholars’ analysis to contradict Zeran court’s opinion about the threat 
of distributor’s liability. The court said that “the total elimination of distributor liability under Zeran would 
eliminate a potential incentive to the development of those technologies, that incentive being the threat of 
distributor liability.” See also, Sewali K. Patel, Immunizing Internet Service Providers from Third Party Internet 
Defamation Claim: How Far Should Court Go?, 55 VAND. L. REV.647, 683-685 (2002). 
652 See, Zeran , 129 F.3d at 333. “If computer service providers were subjected to distributor liability, they would 
face potential liability each time they receive notice of a potentially defamatory statement from any party, 
concerning any message.”   
653 Spence v. Flynt, 647 F. Supp.1266, 1273. (D.Wyo.1986). 
654 Barrett, 114 Cal. App. 4th at 1406. 
655 Id. at 1406. The Barrett court also argued that it is unclear that being exposed to distributor liability would 
be a disaster for online service as Zeran court worried about. To win the libel suit, the plaintiff should prove 
several difficult requirements: defendant’s fault; and if defendant is a public figure; it will be required actual 
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 3.1.3. DISCUSSION: UNDESIRABLE EFFECTS OF THE ZERAN APPROACH  
 The Zeran line courts approach, which focuses on promoting the development of e-
commerce, has brought some significant results.  First, blanket immunity for ISPs leaves the 
victims of tort law without effective or in some case any legal remedy. The decision in John 
Doe v. GTE Corporation was a typical case.657 Someone secretly placed video cameras in the 
locker rooms, bathrooms, and showers of several college sports teams including football 
players at Illinois State University. Tapes showing undressed players were sold on a website 
hosted by GTE Internetworking.658 Unfortunately for the athletes, the people who created and 
distributed the video were bankrupt or unlocatable. The college officials, who had failed to 
detect the cameras, prevailed on grounds of qualified immunity. The only remaining 
defendants were relevant ISPs. However, the court dismissed the athletes’ claims against 
ISPs echoing the decision in Zeran, that ISPs were not liable for the content provided by a 
website owner using the ISP’s service.659 As a result, nowhere could the athletes find ways to 
be compensated for their damages. Although the victims’ nude images were publicized 
without permission, the court could not provide compensation to them. In Patentwizard v. 
Kinko’s, plaintiffs who were defamed in Kinko’s chat room filed a lawsuit against ISPs in 
                                                                                                                                                  
malice; furthermore, alleged defamation is an assertion of actual fact. Therefore, the court asserted that it is 
“almost impossible” for plaintiffs to succeed in the libel suit. Id. 1406. 
656 See, Grace, 120 Cal. App. 4th  at 996. The court said, referring to Oakmont, Inc v. Prodigy, “in light of the 
well-established common law distinction between liability as a primary publisher and liability as a distributor 
and Congress’s expressed intention to overrule an opinion that held the operator of a computer bulletin board as 
a primary publisher rather than a distributor, we cannot conclude that use of the term ‘publisher’ in Section 
230(c)(1) discloses a clear legislative intention to abrogate distributor liability.”  
657 347 F. 3d. 655 (7th Cir. 2003). 
658 Id. at 656. 
659 Id. at 660, 662. Even though the court affirmed lower court ruling that granted blanket immunity to ISPs, the 
court made a notable suggestion which reinterpreted the meaning of the Section 230 (c). Regarding this point, 
the thesis will discuss next subsection “Challenge to Zeran.” 
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lieu of suing Jimmy, a pseudonym of the Kinko’s user who created the defamatory 
statement.660 However, the plaintiffs’ lawsuit ended up as a failed attempt.          
 Second, the worries about the weakness of the “user control” rationale came to be 
realized in some cases. When Senator Exon introduced his amendment, he pointed out the 
need to provide blocking software at libraries and schools to protect children from 
objectionable information.661 Six years after the enactment of the CDA, a mother of a child, 
who used a computer at a library in Livermore, California, to download pornographic 
pictures, filed a lawsuit.662 Before suing, she requested the City of Livermore to install 
blocking software on computers that children would use to access the Internet. However, the 
City of Livermore did not install the software. The Court of Appeal of California determined 
that Section 230 (c) (1) prohibited holding ISPs liable for their failure to edit, withhold, or 
restrict access to offensive material, thus the City of Livemore was also entitled to such 
immunity.663  
 In fact, the court recognized Congress’s deep concern about protecting children, and 
therefore, in order to combat this problem Congress conferred Good Samaritan blocking 
                                                
660 Patentwizard, Inc. v. Kinko’s, Inc., 163 F.Supp. 2d 1069 (D.S.D. 2001). 
661 141 CONG. REC. S8339 (daily ed. June 14, 1995). Senator Exon stated that “I have also heard a great deal 
today about the parents’ responsibility, which means that the parents that have such responsibility must follow 
their children around all of the time.[…] We have just made a concession in the telecommunications bill before 
us to give the schools and libraries a break, if you will, because we want them involved in this. The schools will 
be sources of the [objectionable] information that Senator Coats and I have been describing. The library is a 
place where they can pick it up. We also talk about some of the software and the off-limits proposition that 
some of the software may or may not provide.” 
662 Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore, 87 Cal. App. 4th 684 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). 
663 Id. at 694-96.  
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immunity. However, in spite of Congress’s concern, the court employed again the “policy 
choice” theory: Congress made the policy choice to immunize ISPs from tort liability. 664 
  Here, some ironies were found. When Congress enacted Section 230, the basic 
argument of the civil liberties groups was to encourage using filtering technology to 
encourage user control; however, the court rejected providing filtering technology under the 
same law. As reviewed in Chapter II, user control is the basic concept embedded in Section 
230.665 As the court mentioned, filtering technology enables a user to control the 
objectionable material, and Section 230 (a)(2) clearly states that ISPs should “offer users a 
great degree of control over the information that they receive.”666  
However, the court only emphasized one policy purpose: to “promote the development of the 
Internet.” This policy choice seems to be made not by Congress but by the court without 
serious consideration of the legislative history and the rationale of parental control. 
 Third, the pro-Zeran’s approaches raised strong doubt of whether Section 230 
attained its objective. The Barrett court and other anti-Zeran advocates advanced the 
theoretical proposition that blanket immunity would not encourage self-policing as 
mentioned above. However, this criticism can be practically demonstrated by some cases 
related to notice-based distributor liability. Some cases verified that when ISPs received 
                                                
664 Id. 
665 See Chapter 2. 2.1.2. Proceedings in the House, subsection “Can Section 230 be a law to apply defamation 
on the Internet.” 
666 47 U.S.C.A.§ 230 (a)(2).  
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notice from victims of objectionable messages posted by third parties, ISPs took the “do-
nothing” option instead of removing them or screening in advance regardless of notice.667   
 In Doe v. AOL, Doe’s mother found that Richard Lee Russell videotaped and 
photographed her eleven-year-old son and two other minors engaged in sexual activity and 
then sold the photos and videos through AOL’s chat rooms. Doe’s mother notified AOL that 
Russell transmitted obscene and unlawful photographs or images. According to the plaintiff’s 
allegation, although AOL reserved the right to terminate without notice the service of the 
wrongdoer, AOL neither warned Russell to stop nor suspended his service.668  
 In Barnes v. Yahoo! Inc., Barnes alleged that her former boyfriend made her profile 
including her nude pictures and detailed information about her, such as her workplace, and 
posted them on Yahoo’s website. According to Barnes, she tried on several occasions to get 
Yahoo! to remove it by sending email and telephone messages. However, these efforts were 
in vain. She did not even receive a reply. Approximately three months after the first notice, 
Barnes was contacted by a Yahoo employee who promised to remove her profile. However, 
her unauthorized profile was not removed until Barnes sued Yahoo!.669 
 In another case, Amazon.com agreed that some postings about Schneider and his 
books violated the guidelines and promised him to take steps to remove these postings. 
However, the postings were not removed. 670  
                                                
667 Doe, 347 F. 3d. at 660. The Seven Circuit stated that if ISPs granted blanket immunity regardless of 
distributor liability, “ISPs may be expected to take the do-nothing option and enjoy immunity” because 
precautions are costly, “not only indirect outlay but also in lost revenue from the filtered customers.” 
668 Doe, 783 So. 2d at 1012. 
669 Barnes v. Yahoo! Inc., 2005 WL 3005602 at 1 (D. Or. 2005).  
670 Schneider, 108 Wn. App. at 458. 
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 In Batzel v. Smith, when attorney Batzel complained to a web operator about a 
defamatory posting that falsely described Batzel  as an offspring of a famous Nazi politician 
who had a lot of stolen art as a legacy, her request for a retraction was ignored.671 According 
to Batzel’s claim, the web operator did not advise people who inquired about the genuineness 
of such allegation.672As a result, she lost several prominent clients including Jewish clients 
and also became the subject of an investigation by the North Carolina Bar.673 
 Four typical cases clearly demonstrate the simple premise: “The Internet is not self-
regulating.”674  As the anti-Zeran courts said, the Zeran rationale of absolute immunity did 
not prompt ISPs to self-regulate. On the contrary, it encouraged ISPs to hide under the 
umbrella of broad immunity without any effort to prevent creating Internet victims.  
3.2. INTERPRETING “CREATION OR DEVELOPMENT OF CONTENT”  
  The logic of Information content providers’ liability was employed in order to seek 
legal remedy for Internet victims due to the Zeran court’s strict restriction of imposing 
distributor liability on ISPs. Since Zeran, many victims of defamation and other torts in 
cyberspace have argued that some kinds of ISP activities might give ISPs co-author status as 
an ICP due to ISPs’ contribution to contents.675   
                                                
671 Batzel v. Smith, 333 F. 3d 1018 (9th Cir.2003). 
672 Id. at 1021-22. 
673 Id. at 1022. 
674 Blumstein, supra note 110, at 423. 
675 The first issue of ICP liability controversy is concerning the editing control. After Zeran, the courts had not 
acknowledged the distributor liability related to failure to editing control, they used ICP concept. And then 
plaintiffs argued that several kinds of ISPs activities might be constitute ICPs. See Ben Ezra v. AOL, 206 F.3d 
980 (10th Cir. 2000), Batzel v. Smith, 333 F. 3d 1018 (9th Cir.2003). 
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 The Zeran and anti-Zeran courts present ostensibly diverse approaches to the issues 
of distributor liability of ISPs and the scope of CDA immunity. As a second round of 
controversy, this conflict extends to the issue of joint liability between ISPs and ICPs, 
especially with regard to interpreting what constitutes the development of content. The Zeran 
court required active and substantial change of content to establish joint liability. However, 
the anti-Zeran courts’ interpretation is broader and more flexible. Several categories that are 
defined by the divided courts apply to the case of news portals. (This will be treated in a later 
section.)   
 3.2.1.THE ORIGIN OF THE ICP  
 It is hard to find any references by Congress to the information content provider in 
the legislative history of the CDA. 
  The seminal concept of joint liability, especially in its application to the liability of 
ICPs, was mentioned first in Blumenthal v.Drudge. 676 Blumental applied Section 230 to 
immunize AOL from liability for Drudge’s defamatory remarks that were disseminated by 
AOL. In spite of rejecting the plaintiff’s claim, the court maintained that “Section 230 does 
not preclude joint liability for the joint development of content.”677 Joint liability, the court 
said, is like the relationship of “lyricist” and “composer” as joint authors of a song.678   
 If an ISP had no role in creating or developing any of the information made by a third 
party as a conduit of information, then the ISP would be immune under the Zeran rule. If an 
                                                
676 See Blumenthal, 992 F.Supp.44, at 50-51. Also see, Walter Pincus, The Internet Paradox: Libel, Slander & 
the First Amendment in Cyberspace, 2 Green Bag 2d 279 (1999), at 286. However, the Drudge court failed to 
apply this interpretation to the case because no evidence was presented that AOL had any role of creating or 
developing information in the Drudge Report.  
677 Id.  That is, Section 230 (c) (1) would not protect AOL if it developed or created content entirely on its own.  
678 Id. 
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ISP, on the other hand, created content by itself, then the ISP could be held liable as a 
publisher. If ISPs contributed to the creation and development of a third party entity, they 
might be beyond Section 230’s immunity provision because ISPs have joint liability as co-
authors. In this case, ISPs’ status changed into simultaneously ISPs and ICPs. Thus, courts 
should examine a defendant’s status as an ICP by determining its involvement in how third 
party content is created or developed.679   
 3.2.2. THE ZERAN REASONING 
  In the Zeran-line courts’ view, the essential criterion in deciding the status of an ICP 
was the degree to which an ISP and its users were substantially involved in developing and 
transmitting the content itself. Furthermore, a crucial consideration was whether the basic 
form and message of the content were actually and substantially changed. Minor 
transformation of information is regarded as a traditional editorial function that places a party 
behind the shield of immunity. The Ninth Circuit, mentioning the rationale of Congress’s 
policy choice, concluded that courts have adopted and should adopt “a relatively expansive 
definition of “interactive computer service” and a relatively restrictive definition of 
“information content provider.”” 680 In  Donato v. Moldow,  the Superior Court of New 
Jersey clearly revealed the Zeran line approach stating that Section 230 “has received a 
narrow, textual construction, not one that has welcomed creative theories or exhibited 
judicial creativity” when considering how to decide the scope of the ICP.681  
                                                
679 MCW Inc. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, 2004 WL 833595, at 25 (N.D.Tex. 2004). 
680 Carafano v. Matchmaker.com, Inc. 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003). 
681 2005 WL 201128, at 33 (N.J.Super.A.D. 2005). 
  148
 EDITING FOR SELF-REGULATING. Self- regulating and editorial control did not turn 
ISPs into ICPs. In Ben Ezra, the Tenth Circuit considered whether AOL’s actions such as 
deleting some stock symbols or other information from the database in an effort to correct 
errors rendered it an ICP.682 The court held that “by deleting the inaccurate stock quotation 
information, defendant [AOL] was simply engaging in the editorial functions Congress 
sought to protect” by enacting the Section 230 Good Samaritan blocking provision.683  The 
court added that AOL merely made the data unavailable and did not create or develop the 
information displayed, even though AOL communicated frequently with the stock quote 
providers.684 
 SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE STANDARD. Simple editing does not constitute the 
development of content. Following the same line of reasoning of the Zeran court, the Ninth 
Circuit, in Batzel v. Smith, established important standards of what constituted a content 
provider.685 The pertinent question was whether Smith was the sole content provider of his e-
                                                
682 206 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff Ben Ezra, Weinstein, and Company, Inc., publicly owed company 
designs and manufactures corporate finance computer software. AOL published updated stock quotation 
information concerning over 40,000 publicly traded stocks and securities, and S&B Comstock, Inc. and 
Townsend Analytics, Ltd. provided market information to AOL. Plaintiff sued AOL claiming that AOL 
published the allegedly inaccurate information. Plaintiff BEW also argued AOL deleted some stock symbols or 
other information from the database in an effort to correct the errors; therefore, such alternation constitutes 
“creation or development” of information, which transformed AOL into ICP.  
683 Id. at 985-86. 
684 Id. at 986. 
685 Batzel v. Smith, 333 F. 3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003).  In 1999, handyman Robert Smith worked for Ellen Batzel, 
an attorney in California and North Carolina, at Batzel’s house. For various reasons, Smith came to believe that 
many works of art in her house were looted from Jews during World War II. Smith sent an e-mail to Tom 
Cremers, the operator of the Museum Security Network, to confirm his suspicions concerning Batzel and her 
artwork. Cremers published Smith’s e-mail with some minor word changes, on the network listserv. He also 
posted that Listserv, with Smith’s message included, on the network Web site without Smith’s consent. Smith 
told Cremers that if he had thought that the “message would be posted on an international message board he 
never would have sent it in the first place.” Several months later, Batzel discovered the e-mail message and 
complained to Cremers, saying that it was false. She also filed suit against Smith and Cremers. The trial court 
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mail, or whether Cremers, who published Smith’s e-mail as the operator of the Web site, 
could also be considered to have “creat[ed]” or “develop[ed]” Smith’s message.686 In this 
case, Cremers posted email made by Smith on the Network listserv with “some minor 
wording changes.”687 The court held that Smith composed the e-mail entirely on his own and 
then found that Cremers’s minor alternations of Smith’s e-mail did not “rise to the level of 
development.”688 Such activity did not alter the basic form and message of the original e-mail.  
The court defined the “development of information” to mean something more substantial 
than merely editing a portion of an e-mail and selecting material for publication under 
Section 230’s Good Samaritan blocking and screening clause.689  
 However, the court’s opinion invited the question of what constitutes a substantial 
level of content development. Even though several courts have ventured explanations, an 
adequate definition is still lacking.  
 The Ninth Circuit, in Carafano v. Metrosplash, also held that defendant 
Matchmaker.com, Inc. cannot be considered an ICP under Section 230 because “no profile 
has any content until a user actively creates it,” even though Matchmaker forced its users to 
                                                                                                                                                  
held that Cremers was liable as an ICP. However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the lower court 
opinion and determined that Cremers should be treated as an ISP protected by Section 230.   
686 Id. at, 1031. 
687 Id. at 1022. 
688 Id. 
689 However, the ruling sparked serious criticism. Because of the ruling, for example, “news letter composers 
and bloggers have a license to spread false hurtful information with impunity.” In other words, bloggers could 
post severely defamatory stories under the protection of the court precedent and Section 230 if such stories were 
made by a third party regardless of whether the author’s consent had been obtained. See, John W. Dean, 
Defamation Immunity On The Internet: An Evolving Body of Law Has Been Stretched Beyond Its Limits, (2004) 
available at http://writ.findlaw.com/dean/20030704.html. 
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answer the multiple choice questionnaire.690 In the court’s view, Matchmaker did not play a 
significant role in creating, developing, or transforming the content.    
  SELECTION FOR PUBLICATION AND REASONABLE STANDARD. The Batzel court 
established another critical standard of the term “development” as defined in Section 230. 
This case questioned whether the web operator’s activity of selecting emails constituted the 
development of content. 691 The majority of the court determined that ISP immunity as a 
publisher “will extend to the selection of material” supplied by others, namely the selection 
for publication did not constitute partial creation or development of that information. 692 
According to the court, the distinction between “deciding to publish” and “deciding not to 
publish” some of the material submitted is “not a viable one.” Furthermore, “a distinction 
between removing an item once it has appeared on the Internet and screening before 
publication cannot fly either.” 693 Therefore, Cremers, the website operator, can not be 
considered an ICP due to his selection of the material for publication.  
 However, the question still remained because in this case, Smith, the author of the 
email, argued that he never expected that his email would be posted on the Web. 694 Thus, the 
question becomes whether Smith can be said to have “provided” his email as Section 230 
                                                
690 Carafano v. Matchmaker.com, Inc. 339 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003). The Nine Circuit overruled the 
lower court’s opinion. The Carafano decision of trial court, however, is very important because some courts 
follow its rationale concerning the scope of an ICP. This case will be addressed more minutely another 
subsection.   
691 See Batzel, 206 F.3d at 1032-36. 
692 Id. at 1032. 
693 Id. In Batzel court’s view, Congress’s intention to encourage self-control technology is supporting factor 
immunizing ISP’s selecting function. The court stated that “the goal of encouraging assistance to parents 
seeking to control children’s access to offensive material would suggest a preference for a system in which the 
offensive material is not available even temporarily.”  
694 Id. The Batzel court stated that “in most cases their conclusion that be Cremers, web-operator, cannot be 
considered an ICP would be end matters, however this case presents one twist on the usual § 230 analysis.”  
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means. The court stated that “if information is provided to those individuals in a capacity 
unrelated to their function as a provider or user of interactive computer services, then there is 
no reason to protect them” because Section 230 supplies immunity only for entities acting as 
ISPs or their users.695  However, in such situation, some standards are needed to determine 
whether the email is provided for posting or not. In the Batzel court’s opinion, it depends not 
on the information provider’s intention but instead on the service provider’s or user’s 
“reasonable perception of those intentions or knowledge.” 696 The Batzel court concluded: 
We therefore hold that a service provider or user is immune from liability 
under § 230 (c)(1) when a third person or entity that created or developed the 
information in question furnished it to the provider or user under the 
circumstances in which a reasonable person in the position of the service 
provider or user would conclude that the information was provided for 
publication on the Internet or other “interactive computer service.”697 
 
The court reasoned a First Amendment grounds stating that “[a]bsent an incentive for ISPs 
and users to evaluate whether the content they receive is meant to be posted, speech over the 
Internet will be chilled rather than encouraged.”698  
 RATING SYSTEM. In Gentry v. eBay, the court faced the issue of whether 
implementing a customer rating system was a substantial level of content development. The 
plaintiff argued that eBay was an ICP in that it was responsible for the creation or 
development of information for online auctions through a highly structured rating system, the 
                                                
695 Id. The court gave an example that “if website operator got a defamatory “snail mail” letter from an old 
friend, the website operator can not be said to have been provided the information in his capacity as a website 
service.”   
696 Id. at 1034.  
697 Id. 
698 Id.  
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Feedback Forum.699 However, the court did not find eBay to be an ICP. The court ruled that 
eBay’s rating system comprised negative and positive information “provided by third party 
consumer and dealer” not by eBay.700 Furthermore, eBay’s star symbol and “Power Sellers” 
designation is “simply a representation” of the amount of such positive information received 
by other users of eBay’s Web site.701 
 LICENSE CONTRACT. As mention earlier, in Blumenthal, the court ruled license 
contracts did not confer ICP status on an ISP or its users.702 This reasoning was echoed in 
Schneider.703 An ISP’s possession of a license for rights to material from a third party does 
not mean that the ISP automatically becomes an ICP. The Washington Court of Appeals 
simply summarized its reasoning as follows: “If actual editing does not create liability [by the 
Good Samaritan provision of Section 230], the mere right to edit [contractual license] can 
hardly do so.”704 Because in this case, the defendant Amazon actually altered or edited the 
                                                
699 99 Cal. App. 4th 816 (App. Div. 2002). Online auction service eBay categorized each response as “Positive 
Feedback,” “Negative Feedback,” or “Neutral Feedback.” And eBay provided color-coded star symbols next to 
the name of a seller who had achieved certain levels of “Positive Feedback” and offered a separate “Power 
Sellers” endorsement based on sales volume and positive feedback rating. Lars Gentry, who had purchased 
forged autographed sports items via an eBay auction, argued that eBay encouraged its users to rely upon its 
“Feedback Forum” prior to engaging in a sales transaction. Therefore, eBay was an ICP in that it was 
responsible for the development of information, Gentry maintained.  
700 Id. at 834. 
701 Id. 
702 Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F.Supp. 44 (D.D.C.1998). 
703 Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc. 108 Wn.App 454 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). In Blumenthal, for the first time, 
the matter of a contractual license became an issue in Internet libel. The court, citing a lack of evidence, did not 
clearly determine whether Drudge is or was an employee or agent of AOL. However, regardless of contractual 
relationship or license, the court determined that the sole criterion for judging AOL’s liability was the existence 
of a factual role in writing or editing the material. The Schneider case differed slightly from the Blumenthal 
case in that Schneider granted Amazon a license for free. However, the Washington appeals court did not make 
that distinction.    
704 Id. at 466. 
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visitors’ comments, the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that a license to alter content 
converted the ISP into an ICP.705  
 Aggressive Distributing. Sending hyperlinks in order to induce users’ feedback did 
not constitute the “development” of content.  A federal court in California turned down the 
claim of a commercial e-mailer OptInRealBig claim that SpamCop had contributed the 
content by its aggressive distributing activity.706 The spam-mailer company argued that 
Spamcop changed or influenced the content (1) by removing the name and email address of 
the registered user when reporting the spam, (2) by using hyperlinks leading a recipient back 
to SpamCop’s website, and (3) by sending out numerous reports, the impact of which were 
exaggerated.707 However, the court found that SpamCop’s activities could not be considered 
a contribution to the content because “they do not alter, shape, or even edit the content.”708 
Furthermore, the court did not believe the argument that multiple mailings of spam reports 
would amount to an alteration in the content. 709 
 3.2.3. THE ANTI-ZERAN  REASONING 
 Essentially, courts that oppose the Zeran opinion maintain that a service provider 
loses immunity when it contributes to the content even though the contributions might not 
reach the level of altering the content. The courts have tried to counter the formal approach, 
                                                
705 Id.  Amazon.com advised potential book reviewers in its terms of service that “you grant Amazon.com and 
its affiliates… fully sublicensable right to use, reproduce, modify, adapt, publish, translate, create derivative 
works …. You also grant Amazon.com and the sublicensees the right to use the name that you submit….” 
Schneider argued that this provision meant that Amazon.com substantially developed content.  
706 Optinrealbic.com, LLC v. SpamCop.Net, Inc. 323 F.Supp. 2d 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2004). See supra note 583. 
707 Id.  
708 Id. at 1047.  SpamCop’s report to ISPs says, “This message is brief for your comfort. Please follow links for 
details.” When an ISP administrator opens the link, it connects to a page on SpamCop’s website where the spam 
reports relating to that ISP are listed. It encouraged the ISP to take action against the spammer 
709 Id. 
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which considers only the standard definition of the contribution of content- whether an ISP or 
its users substantially change the nominal meaning of the content. Instead of rigorously 
following the Zeran standard, dissident courts have focused on both potential and actual 
effects on the content when they interpret development.  
 Active Role Standard.  In Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., the seminal case on 
ICP liability, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California developed an active 
role standard.710 Even though the Court of Appeals overruled the trial court on the very issue, 
at least one federal district court cited the reasoning of the trial court in Carafano after this 
decision was overruled. 711 According to the Carafano trial court, ICP status would result 
when an ISP is actively involved in developing content beyond the role of mere conduit of 
information. In the Zeran line courts’ view, the most critical factor to determine the ICP 
status was whether an ISP transformed the core of the content. However, for the Carapano 
court, the question “how much changed” would not be significant. What is important was 
whether an ISP “actually played any role” in changing the content.    
                                                
710 Carafano v. Matchmaker.com, Inc. 207 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (C.D. Cal. 2002). Christianne Carafano is a popular 
actress who had appeared in numerous films. Defendant Matchmaker.com is a commercial Internet dating 
service. In order to submit a profile, members are required to complete a detailed questionnaire containing both 
62 multiple-choice and essay questions. Matchmaker reviews all photographs before they are posted on the 
server. In 1999, an unknown person using a computer in Berlin posted a “trial” personal profile of Carafano 
under the profile name of “Chase 529.” However, the profile contained false and defamatory information 
asserting that she was looking for a man with “a strong sexual appetite.”  Annoyed by faxes and telephone calls, 
Carafano filed a libel suit claiming that Matchmaker is an ICP without the protection of Section 230.  Even 
though the trial court heard Carafano’s argument, Carafano failed to prove the defendant’s actual malice. 
However, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the lower court’s opinion on the ICP issue, 
holding that Matchmaker did not seem to be ICP because it did not play a significant role in developing the 
relevant information. The appellate court, following the Zeran line of reasoning, focused on who was the 
primary author of the content and determined that the one who selected the content was not Matchmaker, but 
the individual user. Therefore “actual profile information consisted of the particular options chosen and the 
additional essay answers provided. Matchmaker was not responsible.”  However, the lower court’s ruling was 
affirmed on other grounds. See, 339 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir., 2003). 
711 See Optinrealbic.com, LLC v. Ironport Systems, Inc., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1045 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
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 In order to reach this conclusion, the Carafano court employed the Blumenthal 
court’s use of joint liability. The Blumenthal court stated that “joint liability would be 
possible if AOL had any role whatsoever in creating or developing any of the information in 
the posted material.”712 Based on that precedent, the court agreed that defendant Matchmaker 
was an ICP because Matchmaker contributed to the content of the profiles by asking a series 
of essay questions and multiple-choice questions that shaped the eventual content that 
subscribers posted. Accordingly, the court found that Matchmaker did not act simply as a 
conduit but took an active role in developing the information that got posted and, therefore, 
rejected the defendant’s argument that Matchmaker’s service functioned just like a bulletin 
board.713  
 Creating Headlines. In MCW, Inc. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, the U.S. District 
Court for the Northern District of Texas crucially enlarged the scope of “creation or 
development,” saying that creating headline constitutes development of content.714 In 
determining whether ISPs qualify as ICPs, the court stated, the critical issue is whether they 
are “responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of [any disputed] 
                                                
712 Id. at 1068. See also Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 50 (D.D.C.1998). 
713 Id. The court said, “Matchmaker’s members cannot post any other additional information even if he or she 
desires. However, a bulletin board and the other types of online forum designed by defendants merely provide 
the forums for the speech and do not contribute to the creation or development of information provided by the 
users of these services.” 
714 MCW Inc., 2004 WL 833595. Plaintiff offered clients job-hunting skills and career-counseling services 
under the marks HALDANE and BERNARD HALDANE.  Defendants operated a consumer complaint forum 
website called “The Rip-Off Report” at the domain names “ripoffreport.com” and 
“badbusinessbureau.com.”  Defendants post consumer complaints on the website, organizing the complaints 
geographically by company and under various other heading. MCW filed a low suit claiming that defendant 
began using the Bernard Haldane marks and similar variation in connection with the publishing and posting of 
false, misleading, and disparaging statement about MCW. In particular, MCW argued that the defendants post 
web site reports using the protected mark, and create defamatory titles to postings. 
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information.”715 In the court’s view, MCW, the consumer complaint forum website, is an ICP 
because MCW creates, develops, and posts original, defamatory information concerning 
plaintiff’s trade mark by creating messages in the form of report titles and various headings. 
According to the court’s opinion, the titles and headings of a report are a part of the Web 
page content. The court clearly stated that “the CDA does not distinguish between acts of 
creating or developing the contents of reports, on the one hand, and acts of creating or 
developing the titles or headings of those reports, on the other.”716 
Consequently, if creating a heading, a report title, and messages, the ISP would qualify as an 
ICP, thus be beyond Section 230’s immunity.717  
 PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPING INFORMATION Another important criterion the 
MCW court provided in determining ICP status is “participating in the process of developing 
information.”718  The court paid attention to the fact that Badbusinessbureau, the defendant’s 
website, actively encouraged, instructed, and participated in the consumer complaints posted 
on the website. 719 In the eyes on the court, such behavior, including active solicitation, was 
clearly more than “making minor alternations” to a consumer’s message but constituted 
                                                
715 Id. at 32. 
716 Id. 
717 Id. MCW’s claims were only based on the content. However, the court said that “the CDA does not 
distinguish between acts of creating or developing the contents of reports, on the one hand and acts of creating 
or developing the titles or headings of those reports, on the other.” 
718 Id at 35. 
719 Id. at 34. MCW argued that defendant encouraged consumers to take photos of owner, owner’s car with 
license plate, the owner handing out Rip-off Reports, the Bernard Haldane sign. The court found that these 
allegations suggested that the defendant was responsible for the material created and developed by the 
consumer.  
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“participating in the process of developing information.”720 The court concluded that a party 
may be responsible for information created by a third party without “actually creating or 
developing the information itself.”721 
 SELECTION PROCESS. Judge Ronald M. Gould’s dissenting opinion in the Batzel case 
offered valuable insight into an ICP’s liability.  On a petition for rehearing en banc, Gould 
sharply criticized the majority’s decision, arguing that “pre-publication selection and editing 
of another entity’s information is ‘development’ of information, which would place the 
selector or editor outside the statutory immunity declared by Congress.” 722 Gould 
distinguished between pre-publication, selecting or editing, and post-publication.723 In his 
view, “selecting” (or providing availability) is different from “screening” (restricting 
availability).724 Unless the offensive materials were already posted, he asked, how else could 
                                                
720 Id.  
721 Id. at 36. To develop the reasoning of granting ICP’s liability, the court reinterpreted the intention of CDA. 
“CDA requires court to consider whether a party is responsible for creation or development of content. 
Therefore, the statute does not require a court to determine only whether a party creates or develops the 
information. Being responsible for the creation or development of the information is sufficient. This distinction 
is significant because a party may be responsible for information created by a third party without actually 
creating or developing the information itself.”  The court complained that “the decision of the Ninth Circuit in 
Carafano case, which overturned the lower court’s opinion regarding ICP liability, ignored this distinction.” Id. 
From the MCW’s court’s perspective, the Ninth Circuit’s decision was based solely on the nominal 
interpretation of who create or develop the content. As a result, the Ninth Circuit made paradoxical reasoning 
“broadening the scope of immunity to protect those who do not create or develop the information themselves, 
but are responsible for the creation or development of information.”  
722 Batzel V. Smith, No. 01-56380 at 17011 (9th Cir. 2003). In the dissent, Judge Gould complained that the 
majority cited other courts cases in which “development did not include the exercise of traditional editorial 
functions.” However, in Judge Gould’s eyes, this reasoning was inappropriate for those cases involved the 
actual or potential editing or removing of information that had already been posted. This case, however, 
concerned the matter of pre-publication. He argued even recent decisions have focused only on post-publication 
editing and screening. No federal court of appeal has addressed the question of prepublication selection and 
posting of harshly defamatory material. 
723 Id.  
724 The majority held that no functional difference existed between selection and screening. See, Batzel, 333 F. 
3d. at 1032. 
  158
one talk about restricting access or availability? 725 Furthermore, Gould argued that when a 
person selects and posts information that had never been posted before, such actions are 
promoting access, not restricting access, to material.726 After analyzing the intent of Section 
230, he emphasized that even though Congress provides immunity for a Web site operator 
who edits or removes what another person has posted on the Internet, this immunity does not 
apply to a web site operator who initially places libelous content on the web. 727  
3.3. Applying Two Approaches to News Portals  
 Two court groups have evolved clearly different approaches each based on a different 
strong rationale. This section explores the issue of which court group’s approach is more 
appropriate to the current Internet media landscape and development of Internet technologies. 
For this purpose, the author decided to apply the two approaches to news portal Websites 
because news portals are one of the most influential type of Websites in terms of user 
numbers and employment of Internet technologies.  
 Imagine that one morning Yahoo! News posted on its web site a USAToday news 
story that contained false information and was defamatory, and it was introduced not only on 
Yahoo! News but also on the home page of Yahoo.com as a headline. Imagine, further, that 
many users saw this information right away via Yahoo!’s news alert service on their mobile 
devices. The defamatory information could reach as many as 274 million Yahoo users,728 
                                                
725 Id. at 17013.  
726 Id. 
727 Id. at 17015.  
728 See, Yahoo! media relations, wherein Yahoo! notes that more than 274 million unique users worldwide used 
the Yahoo! global network of properties and logged 2.4 billion page views per day as of March 2004. This 
information available at http://docs.yahoo.com/info/pr/faq.html.  
  159
many more than the number of unique users of USAToday.com.729 In this instance, 
USAToday provided its news story to Yahoo! via a contractual license. Imagine, further that 
the subject of the story asked Yahoo! News to delete the item, but Yahoo ignored the request 
only because USAToday.com did not send any notice about a retraction.    
 How different would the result be in the hypothetical case if the two court groups’ 
principles were applied? Furthermore which group’s potential opinion is more persuasive?  
 3.3.1. CHARACTERISTICS OF NEWS PORTALS  
 STRUCTURE  News portals began as nothing more than news aggregators or news 
search engines, but they are an entrenched presence on the Internet.  Most news portals have 
no reporters and create no original stories.730 Primarily, they republish the work of other 
news outlets. News portals generally enter into licensing agreements with news agencies, 
established newspapers, and broadcast stations.731 Therefore, a number of news companies 
provide news stories, photos, and audio and video with news portals as independent 
                                                
729 See, Nielsen/NetRatings, Round-the-clock news coverage of the war in Iraq draws surfers online, according 
to Nielsen/NetRatings, March 27, 2003, available at http://www.nielsen-netratings.com/pr/pr_030327.pdf. 
During the week ending March 23, 2003, the first full week of the U.S. war campaign against Iraq, the unique 
audience of Yahoo! News was 5,354,000, more than four times that of USAToday.com, which drew only 
1,190,000.  
730 See, Yahoo! Help-Yahoo! News. Yahoo! News states on its Web site that it “does not write or edit any of the 
news on our site,” available at http://help.yahoo.com/help/us/news/news-03.html.  
731 See, PR Week, Associated Press Team Up With Yahoo! News (Jan. 6, 2003). “The Associated Press (AP) has 
teamed up with Yahoo! News to offer fee-based archives from the AP on the Yahoo! News site. Users can 
access the archives by conducting a keyboard search for articles dating back to January 1, 1998. Relevant 
articles will be displayed, and users then have the option of purchasing them at $1.50 each.”  
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contractors.732 Sources for news can number 100, while organized links number in the 
thousands or higher.733  
This organizational function provides value to the user, and news portals can shape 
their Web pages just like any high quality newspaper’s Web site. It is unlikely that people 
visit Yahoo! News just to get news from The Washington Post, even though Yahoo! News 
displays Washington Post stories. Most users visit Yahoo! News to access news stories that 
Yahoo! News selects according to its news value criteria. Users visit Yahoo! News to get 
information under the Yahoo! News logo, regardless of the original sources.  
 The most prominent characteristics of news portals are that they function as a 
multimedia outlet, combining various channels, such as newspapers, broadcasters, and 
magazines.734 In organizational and editorial function, a news portal can be similar to a 
newspaper. Like a print daily, a news portal divides its space into subject categories, such as 
politics, economics, and sports, and then places various stories in each section’s limited space. 
Further, the news portal includes third party content such as comics and Op/Ed columns. Of 
course, a news portal’s selection and organization of news can vary from a pure algorithm, 
like Google news, to a paperless newspaper, like Daum, in South Korea. Yahoo! News, for 
example, employs a team of editors that makes the selections.735 They are responsible for the 
design and content of the Web page, selecting and placing each news story. Unlike Yahoo! 
                                                
732 Yahoo! Help-Yahoo! News, What Kinds of News Can I Find Here? Yahoo says that its content comes from 
more than a dozen news partners in 13 categories.  Available at http://help.yahoo.com/help/us/news/news-
01.html.  
733 Palser, supra note 577. 
734 Multimedia means the integration of text, pictures, audio, video, or graphics. See, Amy Zerba, Perceived 
Motives for Clicking on Multimedia Features on News Web Sites: An Exploratory Study, Association for 
Education in Journalism and Mass Communication Conference paper (2003). 
735 Id.  
  161
News, AOL is more apt to alter content, rewriting a headline, for example. These sites vary 
in their news selection, which could be a crucial element of in determining news portals’ 
legal immunity. In particular, they shape the package of the news story, adding previous or 
related news stories, images, and videos to help people evaluate the information. These 
peripheral actions serve to add value for the user. A news portal’s unique aggregating 
function has been called a new type of journalism.736  
 NEWS SELECTION. A news portal like Yahoo! News exercises several steps in news 
selection and uses various tools to attract the users’ attention. Yahoo.com features a special 
news section, “In the News,” on its homepage, in which six or seven news headlines are 
posted. Yahoo! News chooses to display these news stories from among the numerous items 
provided by news services.737   
People who visit Yahoo.com can click on the headline in which they are interested, 
making the “In the News” a doorway to news stories. Most importantly, though, the 
headlines’ prominence may suggest those news stories are the most newsworthy items at that 
time.  
 A second area of news selection occurs on the Yahoo! News page, which functions in 
a manner like that of the front page of a traditional newspaper. Yahoo! News posts top news 
stories in a dozen categories, including politics, business, and sports. Yahoo! News also 
selects the leading story and posts it at the top of the page, as a newspaper might place the 
top story above the fold. Each of the stories features a photo, and in some cases video, that is 
                                                
736 Id.  
737 Front page headlines were selected from 13 categories of news.  
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provided by several media and news wires, for example AP, Reuters, and AFP. In this regard, 
the editing process is similar to that of a newspaper.  
 The process is repeated for each topical area. Yahoo! News shapes the layout and 
content of each section by selecting and laying out several news stories and linking additional 
content.738 During these processes, Yahoo! News selects news items from among the 
numerous stories sent by partners and then decides the size and location in the section 
according to the item’s news value and recency.  
 3.3.2. TOOLS FOR CONTENT DEVELOPMENT AND DISTRIBUTION  
 Yahoo! News has several ways to develop the news stories and facilitate their 
distribution. An important feature of Yahoo! News is the rating system for news stories, 
which appears at the bottom of the story and photo pages.739 Every user can participate in the 
rating.740 Yahoo calculates each story’s or photo’s average rating, as well as the number of 
ratings it has received. Users can view the average rating and the number of participants, and 
what is more, add their ratings to the stories and photos. Yahoo! News presents the feature as 
a way to “recommend” the news story to others.741 This means that the rating system is 
designed to play an active role in attracting users’ attention by offering other people’s 
evaluations of the news story. In this respect, the average rating and rating frequency become 
new information about the news story made available to users. Even though ranking is made 
                                                
738 The order of the news selection process takes place in reverse order. A news story is selected for publication; 
the top story of each section is selected; the top news story overall is chosen; and headlines are chosen for the 
“In the News” section.  
739 See, Yahoo! Help-Yahoo! News. Rating the news, available at http://help.yahoo.com/help/us/news/news-
74.html.  
740 Id., Rating consists of 5-point scales, where 1 is recommend “Not at All” and 5 is recommend “Highly.” 
741 Id.  
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by the user and not by Yahoo! News, the site calculates the rating and displays it as new 
information.  
Every Yahoo! News user can post and read messages about news stories on a 
message board.742 At the bottom of every story appears a box containing a link to that story’s 
message board. After clicking on the link, the user can see a list of messages related to that 
story. In addition, a user sees the headline and summary of the news story being discussed.743  
Yahoo! News has a “news alert” system to distribute news stories to users. If one 
signs up for its news alert service, he or she can receive updated information by e-mail or 
other means. Yahoo! News uses four types of alert channels to notify subscribers.744 Yahoo! 
News notifies the user when a news story matches the user’s interest (by subject and source); 
offers the latest breaking headlines from the AP; sends an HTML or text e-mail of Yahoo! 
News category and feature pages; and sends news to a user’s mobile device.745 One 
advantage of Yahoo! News for a user may be the use of an RSS (Really Simple Syndication) 
feed. Users can easily create and disseminate feeds of data such as news links, headlines, and 
summaries to their own Web site or blog. These devices allow Yahoo! News to play an 
active and aggressive role in distributing news and information.  
                                                
742 Yahoo! Help-Yahoo! News, Yahoo News Message Board, available at 
http://help.yahoo.com/help/us/news/news-28.html. 
743 Id. 
744 See, Yahoo! Help-Yahoo! News. About News Alert and Bulletins. 
 Available at http://help.yahoo.com/help/us/news/news-37.html.  
745 Id. 
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Yahoo! News also has a “Most Popular” section, which displays the news stories that 
users frequently used, divided into three categories: Most e-mailed, Most viewed, and 
Ratings  This peripheral content provides added value to the central content. 
 HEADLINE CREATION. Yahoo! News generally does not create the headline itself, 
instead using the headlines provided by the news service. However, AOL often writes a 
headline for stories from wire services and other third-party sources.  For example, on March 
26, 2005, Yahoo! News and AOL News posted as a top item the same news story regarding a 
federal appeals court panel’s refusal to order the reinsertion of Terri Schiavo’s feeding tube. 
Yahoo! News ran the headline746 provided by The Associated Press: “Schiavo’s Father Says 
She’s in Last Hours.”747 AOL, however, ran a different headline: “Federal Court Again 
Rejects Schiavo Parents’ Case.”748 
Different headlines on AOL News and Yahoo! News point to a significant 
implication regarding the issue of the creation or development of content. The AOL headline 
changed the news angle from that written by the creator of news story. While the AP 
headline focused on the position of Schiavo’s father, AOL highlighted the court’s actions. 
AOL’s headline could be construed as an interpretation of the issue and the insertion of its 
point of view.  
  
                                                
746 Mike Schneider, “Schiavo’s Father Says She’s in Last Hours,” March 26, 2005, Yahoo! News, available 
athttp://news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&e=1&u=/ap/20050326/ap_on_re_us/brain_damaged_woman&sid=8
4439559. 
747 Mike Schneider, “Schiavo’s Father Says She’s in Last Hours,” The Associated Press (March 26, 2005), 
available at    
http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/B/BRAIN_DAMAGED_WOMAN?SITE=FLSTU&SECTION=HOME. 
748 Mike Schneider, Federal Court Again Rejects Schiavo Parents’ Case, March 26, 2005, AOL News, 
available at http://aolsvc.news.aol.com/news/article.adp?id=20050316235609990012. 
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3.3.3. APPLYING INTERNET DEFAMATION RULES TO NEWS PORTALS 
 PRO-ZERAN COURTS 
 About 30 years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court said that “a newspaper is more than a 
passive receptacle or conduit for news, comment, and advertising.”749  From the Court’s 
perspective, editorial control and judgment are fundamental functions for creating a qualified 
and credible medium. The “choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions 
made as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and 
public officials” are crucial functions of media that should be preserved.750 
 By the same reasoning, news portals should be considered more than ISPs. Yahoo! 
News, for example, chooses material from numerous sources and evaluates its news value 
and places it on the Web page. In many regards, news portals function like traditional media.  
 Under the current state of Internet doctrine, the outcome of the hypothetical 
USAToday case, described above, would be vastly different, depending on which line of 
reasoning a particular court adopted.  
 A court following Zeran’s line of reasoning would not consider the news portal to be 
a publisher or distributor if it did not provide original content. The involvement of Yahoo! 
News editors would be ignored. The USAToday news story was posted on the “In the News” 
section on the home page of Yahoo.com, but the news selection process did not substantially 
alter the content itself. The USAToday news story was placed as the top story of the politics 
section for an extended period of time. The size of the news story was not regarded as 
“development” of the content. A license with USAToday could not help to convert Yahoo! 
                                                
749 Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S.241, 258 (1974).   
750 Id. 
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News into an ICP because a license is just a mere right to edit. What is more, article ratings 
and numerous comments could not affect the liability of Yahoo! News because all of them 
were provided by third parties.  
Pro- Zeran courts would disagree with recognizing a news portal’s liability as a 
distributor. Therefore, a distributor’s knowledge-based negligence would not be established. 
Yahoo! News could continue to disseminate the defamatory news story through its various 
devices.  
 However, the Zeran line of reasoning brings several problems that cannot be 
answered unambiguously when applied to a news portal. The fundamental problem is the 
vague definition of “contribution to the content.” The Blumenthal case ruled only whether 
AOL engaged in substantive or editorial involvement and did not establish a clear definition 
of “creation or development.” Batzel merely found that the plaintiff’s minor alterations to an 
e-mail did not “rise to the level of ‘development.’” Furthermore, most courts ruled ICP status 
based on one or two actions, such as selecting an e-mail or making a minor alteration,751 
rating, 752 licensing a right,753 or deleting a symbol.754 However, what about several options 
that the courts have identified as being potential elements of contributing content? A news 
portal could engage in similar actions. In the hypothetical case, Yahoo! News posted the 
USAToday’s defamatory news story by selecting it from among those of several news 
services. What is more, Yahoo! News has a contractual license with the USAToday, and the 
                                                
751 Batzel v. Smith, 333 F. 3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003). 
752 Gentry v. eBay, 99 Cal. App. 4th 816 (App. Div. 2002). 
753 Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc. 108 Wn.App 454 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). 
754 Ben Ezra v. AOL, 206 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 2000). 
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site offered additional information concerning the story. All these actions rise to the level of 
development, contrary to what the Batzel court determined.755  
 SIGNIFICANT ISSUES.  
 The ambiguity of the Zeran court opinion gives rise to several significant issues. First 
is the issue of selection. Prior to republishing the USAToday news story on the Yahoo! News, 
the information had been selected at four stages. More importantly for a defamation suit, it is 
easy to imagine that the news story caused greater harm, given the wider Yahoo! audience 
and given the prominent placement. In other words, the editors at Yahoo! News added more 
news value to this story than those of USAToday when they decided on its size and location. 
However, the most important issue is that if there is no selection, there is no republication as 
Judge Gould pointed out in Batzel.756 At the time of selection, various kinds of stories were 
available to the editors of Yahoo! News. Actions such as adding links to additional reports 
far exceeded the role of being a mere conduit of information; doing so contributed to the 
content by developing added value.757   
 Second, the nature of the introductory news section on the home page of Yahoo.com 
can give rise to a significant problem. Because the “In the News” section consists only of 
headlines, there is no attribution to any other source. Users find only the Yahoo! logo.758 It is 
                                                
755 Batzel, 333 F. 3d, at 1031. 
756 See, Batzel v. Smith, No. 01-56380 at 17008 (9th Cir. 2003). 
757 Strictly speaking, in Batzel, Cremers, the Web site operator, only decided whether to post the e-mail on the 
Web. However, the Yahoo! News editors make that decision as many as four times.   
758 The situation for AOL is similar to that of Yahoo!. The AOL home page features a headline news section. 
Furthermore, AOL’s news section on the home page is devided into two kinds of news, “TODAY’S STORIES 
& FEATURES” (especially selected as a top story of the day) and “AOL NEWS” (other top stories). Neither 
one of them, identifies the source of the information. 
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reasonable to expect that the information will be perceived not as a part of republished news 
but as a new publication in itself.  
 More importantly, the Restatement (Second) of Torts noted that “the public 
frequently reads only the headlines of a newspaper or reads the article itself so hastily or 
imperfectly as not to realize its full significance.”759 Therefore, a complete newspaper article 
is ordinarily not the context of the headline, even though it may explain or qualify a 
defamatory imputation conveyed when the headline alone is read.760  Furthermore, courts 
have ruled that a defamatory headline alone is sufficient grounds for a libel suit. A Louisiana 
appellate court reasoned that a headline by itself may be considered libelous even if the news 
story below the headline was accurate.  The New Orleans Times–Picayune lost a libel suit for 
the headline “Bid Specs Reported Rigged.”761 The news story was factual. However, the 
court said that “even though the news story below the headline was correctly reported, the 
word ‘rigged’ in the headline was defamatory because it denoted ‘fraudulent, illegal and 
improper.’”762 This reasoning can be extended to Internet media. Some users, for example, 
might not click the headlines, merely skimming the attribution-free information before 
proceeding to another section. A service like Yahoo! News just reprints the headlines 
provided by the news services, but others, such as AOL, do not. 
                                                
759 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §564. 
760 Id. 
761 Forrest v. Lynch, 347 So. 2d 1255, 1258 (La. Ct. App. 1997).   
762 Id. However, the headline issue remains controversial. Some courts said that the headline and article must be 
read as a whole. That is, if the meaning of the headline is explained by the news story, the headline and the 
story, taken together, are not defamatory. See Fernandes v. Tenbruggencate, 649 P. 2d. 1144 (Haw. 1982). The 
case of a news portal is different, however, when the headline is on a separate page from the body of the story. 
In a newspaper, the story is located directly below the headline.  
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 The creation of headlines raises a significant issue regarding the practice of content 
development. Two of the major functions of a headline are “helping set the tone of the 
newspaper” and “depicting the mood of the story.”763 A good headline attracts the reader’s 
attention to the story and helps the reader determine what to read or what to ignore. 
Furthermore, headlines reveal as much about the tone or character of a newspaper as 
anything it contains. 764 Thus, the headline plays an active role in setting the tone of news 
story.  
While this would not matter if the headline is not defamatory, such actions could 
make AOL subject to liability as an ICP. Even though AOL’s news stories were provided by 
an original source, AOL made alterations that changed the tone, presumably to add value. 
Engaging in peripheral modifications, though leaving the central content intact, might lead a 
court to classify the ISP as an ICP. Actions such as making a headline could be considered a 
substantial development of the content, and routinely developing content could make an ISP 
like AOL an ICP, although Zeran suggests that such actions would not.  
 As an ICP, Yahoo! News enjoys greater immunity under Zeran than that associated 
with traditional media outlets. Yahoo! News has greater protection even though, in function 
or in utility to a user, it is little different from sites operated by traditional outlets such as The 
Miami Herald.  
 Lastly, limiting news portals’ liability for defamation raises serious issues. In the 
hypothetical USAToday case, a court could rule that only USAToday should be liable for 
                                                
763 BRIAN BROOKS & JACK SISSORS, THE ART of EDITING 156 (7th ed. 2001). Other functions of 
headline are to attract the reader’s attention; to summarize the story; to help the reader index the contents of the 
page; and to provide adequate typographic relief.  
764 Id. at 158. 
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defamation as an original publisher while exempting Yahoo! News.  In measuring the scope 
of the harm the plaintiff suffered, the court could calculate damages USAToday must pay 
based on the number of all possible readers, including the much larger readership of Yahoo! 
News. When deciding compensatory damage awards, juries consider the number of people 
who may have read or heard the defamation as a primary factor.765   
 Anti-Zeran Courts 
 Courts that disagree with the Zeran ruling already have found several cases for 
making a news portal liable for defamation as an ICP. The pre-publication selection of 
information conveys a tacit approval of the newsworthiness of that information.766 The 
recipient understands that information selected for dissemination by another person has been 
deemed worthy of dissemination by the sender. Therefore, republished information is not the 
same qualitatively as the original information that the sender provided.767  A news portal’s 
repeated steps in news selection and some type of editing function, such as deciding size and 
placement, adds to the news value and is actually developing the content.     
 The rating system is open to reconsideration, as well. In the Gentry case, the court 
held that the rating role did not constitute a contribution to content, saying that the ratings 
were made by a third party. The Yahoo! News rating system is more developed than that of 
the eBay’s “FeedBack” system, which was at issue. The Yahoo! News rating system is 
designed to evaluate directly the content (of a news story), while eBay’s system is designed 
                                                
765 See, MIDDLETON et all, supra note 43, at 149. Other factors such as the degree of fault, the seriousness of the 
defamatory charge, the degree of injury suffered, and the character and reputation of the litigants can be 
considered in deciding the damage awards.  
766 See, Batzel v. Smith, 333 F. 3d 1018, 1037-1041 (9th Cir. 2003). Gould wrote, “A person’s decision to select 
particular information for distribution on the Internet changes that information in a subtle but important way: it 
adds the person’s imprimatur to it.”  
767 Id.  
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to evaluate not contents (the merchandise for sale) but the seller’s credibility, even though in 
both instances the evaluators are third parties. Further, eBay functions as a system of 
exchange, a marketplace, while Yahoo! itself is the service. What is more, Yahoo! News 
offers the average rating result and the number of participants. It turned raw materials 
(individual rates) into information (average rate) of the content. A rating system offers 
important information, other peoples’ opinion, about the news story. Therefore, it may be 
able to directly influence the reader’s opinion. In this sense Yahoo! News participates in the 
process of developing information.  
 Lastly, headlines themselves are regarded as the creation or development of content, 
as a Texas district court in MCW768 ruled that headings and titles are part of content. 
Therefore, for opponents of the Zeran line of reasoning, AOL’s creation of headlines is likely 
to be regarded as the development of content.  
  Distributor Liability 
 In the hypothetical USAToday case, the distributor’s liability is very important. 
Under Batzel, even if the defamed person asks for a retraction and the deletion of the news 
story from the database, the distributor does not need to respond to this request because of 
protection under Section 230.  Under Barrett, however, a person cannot enjoy immunity 
provided under Section 230 in republishing information that one knows is defamatory.  
 However, the characteristics of news portals and technological innovations in 
information distribution provide additional reasons for favoring the Barrett ruling in 
explaining why distributor liability of ISPs should be recognized. A news portal can use 
                                                
768 MCW Inc., 2004 WL 833595. 
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cutting-edge information distribution technology such as a mobile device. The portal’s 
influence on the reader is very direct, effectual, and prevailing.  
 Under the Zeran precedent, Yahoo! News, in the hypothetical USAToday case, would 
have no liability for continuing to publish further news related to the defamatory news story 
provided by USAToday, ignoring the defamed person’s request. More seriously, even if that 
person were to win a lawsuit against the USAToday, Yahoo! News could continue to post the 
USAToday news story and make it available in its database because Yahoo! News is 
considered an ISP protected by Section 230.769 Further, if  the USAToday were to publish a 
retraction and apology, Yahoo! News would not need to republish it; Yahoo! News would 
have no legal responsibility in the matter, even if it saved the USAToday news story in a 
news database. 
                                                
769 However, in traditional defamation law, republication of a statement after the defendant’s notice about the 
false and defamatory content might be or could be treated as evidence of reckless disregard. See, supra note 23, 
at § 580 A. 
  
 
CHAPTER 4  
CONCLUSION 
  The purpose of this thesis was to explore why Congress enacted Section 230 and how 
the courts have evolved the case law concerning the ISP immunity. 
 When Congress passed the CDA in 1996, the intent was to protect children from 
cyberporn. However, the CDA mainly was used by ISPs as a safety net against all kinds of 
torts, including defamation suits brought by third parties, under the protective umbrella of 
Section 230. This was mainly because the courts have broadly interpreted the scope of ISP 
immunity as defined under Section 230 since the Fourth Circuit first ruled in Zaran in 1997. 
But ISP immunity continues to be controversial as it ignores to a dangerous extent the 
interest of the victims of Internet defamation and also the common law traditions that would 
hold traditional media liable in such instances. 
 The questions this thesis ultimately sought to answer were whether Congress intended 
Section 230 to grant “absolute” civil immunity to ISPs and whether granting perfect 
immunity could work as an effective and well-balanced means to govern the rapidly 
changing Internet. Part I of this chapter will summarize the findings of the research. Based on 
these findings, Part II will address some suggestions for how the “Good Samaritan law” 
could actually make a “good law.”  
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
RESEARCH QUESTION 1: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 230. 
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 1-1.WHAT IS THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 230? HOW AND WHY WAS IT 
ADDED TO THE CDA?  The original version of Section 230 was designed as an alternative to 
Senator Exon’s amendment to the CDA. Exon and the conservative members of the Senate 
believed that criminal penalties were an effective means of regulating cyberporn and that 
ISPs were not exempt from limited liability. However, the House had a different remedy for 
cyberporn. House members disagreed with expanding federal regulations and imposing 
liability on ISPs because of the potential chilling effect on cyberspace. As an alternative, 
Representatives Cox and Wyden made the IFFEA, the original version of Section 230, which 
preferred self-regulation to government regulation along with the anticipation that advances 
in filtering technology would realize this premise. In addition, reflecting the troubling result 
of Stratton v. Prodigy, the IFFEA incorporated the Good Samaritan blocking protection so as 
not to discourage ISPs from exercising self-regulation.  
 However, when Congress finally passed the CDA, these two laws based on totally 
different and conflicting philosophies were integrated into the CDA as the result of political 
negotiation.  
 Four aspects of the legislative history of the CDA clearly raise the question whether 
such broad immunity for ISPs should be considered valid. First, when Congress wrote 
Section 230 (or Section 223, the Exon amendment), there was no direct reference to 
defamation or tort law. The only reference was in the Conference Report of Section 230, 
which said that “one of the specific purposes of this section is to overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. 
Prodigy.” This became the only ground for granting broad immunity. Second, the rationale of 
“user control” embedded in Section 230 is inappropriate to apply to Internet libel and cyber-
torts. Third, the legislative history strongly supported the premise that the immunity defined 
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by Section 230 reasonably meant only limited immunity for ISPs that engaged in “Good 
Samaritan Blocking,” instead of absolute immunity. Finally, the history also implied that the 
CDA, including Section 230, was crafted based on the assumption that knowledge-based 
distributor liability would be recognized. 
1-2.WHAT ROLE, IF ANY, DID SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS PLAY IN THE ENACTMENT OF 
SECTION 230?  
  Interest groups, whether the religious right or the coalition between civil liberties 
groups and Internet businesses, were actually co-authors of the CDA, including Section 230. 
In particular, civil liberties groups and Internet businesses successfully cooperated to combat 
the religious right, even though their ultimate goals were different, i.e. protecting freedom of 
the speech on the Internet versus creating a favorable environment for businesses. 
Furthermore, many members of Congress who strongly supported Section 230, including key 
players who wrote Section 230, had close ties to the businesses. Thus Section 230 inevitably 
reflected the interests of the ISPs. 
 On the contrary, there was no interest group representing victims of Internet 
defamation. Moreover, the characteristic of defamation law as a remedy for damage to 
individual reputation made it difficult to organize victims as a political force.  
1-3 HOW AND WHY DID SECTION 230 REMAIN WHEN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT STRUCK 
DOWN THE REST OF THE CDA IN 1997?  
 When the ACLU and Internet business groups filed a suit against the CDA, they did 
not mention Section 230. They did not need to because Section 230 exactly reflected either 
their business interests or philosophical views. Though the Court did not explicitly endorse 
Section 230, it revealed its preference in Internet regulation approaches by supporting 
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“parental control.” One important fact is that ACLU v. Reno foreshadowed the strong 
movement to protect Section 230 on the part of these interest groups, which attempted to 
make the statute unassailable.  The coalition between Internet businesses and civil liberties 
groups continued after ACLU v. Reno in several defamation or tort cases, while the religious 
right lost interest in the issue of ISP liability since their only interest was to protect children 
from pornography. Consequently, as no one except the plaintiffs and their attorney pushed 
for ISP liability in Internet libel cases, the courts also paid little attention to creating remedies 
for Internet victims. In sum, the victims were virtually alone, without any social support.    
RESEARCH QUESTION 2: TWO DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO SECTION 230 
2-1. HOW HAVE COURTS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED SECTION 230? 
  Even though Zeran v. AOL became a dominant precedent in interpreting Section 230, 
the decision has continuously been challenged by other courts. The courts are now divided 
into two distinct groups: pro-Zeran and anti-Zeran. The pro-Zeran side supported the 
rationale that “Congress recognized the threat that tort-based lawsuits pose to freedom of 
speech in the new burgeoning Internet medium.”770 They expressly safeguarded Internet 
businesses by mentioning tort liability for third party postings as representing “another form 
of regulation” and saying that Congress “sought to prevent lawsuits from shutting down 
Internet services on the Internet.”  However, anti-Zeran courts disagreed with granting 
perfect immunity because it was beyond the intent of Congress and caused significant 
adverse effects. They argued for returning to the common law tradition for governing 
cyberspace; furthermore, courts should and could supply legal remedies for online 
defamation victims, they said.  
                                                
770 Zeran, 129 F. 3d at 330. 
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2-1. HOW HAVE COURTS INTERPRETED “DISTRIBUTOR LIABILITY” SINCE ZERAN V. AOL?  
 The pro-Zeran group considered distributor liability to be nothing more than a subset 
of publisher liability; therefore, the CDA granted broad immunity to ISPs both as publishers 
and distributors. Even though this civil immunity would have troubling effects, such as 
failure to deter harmful online speech or intentional failure of self-regulating, these results 
were Congress’s policy choice to protect freedom of speech and the interests of Internet 
businesses. Ironically, the crux of the pro-Zeran courts’ rationale is the belief that broad 
immunity would encourage ISPs to self-police the Internet.   
 This paradox was directly criticized by the anti- Zeran courts. Unlike Zeran, the 
Barrett and Grace courts stated that perfect immunity did not encourage ISPs to self-regulate, 
rather encouraging them not to screen their content because it would be no more than a waste 
of time and money. They said the Zeran court’s logic concerning distributor liability lacked 
precedent and theoretical background. Distributors are not a subset of publishers; on the 
contrary, they belong to a set of entities who perform a “secondary role in disseminating 
defamatory matter” created by third parties.771 Like the legislative history analysis in this 
thesis, the anti-Zeran courts argued that Section 230(1) should be read not as a broad 
immunity provision but merely a definitional clause. Therefore, ISP immunity should be 
applied only when ISPs affirmatively act to block objectionable material in good faith. Many 
cases concerning ISP immunity demonstrated that ISPs did not automatically self-police as 
the Zeran court had imagined. Rather, ISPs enjoyed the right not to self-control under the 
protection of the CDA. As a result, absolute immunity took away the last resort of Internet 
defamation victims to be compensated for their damages.  
                                                
771 Doe, 783 So. 2d at 1022. 
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2-3. HAVE COURTS DISTINGUISHED BETWEEN ISPS AND ICPS? HOW HAVE COURTS 
DEFINED “CREATING” OR “DEVELOPING” CONTENT? 
 As Zeran blocked the imposition of any kind of civil liability on ISPs for injury from 
third-party postings, anti-Zeran courts paid attention to the concept of ICPs and joint liability 
for ISPs co-authors. The two court groups clashed again concerning the scope of ICPs. The 
pro-Zeran courts considered ISPs to be ICPs only when the basic form of the message was 
substantially transformed. Minor changes or traditional editing controls did not constitute 
“development” of information. The selection process was also regarded as a part of the 
publication process, which is protected under the immunity provision. Rating, editing 
according to licensing contracts, and aggressive distribution using cutting-edge Internet 
technology did not change ISPs into ICPs because these acts could not significantly change 
the content created by a third party.  
 However, anti-Zeran courts introduced the “active role standard” with a broader and 
more flexible scope of ICP liability. In other words, the important factor in the eyes of anti-
Zeran courts was not the amount of the changed content but the ISPs’ actual involvement in 
transforming the content. Therefore, requiring users to answer multiple-choice questions 
shapes the development of information. Furthermore, a title or headline was regarded as a 
contribution to the content even though it did not substantially change the information. 
Selecting which information to post would be very significant involvement, and participating 
in content development, such as by actively soliciting information, could be considered 
contribution even without transforming the content. 
2-4. WHICH RATIONALE IS MORE APPROPRIATE TO APPLY TO THE NEW ONLINE MASS 
COMMUNICATION ENVIRONMENT, SUCH AS EXEMPLIFIED BY NEWS PORTALS?  
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 As the last analysis, this thesis applied two court rationales to news portals. 
Influential news portals such as Yahoo! News and AOL News have similar systems of 
selecting and editing articles as do traditional news outlets. But they have no reporters and no 
original news stories. Furthermore, portals have various ways of developing stories and 
facilitating their distribution. Most news portals employ rating systems, message boards, 
hyperlinks, news alert systems, and news delivery services to users’ e-mail accounts. One 
important fact is that the “most viewed” list or other methods of rating stories facilitate 
consumption of the news. Some news portals create their own headlines even though the 
stories themselves are provided by the news services.  
 In the eyes of the Zeran court, the news portals would not be considered publishers or 
distributors because they do not create original content. Furthermore, their news selection 
process or the supporting tools to produce new information about the news stories such as 
other people’s interest or page views, would not be regarded development of the content 
because it would not significantly change the content. Cutting-edge distribution technology 
also would not make ISPs into ICPs.  
 On the contrary, according to anti-Zeran courts’ opinions, news portals would be 
liable for defamatory stories as ICPs because of their news selection process. Furthermore, 
if ISPs contributed to a certain degree in developing the story’s news value, such as 
providing headlines or ranking it in the “most viewed” list, they should be liable for those 
stories.  
 It seems clear that the pro-Zeran courts would not appropriately reflect the nature of 
the revolutionarily changed Internet. In contrast, anti-Zeran courts would more flexibly deal 
with new mass media, Internet-based or otherwise. News portals are only an example. 
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 When Congress enacted Section 230 and the CDA, it never predicted the appearance 
of the blog, even though blogs are now one of the more popular forms of communication on 
the Internet. Are blogs also ISPs? What if the owner of a blog or an anonymous user copied 
defamatory content, such as Seigenthaler’s Wikipedia biography? Can blogs enjoy immunity 
under Section 230 according to Zeran?   
 Discussion and SUGGESTIONS 
 The findings provided theoretical and logical support to the idea that Section 230 is 
not a sound law for covering Internet libel and other cyber-torts. The legislative history of the 
CDA clearly demonstrated that Section 230 was not designed as a law for addressing Internet  
cyber-torts. Section 230 ignored the common law traditions regarding torts without any 
consideration of side effects and legal application. Even so, the statute firmly became rooted 
as an Internet defamation-and-tort law.  
Furthermore, in application to the cases, most courts seemed to distort or exaggerate 
the real intent of Congress and ignored the complexities surrounding Internet communication. 
There seemed to be two stages of exaggeration. The Zeran court created the policy choice 
theory to justify absolute immunity, stating that Congress deliberately made a policy choice 
not to limit harmful online speech to encourage free speech and protect Internet business 
interests. In reality, the choice was not made by Congress but by the Zeran court and its 
followers. As discussed in Chapter 2, the legislative history does not indicate perfect 
immunity to ISPs and Congress did not decide not to deter harmful speech – such a choice 
would be in direct opposition to the primary principle of the CDA.   
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The results of the Zeran-line courts’ decisions are grave. As Judge Gould pointed out, 
some court opinions made the Internet like the “Old West: a lawless zone.”772 It is wrong that  
courts protect not only the “good faith” activities of ISPs but also “bad faith” activities under 
the umbrella of Section 230; in other words, the court should not afford “good faith” 
immunity to “bad faith” ISPs.  
It is true that Congress, especially the designers of Section 230, intended to promote 
the Internet both as a burgeoning communication medium and a business opportunity 
because it was significantly influenced by the civil liberties and Internet business-related 
groups. However, such an incentive should be reconsidered because the current Internet 
environment is very different from the simple online bulletin boards that Congress had in 
mind when passing Section 230. “The Internet is no longer in its infancy,” one observer 
remarked, questioning “whether the Internet continues to need such subsidies” of broad 
protection from defamation liability.773 This thesis agrees with such arguments.   
This is the time for Congress and the courts to reconsider integrating the intent of 
Section 230’s “Good Samaritan” provision with innovations in communication technology. 
The thesis suggests that Congress should rewrite Section 230 or enact other legislation to 
cover Internet libel and ISP immunity. The theoretical architecture for creating more robust 
and up-to-date rules for the Internet is already being built by the anti-Zeran courts. New 
legislation should strike a balance between freedom of online speech and protection of 
Internet victims’ interests.  
                                                
772 Batzel v. Smith, 333 F. 3d 1018, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003). 
773 Jae Hong Lee, Batzel v. Smith & Barrett v. Rosenthal: Defamation Liability for Third Party Content on the 
Internet, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 469, 491 (2004). 
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Section 230 is a worthwhile provision designed with noble intentions, namely to 
cultivate the robust nature of Internet communication and to keep government interference 
therein to a minimum. However, as many cases demonstrated, free speech and the 
development of the Internet are not promoted by a grant of perfect immunity to ISPs that 
know or have reason to know that certain information is problematic. It was a costly lesson 
for the last decade. Immunity for ISPs should be limited; in particular, notice-based 
distributor liability should be recognized in order to encourage ISPs to engage in Good 
Samaritan blocking. 
What is important is that Congress should thrust itself into the debate concerning 
issues such as whether it was wrong to provide ISPs immunity from libel and other tort suits, 
and if ISPs should enjoy some immunity, what degree would be appropriate.  
If it will be difficult for Congress to rewrite Section 230, no doubt about that the 
courts should positively open the door toward the anti-Zeran approach instead of the pro-
Zeran approach.  
The coalition of civil liberties and Internet business-related groups is still strong and 
steady while no social force represents Internet victims. This is due to the individuality of 
libel suits and loss of interest on the part of the religious right.  The courts should take care to 
understand the nature of ISP liability cases and pay special attention to striking the balance 
between two different social values.  
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APPENDIX ONE 
 
SENATOR EXON AND GORTON’S PROPOSAL OF CDA (S.314). 
 
104th CONGRESS 
1st Session 
S. 314 
 
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES  
February 1 (legislative day, January 30), 1995 
 
Mr. Exon (for himself and Mr. Gorton) introduced the following bill; which was read twice 
and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 
 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the ‘Communications Decency Act of 1995’. 
SEC. 2. OBSCENE OR HARASSING USE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES 
UNDER THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934. 
(a) Offenses: Section 223 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 223) is 
amended-- 
(1) in subsection (a)(1)-- 
(A) by striking out `telephone' in the matter above subparagraph (A) 
and inserting `telecommunications device'; 
(B) by striking out `makes any comment, request, suggestion, or 
proposal' in subparagraph (A) and inserting `makes, transmits, or 
otherwise makes available any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, 
image, or other communication'; 
(C) by striking out subparagraph (B) and inserting the following: 
(B) makes a telephone call or utilizes a telecommunications device, 
whether or not conversation or communications ensues, without 
disclosing his identity and with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or 
harass any person at the called number o r who receives the 
communication;' and 
(D) by striking out subparagraph (D) and inserting the following: 
`(D) makes repeated telephone calls or repeatedly initiates 
communication with a telecommunications device, during which 
conversation or communication ensues, solely to harass any person at 
the called number or who receives the communication ; or'; 
(2) in subsection (a)(2), by striking `telephone facility' and inserting 
`telecommunications facility'; 
(3) in subsection (b)(1)-- 
(A) in subparagraph (A)-- 
(i) by striking `telephone' and inserting `telecommunications 
device'; and 
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(ii) inserting `or initiated the communication' and `placed the 
call', and 
(B) in subparagraph (B), by striking `telephone facility' and inserting 
`telecommunications facility'; and 
(4) in subsection (b)(2)-- 
(A) in subparagraph (A)-- 
(i) by striking `by means of telephone, makes' and inserting `by 
means of telephone or telecommunications device, makes, 
knowingly transmits, or knowingly makes available'; and 
(ii) by inserting `or initiated the communication' after `placed 
the call'; and 
(B) in subparagraph (B), by striking `telephone facility' and inserting 
in lieu thereof `telecommunications facility'. 
(b) Penalties: Section 223 of such Act (47 U.S.C. 223) is amended-- 
(1) by striking out `$50,000' each place it appears and inserting `$100,000'; 
and 
(2) by striking `six months' each place it appears and inserting `2 years'. 
(c) Prohibition on Provision of Access: Subsection (c)(1) of such section (47 U.S.C. 
223(c)) is amended by striking `telephone' and inserting `telecommunications device.' 
(d) Conforming Amendment: The section heading for such section is amended to read 
as follows: obscene or harassing utilization of telecommunications devices and 
facilities in the district of columbia or in interstate or foreign communications'.  
SEC. 3. OBSCENE PROGRAMMING ON CABLE TELEVISION. 
Section 639 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 559) is amended by 
striking `$10,000' and inserting `$100,000'. 
SEC. 4. BROADCASTING OBSCENE LANGUAGE ON RADIO. 
Section 1464 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking out `$10,000' and 
inserting `$100,000'. 
SEC. 5. INTERCEPTION AND DISCLOSURE OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS. 
Section 2511 of title 18, United States Code, is amended-- 
(1) in paragraph (1)-- 
(A) by striking `wire, oral, or electronic communication' each place it 
appears and inserting `wire, oral, electronic, or digital communication', 
and 
(B) in the matter designated as `(b)', by striking `oral communication' 
in the matter above clause (i) and inserting `communication'; and 
(2) in paragraph (2)(a), by striking `wire or electronic communication service' 
each place it appears (other than in the second sentence) and inserting `wire, 
electronic, or digital communication service'. 
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SEC. 6. ADDITIONAL PROHIBITION ON BILLING FOR TOLL-FREE TELEPHONE 
CALLS. 
Section 228(c)(6) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 228(c)(6)) is 
amended-- 
(1) by striking `or' at the end of subparagraph (C); 
(2) by striking the period at the end of subparagraph (D) and inserting a 
semicolon and `or'; and 
(3) by adding at the end thereof the following: 
`(E) the calling party being assessed, by virtue of being asked to 
connect or otherwise transfer to a pay-per-call service, a charge for the 
call.'. 
SEC. 7. SCRAMBLING OF CABLE CHANNELS FOR NONSUBSCRIBERS. 
Part IV of title VI of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 551 et seq.) is 
amended by adding at the end the following: 
SEC. 640. SCRAMBLING OF CABLE CHANNELS FOR NONSUBSCRIBERS. 
`(a) Requirement: In providing video programming unsuitable for children to any 
subscriber through a cable system, a cable operator shall fully scramble or otherwise 
fully block the video and audio portion of each channel carrying such progra mming 
so that one not a subscriber does not receive it. 
`(b) Definition: As used in this section, the term `scramble' means to rearrange the 
content of the signal of the programming so that the programming cannot be received 
by persons unauthorized to receive the programming.'. 
SEC. 8. CABLE OPERATOR REFUSAL TO CARRY CERTAIN PROGRAMS. 
(a) Public, Educational, and Governmental Channels: Section 611(e) of the 
Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 531(e)) is amended by inserting before the 
period the following: `, except a cable operator may refuse to transmit any public acce 
ss program or portion of a public access program which contains obscenity, 
indecency, or nudity'. 
(b) Cable Channels for Commercial Use: Section 612(c)(2) of the Communications 
Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 532(c)(2)) is amended by striking `an operator' and inserting 
`a cable operator may refuse to transmit any leased access program or portion of a 
leased access program which contains obscenity, indecency, or nudity. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
TEXT OF 47 U.S.C. 223 AS AMENDED BY S. 314 
 
**NOTE:         [] = deleted  
                 ALL CAPS = additions 
            
47 USC 223 (1992) 
 
Sec. 223.  [Obscene or harassing telephone calls in the District 
of Columbia or in interstate or foreign communications] 
 
  186
OBSCENE OR HARASSING UTILIZATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS  
DEVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA OR IN  
INTERSTATE OR FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS" 
 
   (a) Whoever-- 
 
   (1) in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign  
communication by means of [telephone] TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
DEVICE-- 
 
   (A) [makes any comment, request, suggestion or proposal]  
MAKES, TRANSMITS, OR OTHERWISE MAKES AVAILABLE ANY 
COMMENT,REQUEST, SUGGESTION, PROPOSAL, IMAGE, OR OTHER 
COMMUNICATION which is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent; 
 
   [(B) makes a telephone call, whether or not conversation ensues,  
without disclosing his identity and with intent to annoy, abuse,  
threaten, or harass any person at the called number;] 
 
 
"(B) MAKES A TELEPHONE CALL OR UTILIZES A TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
DEVICE, WHETHER OR NOT CONVERSATION OR COMMUNICATIONS 
ENSUES, WITHOUT DISCLOSING HIS IDENTITY AND WITH INTENT TO ANNOY, 
ABUSE, THREATEN, OR HARASS ANY PERSON AT THE CALLED NUMBER OR 
WHO RECEIVES THE COMMUNICATION; 
 
 
   (C) makes or causes the telephone of another repeatedly or continuously to ring, with intent 
to harass any person at the called number; or 
 
   [(D) makes repeated telephone calls, during which conversation ensues, solely to harass 
any person at the called number; or] 
 
(D) MAKES REPEATED TELEPHONE CALLS OR REPEATEDLY INITIATES 
COMMUNICATION WITH A TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEVICE, DURING WHICH 
CONVERSATION OR COMMUNICATION ENSUES, SOLELY TO HARASS ANY 
PERSON AT THE CALLED NUMBER OR WHO RECEIVES THE COMMUNICATION, 
 
   (2) knowingly permits any [telephone facility]  
TELECOMMUNICATIONS FACILITY under his control to be used for any purpose 
prohibited by this section, shall be fined not more than $[50,000]100,000 or imprisoned  not 
more than [six months] TWO YEARS, or both. 
                                          
   (b)(1) Whoever knowingly-- 
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   (A) within the United States, by means of [telephone] TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
DEVICCE, makes (directly or by recording device) any obscene communication for 
commercial purposes to any person, regardless of whether the maker of such communication 
placed the call or INITIATED THE COMMUNICATION; or 
         
  (B) permits any [telephone facility] TELECOMMUNICATIONS FACILITY under such 
person's control to be used for an activity prohibited by subparagraph (A), shall be fined in 
accordance with title 18, United States Code, or imprisoned not more than two  
years, or both. 
 
   (2) Whoever knowingly-- 
 
   (A) within the United States, [by means of telephone],  
makes BY MEANS OF TELEPHONE OR TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEVICE, MAKES, 
TRANSMITS, OR MAKES AVAILABLE(directly or by recording device) any  
indecent communication for commercial purposes which is available to any person under 18 
years of age or to any other person without that person's consent, regardless of whether the 
maker of such communication placed the call OR INITIATED THE COMMUNICATION; 
or                                            
 
   (B) permits any [telephone facility] TELECOMMUNICATIONS FACILITY under such 
person's control to be used for an activity prohibited by subparagraph (A), shall be fined not 
more than $[50,000] 100,000 or imprisoned not more than [six months] 
TWO YEARS, or both.  
 
    (3) It is a defense to prosecution under paragraph (2) of this subsection that the defendant 
restrict access to the prohibited communication to persons 18 years of age or older in 
accordance with subsection (c) of this section and with such procedures as the  
Commission may prescribe by regulation. 
 
   (4) In addition to the penalties under paragraph (1), whoever, within the United States, 
intentionally violates paragraph (1) or (2) shall be subject to a fine of not more than 
$[50,000] 100,000 for each violation. For purposes of this paragraph, each  
day of violation shall constitute a separate violation. 
 
   (5)(A) In addition to the penalties under paragraphs (1), (2), and (5), whoever, within the 
United States, violates paragraph (1) or (2) shall be subject to a civil fine of not more than 
$[50,000] 100,000 for each violation. For purposes of this paragraph, each  
day of violation shall constitute a separate violation. 
 
   (B) A fine under this paragraph may be assessed either-- 
 
   (i) by a court, pursuant to civil action by the Commission or any attorney employed by the 
Commission who is designated by the Commission for such purposes, or 
 
   (ii) by the Commission after appropriate administrative proceedings. 
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(6) The Attorney General may bring a suit in the appropriate district court of the United 
States to enjoin any act or practice which violates paragraph (1) or (2). An injunction may be 
granted in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
 
   (c)(1) A common carrier within the District of Columbia or within any State, or in 
interstate or foreign commerce, shall not, to the extent technically feasible, provide access to 
a communication specified in subsection (b) from the telephone of any subscriber who has 
not previously requested in writing the carrier to provide access to such communication if the 
carrier collects from subscribers an identifiable charge for such communication that the 
carrier remits, in whole or in part, to the provider of such communication. 
 
   (2) Except as provided in paragraph (3), no cause of action may be brought in any court or 
administrative agency against any common carrier, or any of its affiliates, including their 
officers, directors, employees, agents, or authorized representatives on account of-- 
 
   (A) any action which the carrier demonstrates was taken in good faith to restrict access 
pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection; or  
 
   (B) any access permitted--   (i) in good faith reliance upon the lack of any representation by 
a provider of communications that communications provided by  
that provider are communications specified in subsection (b), or (ii) because a specific 
representation by the provider did not allow the carrier, acting in good faith, a sufficient 
period to restrict access to communications described in subsection (b). 
 
   (3) Notwithstanding paragraph (2) of this subsection, a provider of communications 
services to which subscribers are denied access pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection 
may bring an action for a declaratory judgment or similar action in a court. Any such action 
shall be limited to the question of whether the communications which the provider seeks to 
provide fall within the category of communications to which the carrier will provide access 
only to subscribers who have previously requested such  
access. 
 
*This proposal is cited from Center for Democracy and Technology, An Analysis of 
S314, March 9, 1995. available at 
http://www.cdt.org/speech/cda/950309s314analysis.html. 
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APPENDIX TWO 
 
EXON’S SECOND AMENDMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TITLE 47.  TELEGRAPHS, TELEPHONES, AND RADIOTELEGRAPHS   
CHAPTER 5.  WIRE OR RADIO COMMUNICATION   
COMMON CARRIERS 
 
47 USCS | 223 (1992) 
 
| 223.  [Obscene or harassing telephone calls in the District 
of Columbia or in interstate or foreign communications] 
 
OBSCENE OR HARASSING UTILIZATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS  
DEVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA OR IN  
INTERSTATE OR FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS" 
 
   (a) Whoever-- 
 
   (1) in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign  
communication by means of [telephone] TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
DEVICE-- 
 
  [ (A) makes any comment, request, suggestion or proposal which is obscene,  
lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent;] 
 
   (A) KNOWINGLY -- 
         
        (i)  MAKES, CREATES, OR SOLICITS, AND 
        (ii) INITIATES THE TRANSMISSION OF, 
 
ANY COMMENT, REQUEST, SUGGESTION, PROPOSAL, IMAGE, OR OTHER 
COMMUNICATION  
 
Substantial changes from previous version include: 
 
-- the term 'knowingly' has been added to section (a)(1)(A) 
-- additional defenses have been added in subsection (d) 
 
**NOTE:         [] = deleted  
                                ALL CAPS = additions 
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WHICH IS OBSCENE, LEWD, LASCIVIOUS, FILTHY, OR INDECENT; 
 
   (B) makes a telephone call, whether or not conversation ensues,  
without disclosing his identity and with intent to annoy, abuse,  
threaten, or harass any person at the called number; 
 
   (C) makes or causes the telephone of another repeatedly or  
continuously to ring, with intent to harass any person at the  
called number; or 
 
   (D) makes repeated telephone calls, during which conversation  
ensues, solely to harass any person at the called number; or 
 
   (2) knowingly permits any [telephone] TELECOMMUNICATIONS facility 
under his control to be used for any purpose prohibited by this section, shall  
be fined not more than $[50,000]100,000 or imprisoned  not more than [six  
months] TWO YEARS, or both. 
                                          
   (b)(1) Whoever knowingly-- 
 
   [(A) within the United States, by means of telephone, makes (directly or by  
recording device) any obscene communication for commercial purposes to any  
person, regardless of whether the maker of such communication placed the  
call;] 
 
    (A) WITHIN THE UNITED STATES, BY MEANS OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
DEVICE -- 
 
        (i)  MAKES, CREATES, OR SOLICITS, AND 
        (ii) PURPOSEFULLY MAKES AVAILABLE, 
 
ANY OBSCENE COMMUNICATION FOR COMMERCIAL PURPOSES TO ANY 
PERSON, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE MAKER OF SUCH COMMUNICATION 
PLACED THE CALL OR INITIATED THE  
COMMUNICATION; OR 
         
  (B) permits any [telephone facility] TELECOMMUNICATIONS FACILITY under such 
person's control to be used for an activity prohibited by subparagraph (A), shall be fined in 
accordance with title 18, United States Code, or imprisoned not more than two  
years, or both. 
 
   (2) Whoever knowingly-- 
 
  [ (A) within the United States, by means of telephone, makes (directly or by recording 
device) any indecent communication for commercial purposes which is available to any 
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person under 18 years of age or to any other person withoutthat person's consent, regardless 
of whether the maker of such  communication placed the call; or ] 
 
   (A) WITH THE UNITED STATES, BY MEANS OF TELEPHONE OR 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEVICE, 
 
        (i)  MAKES, CREATES, OR SOLICITS, AND 
        (ii) PURPOSEFULLY MAKES AVAILABLE (DIRECTLY OR BY RECORDING 
DEVICE) 
 
ANY INDECENT COMMUNICATIONS FOR COMMERCIAL PURPOSES WHICH IS 
AVAILABLE TO ANY PERSON UNDER 18 YEARS OF AGE OR TO ANY OTHER 
PERSON WITHOUT THAT PERSON'S CONSENT, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE 
MAKER OF SUCH COMMUNICATION PLACED THE  
CALL; OR 
                                                 
   (B) permits any [telephone facility] TELECOMMUNICATIONS FACILITY under such 
person's control to be used for an activity prohibited by subparagraph (A), shall be fined not 
more than $[50,000] 100,000 or imprisoned not more than [six months] 
TWO YEARS, or both. 
 
   (3) It is a defense to prosecution under paragraph (2) of this subsection that the defendant 
restrict access to the prohibited communication to persons 18 years of age or older in 
accordance with subsection (c) of this section and with such procedures as the  
Commission may prescribe by regulation. 
 
   (4) In addition to the penalties under paragraph (1), whoever, within the United States, 
intentionally violates paragraph (1) or (2) shall be subject to a fine of not more than 
$[50,000] 100,000 for each violation. For purposes of this paragraph, each  
day of violation shall constitute a separate violation. 
 
   (5)(A) In addition to the penalties under paragraphs (1), (2), and (5), whoever, within the 
United States, violates paragraph (1) or (2) shall be subject to a civil fine of not more than 
$[50,000] 100,000 for each violation. For purposes of this paragraph, each  
day of violation shall constitute a separate violation. 
 
   (B) A fine under this paragraph may be assessed either-- 
 
   (i) by a court, pursuant to civil action by the Commission or any attorney employed by the 
Commission who is designated by the Commission for such purposes, or 
 
   (ii) by the Commission after appropriate administrative proceedings. 
 
   (6) The Attorney General may bring a suit in the appropriate district court of the United 
States to enjoin any act or practice which violates paragraph (1) or (2). An injunction may be 
granted in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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   (c)(1) A common carrier within the District of Columbia or  
within any State, or in interstate or foreign commerce, shall not, to the extent technically 
feasible, provide access to a communication specified in subsection (b) from the 
[telephone] TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEVICE  of any subscriber who has not  
previously requested in writing the carrier to provide access to such communication if the 
carrier collects from subscribers an identifiable charge for such communication that the 
carrier remits, in whole or in part, to the provider of such communication. 
 
   (2) Except as provided in paragraph (3), no cause of action may be brought in any court or 
administrative agency against any common carrier, or any of its affiliates, including their 
officers, directors, employees, agents, or authorized representatives on account of-- 
 
   (A) any action which the carrier demonstrates was taken in good faith to restrict access 
pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection; or  
 
   (B) any access permitted— 
   (i) in good faith reliance upon the lack of any representation by a provider of 
communications that communications provided by that provider are communications 
specified in subsection (b), or   (ii) because a specific representation by the provider did not 
allow the carrier, acting in good faith, a sufficient period to restrict access to communications 
described in subsection (b). 
 
   (3) Notwithstanding paragraph (2) of this subsection, a provider of communications 
services to which subscribers are denied access pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection 
may bring an action for a declaratory judgment or similar action in a court. Any such action 
shall be limited to the question of whether the communications which the provider seeks to 
provide fall within the category of communications to which the carrier will provide access 
only to subscribers who have previously requested such  
access. 
 
        (d) ADDITIONAL DEFENSES; RESTRICTIONS ON ACCESS; JUDICIAL 
REMEDIES RESPECTING RESTRICTIONS. -- 
 
                (1) NO PERSON SHALL BE HELD TO HAVE VIOLATED THIS SECTION 
WITH RESPECT TO ANY ACTION BY THAT PERSON OR A SYSTEM UNDER HIS 
CONTROL THAT IS LIMITED SOLELY TO THE PROVISION OF ACCESS, 
INCLUDING TRANSMISSION, DOWNLOADING, INTERMEDIATE STORAGE, 
NAVIGATIONAL TOOLS, AND RELATED CAPABILITIES NOT INVOLVING THE 
CREATION OR ALTERATION OF THE CONTENT OF THE COMMUNICATIONS, 
FOR OTHER PERSON'S COMMUNICATIONS TO OR FROM A SERVICE, FACILITY, 
SYSTEM, OR NETWORK NOT UNDER THAT PERSON'S CONTROL. 
 
                (2) IT IS A DEFENSE TO PROSECUTION UDER SUBSECTIONS (a)(2), 
(b)(1(B), AND (b)(2)(B) THAT A DEFENDANT LACKED EDITORIAL CONTROL 
OVER THE COMMUNICATIONS SPECIFIED IN THIS SECTION. 
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                (3) IT IS A DEFENSE TO PROSECUTION UNDER SUBSECTIONS 
(a)(2), (b)(1)(B), AND (b)(2)(B) THAT A DEFENDANT HAS TAKEN GOOD FAITH, 
REASONABLE STEPS, AS APPROPRIATE -- 
 
                        (A) TO PROVIDE USERS WITH THE MEANS TO RESTRICT     
            ACCESS TO COMMUNICATIONS DESCRIBED IN THIS SECTION; 
 
                        (B) PROVIDE USERS WITH WARNINGS CONCERNING THE      
    POTENTIAL FOR ACCESS TO SUCH COMMUNICATIONS; 
 
                        (C) TO RESPOND TO COMPLAINTS FROM THOSE WHO ARE     
            SUBJECTED TO SUCH COMMUNICATIONS; 
 
                        (D) TO PROVIDE MECHANISMS TO ENFORCE A PROVIDER'S   
            TERMS OF SERVICE GOVERNING SUCH COMMUNICATIONS; OR 
 
                        (E) TO IMPLEMENT SUCH OTHER MEASURES AS THE         
            COMMISSION MAY PRESCRIBE TO CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES OF THIS 
PARAGRAPH. NOTHING IN THIS SECTION IN AND OF ITSELF SHOULD BE 
CONSTRUED TO TREAT ENHANCED INFORMATION SERVICES AS COMMON 
CARRIAGE. 
 
                (4) INADDITION TO OTHER DEFENSES AUTHORIZED UNDER THIS 
SECTION, IT SHALL BE A DEFENSE TO PROSECUTION UNDER SECTION (b) THAT 
A DEFENDANT IS NOT ENGAGED IN A COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY THAT HAS AS A 
PREDOMINATE  PURPOSE AN ACTIVITY SPECIFIED IN THAT SUBSECTION. 
 
                (5) NO CAUSE OF ACTION MAY BE BROUGHT IN ANY COURT OR ANY 
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY AGAINST ANY PERSON ON ACCOUNT OF ANY 
ACTION WHICH THE PERSON HAS TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH TO IMPLEMENT A 
DEFENSE AUTHORIZED UNDER THIS SECTION OR OTHERWISE TO RESTRICT 
OR PREVENT THE TRANSMISSION OF, OR ACCESS TO, A COMMUNICATION 
SPECIFIED IN THIS SECTION. THE PRECEDING SENTENCE SHALL NOT APPLY 
WHERE THE GOOD FAITH DEFENSES UNDER SUBSECTION (c)(2) APPLY. 
 
        (6) NO STATE OR LOCAL GOVERNMENT MAY IMPOSE ANY LIABILITY IN 
CONNECTION WITH A VIOLATION DESCRIBED IN SUBSECTION (a)(2), (b)(1)(B), 
(b)(2)(B) THAT IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE TREATMENT OF THOSE 
VIOLATIONS UNDER THIS SECTION PROVIDED, HOWEVER, THAT NOTHING 
HEREIN SHALL PRECLUDE ANY STATE OR LOCAL GOVERNMENT FROM 
ENACTING AND ENFORCING COMPLEMENTARY OVERSIGHT, LIABILITY, AND 
REGULATORY SYSTEMS, PROCEDURES, AND REQUIREMENTS SO LONG AS 
SUCH SYSTEMS, PROCEDURES, AND REQUIREMENTS GOVERN ONLY 
INTRASTATE SERVICES AND DO NOT RESULT IN THE IMPOSITION OF 
INCONSISTENT OBLIGATIONS ON THE PROVISION OF INTERSTATE SERVICES. 
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        (e) FOR PURPOSES OF SUBSECTION (a) AND (b), THE TERM 'KNOWINGLY' 
MEANS AN INTENTIONAL ACT WITH ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE SPECIFIC 
CONTENT OF THE COMMUNICATION SPECIFIED IN THIS SECTION TO ANOTHER 
PERSON. 
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APPENDIX 3. 
 
THE ORIGINAL VERSION OF COX-WYDEN BILL (H.R.1978) 
H.R. 1978 
 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
Mr. Cox (for himself and Mr. Wyden) introduced the following bill; which was referred to 
the Committee on ____  
A BILL 
 
To encourage and protect private sector initiatives that improve user control over computer 
information services.  
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in 
Congress assembled  
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE  
This Act may be cited as the "Internet Freedom and Family Empowerment Act".  
SEC. 2. ONLINE FAMILY EMPOWERMNET  
Title II of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. et seq.) is amended by adding at the 
end the following new section:  
"SEC. 230. PROTECTION FOR PRIVATE BLOCKING AND SCREENING OF 
OFFENSIVE MATERIAL; FCC CONTENT AND ECONOMIC REGULATION OF 
COMPUTER SERVICES PROHIBITED.  
"(a) FINDINGS. -- The Congress finds the following:  
"(1) The rapidly developing array of Internet and other interactive computer service 
available to individual Americans represent an extraordinary advance in the 
availability of educational and informational resources to our citizens.  
"(2) These services offer users a great degree of control over the information that they 
receive, as well as the potential for even greater control in the future as technology 
develops.  
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"(3) The Internet and other interactive computer services offer a forum for a true 
diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and 
myriad avenues for intellectual activity.  
"(4) The Internet and other interactive computer services have flourished, to the 
benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government regulation.  
"(5) Increasingly Americans are relying on interactive media for a variety of political, 
educational, cultural and entertainment services.  
"(b) POLICY.-- It is the policy of the United States to--  
"(1) promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive 
computer services and other interactive media;  
"(2) preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the 
Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Sate or Federal 
regulation;  
"(3) encourage the development of technologies which maximize user control over 
the information received by individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet 
and other interactive computer services;  
"(4) remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and 
filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict their children's access to 
objectionable or inappropriate online material; and  
"(5) ensure vigorous enforcement of criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in 
obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of computer.  
"(c) PROTECTION FOR 'GOOD SAMARITAN' BLOCKING AND SCREENING OF 
OFFENSIVE MATERIAL.-- No provider or user of interactive computer services shall be 
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by an information content 
provider. No provider or user or interactive computer services shall be held liable on account 
of --  
"(1) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to material that the 
provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, 
harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally 
protected; or  
"(2) any action to make available to information content providers or others the 
technical means to restrict access to material described in paragraph (1).  
"(d) FCC REGULATION OF THE INTERNET AND OTHER INTERACTIVE 
COMPUTER SERVICES PROHIBITED.-- Nothing in this Act shall be construed to grant 
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any jurisdiction or authority to the Commission with respect to content or other regulation of 
the Internet or other interactive computer services.  
"(e) EFFECT ON OTHER LAWS.--  
"(1) NO EFFECT ON CRIMINAL LAW.-- Nothing in this section shall be construed 
to impair the enforcement of section 223 of this Act, chapter 71 (relating to 
obscenity) or 110 (relating to sexual exploitation of children) of title 18, United States 
Code, or any other Federal criminal statute.  
"(2) NO EFFECT ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW.-- Nothing in this 
section shall be construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual 
property.  
"(3) IN GENERAL.-- Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent any State 
from enforcing any State law that is consistent with this section.  
"(f) DEFINITIONS.-- As used in this section:  
"(1) INTERNET.-- The term 'Internet' means the international computer network of 
both Federal and non-Federal interoperable packet switched data networks.  
"(2) INTERACTIVE COMPUTER SERVICE.-- The term 'interactive computer 
service' means any information service that provides computer access to multiple 
users via modem to a remote computer server, including specifically a service that 
provides access to the Internet.  
"(3) INFORMATION CONTENT PROVIDER.-- The term 'information content 
provider means any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the 
creation or development of information provided by the Internet or any other 
computer service, including any person or entity that creates or develops blocking or 
screening software or other techniques to permit user control over offensive material.  
"(4) INFORMATION SERVICE.-- The term 'information service' means the offering 
of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, 
utilizing, or making available information via telecommunications, and includes 
electronic publishing, but does not include any use of such capability for the 
management, control, or operation of a telecommunications system or the 
management of a telecommunications service."  
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APPENDIX FOUR 
 
THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT OF 1996 
(Section 223 & Section 230) 
 
TITLE V OBSCENITY AND VIOLENCE Subtitle A Obscene, Harassing, and Wrongful 
Utilization of Telecommunications Facilities 
 
SEC. 501. SHORT TITLE. 
 
This title may be cited as the "Communications Decency Act of 1996". 
 
SEC. 502. OBSCENE OR HARASSING USE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
FACILITIES UNDER THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934. 
 
Section 223 (47 U.S.C. 223) is amended 
 
(1) by striking subsection (a) and inserting in lieu thereof: 
 
"(a) Whoever 
 
"(1) in interstate or foreign communications 
 
"(A) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly 
 
"(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and 
 
"(ii) initiates the transmission of, any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or 
other communication which is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent, with intent to 
annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass another person; 
 
"(B) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly 
 
"(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and 
 
"(ii) initiates the transmission of, any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or 
other communication which is obscene or indecent, knowing that the recipient of the 
communication is under 18 years of age, regardless of whether the maker of such 
communication placed the call or initiated the communication; 
 
"(C) makes a telephone call or utilizes a telecommunications device, whether or not 
conversation or communication ensues, without disclosing his identity and with intent to 
annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass any person at the called number or who receives the 
communications; 
 
"(D) makes or causes the telephone of another repeatedly or continuously to ring, with intent 
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to harass any person at the called number; or 
 
"(E) makes repeated telephone calls or repeatedly initiates communication with a 
telecommunications device, during which conversation or communication ensues, solely to 
harass any person at the called number or who receives the communication; or 
 
"(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under his control to be used for any 
activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that it be used for such activity, 
shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, or imprisoned not more than two years, or 
both."; and 
 
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsections: 
 
"(d) Whoever 
 
"(1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly 
 
"(A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a specific person or persons under 18 
years of age, or 
 
"(B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a manner available to a person under 
18 years of age, any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication 
that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by 
contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs, regardless of 
whether the user of such service placed the call or initiated the communication; or 
 
"(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under such persons control to be 
used for an activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that it be used for such 
activity, shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, or imprisoned not more than two 
years, or both. 
 
"(e) In addition to any other defenses available by law: 
 
"(1) No person shall be held to have violated subsection (a) or (d) solely for providing access 
or connection to or from a facility, system, or network not under that persons control, 
including transmission, downloading, intermediate storage, access software, or other related 
capabilities that are incidental to providing such access or connection that does not include 
the creation of the content of the communication. 
 
"(2) The defenses provided by paragraph (1) of this subsection shall not be applicable to a 
person who is a conspirator with an entity actively involved in the creation or knowing 
distribution of communications that violate this section, or who knowingly advertises the 
availability of such communications. 
 
"(3) The defenses provided in paragraph (1) of this subsection shall not be applicable to a 
person who provides access or connection to a facility, system, or network engaged in the 
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violation of this section that is owned or controlled by such person. 
 
"(4) No employer shall be held liable under this section for the actions of an employee or 
agent unless the employees or agents conduct is within the scope of his or her employment or 
agency and the employer (A) having knowledge of such conduct, authorizes or ratifies such 
conduct, or (B) recklessly disregards such conduct. 
 
"(5) It is a defense to a prosecution under subsection (a)(1)(B) or (d), or under subsection 
(a)(2) with respect to the use of a facility for an activity under subsection (a)(1)(B) that a 
person 
 
"(A) has taken, in good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions under the 
circumstances to restrict or prevent access by minors to a communication specified in such 
subsections, which may involve any appropriate measures to restrict minors from such 
communications, including any method which is feasible under available technology; or 
 
"(B) has restricted access to such communication by requiring use of a verified credit card, 
debit account, adult access code, or adult personal identification number. 
 
"(6) The Commission may describe measures which are reasonable, effective, and 
appropriate to restrict access to prohibited communications under subsection (d). Nothing in 
this section authorizes the Commission to enforce, or is intended to provide the Commission 
with the authority to approve, sanction, or permit, the use of such measures. The Commission 
shall have no enforcement authority over the failure to utilize such measures. The 
Commission shall not endorse specific products relating to such measures. The use of such 
measures shall be admitted as evidence of good faith efforts for purposes of paragraph (5) in 
any action arising under subsection (d). Nothing in this section shall be construed to treat 
interactive computer services as common carriers or telecommunications carriers. 
 
"(f)(1) No cause of action may be brought in any court or administrative agency against any 
person on account of any activity that is not in violation of any law punishable by criminal or 
civil penalty, and that the person has taken in good faith to implement a defense authorized 
under this section or otherwise to restrict or prevent the transmission of, or access to, a 
communication specified in this section. 
 
"(2) No State or local government may impose any liability for commercial activities or 
actions by commercial entities, nonprofit libraries, or institutions of higher education in 
connection with an activity or action described in subsection (a)(2) or (d) that is inconsistent 
with the treatment of those activities or actions under this section: Provided, however, That 
nothing herein shall preclude any State or local government from enacting and enforcing 
complementary oversight, liability, and regulatory systems, procedures, and requirements, so 
long as such systems, procedures, and requirements govern only intrastate services and do 
not result in the imposition of inconsistent rights, duties or obligations on the provision of 
interstate services. Nothing in this subsection shall preclude any State or local government 
from governing conduct not covered by this section. 
 
  201
"(g) Nothing in subsection (a), (d), (e), or (f) or in the defenses to prosecution under (a) or (d) 
shall be construed to affect or limit the application or enforcement of any other Federal law. 
 
"(h) For purposes of this section 
 
"(1) The use of the term elecommunications device in this section 
 
"(A) shall not impose new obligations on broadcasting station licensees and cable operators 
covered by obscenity and indecency provisions elsewhere in this Act; and 
 
"(B) does not include an interactive computer service. 
 
"(2) The term nteractive computer service has the meaning provided in section 230(e)(2). 
 
"(3) The term ccess software means software (including client or server software) or enabling 
tools that do not create or provide the content of the communication but that allow a user to 
do any one or more of the following: 
 
"(A) filter, screen, allow, or disallow content; 
 
"(B) pick, choose, analyze, or digest content; or 
 
"(C) transmit, receive, display, forward, cache, search, subset, organize, reorganize, or 
translate content. 
 
"(4) The term nstitution of higher education has the meaning provided in section 1201 of the 
Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1141). 
 
"(5) The term ibrary means a library eligible for participation in State-based plans for funds 
under title III of the Library Services and Construction Act (20 U.S.C. 355e et seq.).". 
 
SEC. 509. ONLINE FAMILY EMPOWERMENT. 
 
Title II of the Communications Act of 1934 (47   U.S.C. 201 et seq.) is 
 
amended by adding at the end the following new section: 
 
"SEC. 230. PROTECTION FOR PRIVATE BLOCKING AND SCREENING OF 
OFFENSIVE MATERIAL 
 
 "(a) FINDINGS.-The Congress finds the following: 
 
    "(1) The rapidly developing array of Internet and other interactive  computer services 
available to individual Americans represent an extraordinary advance in the availability of 
educational and informational resources to our citizens. 
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    "(2) These services offer users a great degree of control over the information that they 
receive, as well as the potential for even greater control in the future as technology develops. 
 
    "(3) The Internet and other interactive computer services offer a forum for a true diversity 
of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for 
intellectual activity. 
 
    "(4) The Internet and other interactive computer services have flourished, to the benefit of 
all Americans. with a minimum of government regulation. 
 
    "(5) Increasingly Americans are relying on interactive media for a variety of political, 
educational, cultural, and entertainment services. 
 
 "(b) POLICY.- It is the policy of the United States- 
 
    "(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer 
services and other interactive media; 
 
"(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the 
Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation; 
 
    "(3) to encourage the development of technologies which maximize user control over what 
in formation is received by individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and other 
interactive computer services; 
 
    "(4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering 
technologies that empower parents to restrict  their children's access to objectionable or 
inappropriate online material; and 
 
    "(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish 
trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of computer. 
 
 "(c) PROTECTION FOR 'GOOD SAMARITAN BLOCKING AND SCREENING OF 
OFFENSIVE  MATERIAL.- 
 
    "(1) TREATMENT OF PUBLISHER OR SPEAKER.-No provider or user of an 
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider. 
 
    "(2) CIVIL LIABILITY.-No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be 
held liable on account of 
 
      "(A) any- action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of 
material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, 
excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is 
constitutionally protected; or 
  203
 
      "(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers or 
others the technical means to restrict access to material described in paragraph (1). 
 
 "(d) EFFECT ON OTHER LAWS. 
 
    "(1) NO EFFECT ON CRIMINAL. LAW.-Nothing in this section shall be construed to 
impair the enforcement of section 223 of this Act, chapter 71 (relating to obscenity) or 110 
(relating to exploitation of children) of title 18, United States Code, or any other Federal 
criminal statute. 
 
    "(2) NO EFFECT ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW.-Nothing in this section 
 shall be construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property. 
 
    "(3) STATE LAW.-Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent any State from 
enforcing any State law that is consistent with this section. No cause of action may be 
brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is in consistent 
with this section. 
 
    "(4) NO EFFECT ON COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY LAW.-Nothing in this 
section shall be construed to limit the application of the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act of 1986 or any of the amendments made by such Act, or any similar State law. 
  
"(f) DEFINITIONS.-As used in this section: 
 
    "(1) INTERNET.-The term 'Internet' means the international computer network of both 
Federal and non-Federal interoperable packet switched data networks. 
 
    "(2) INTERACTIVE COMPUTER SERVICE.-The term 'interactive computer service' 
means an information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables 
computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or 
system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by 
libraries or educational institutions. 
 
   "(3) INFORMATION CONTENT PROVIDER.-The term 'information content provider' 
means any per son or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or 
development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer 
service. 
 
   "(4) ACCESS SOFTWARE PROVIDER.-The term 'access software provider' means a 
provider of software (including client or server software), or enabling tools that do any one or 
more of the following 
     "(A) filter, screen, allow, or disallow content; 
 
    "(B) pick, choose, analyze, or digest content; or 
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     "(C) transmit, receive, display, forward cache, search, subset, organize, reorganize, or 
translate content.". 
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